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Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability 
Benjamin N. Roin 
The role of the patent system in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is 
widely seen as a tremendous success story.  This view overlooks a serious short-
coming in the drug patent system: the standards by which drugs are deemed 
unpatentable under the novelty and nonobviousness requirements bear little re-
lationship to the social value of those drugs or the need for a patent to motivate 
their development.  If the idea for a drug is not novel or is obvious—perhaps 
because it was disclosed in an earlier publication or made to look obvious by 
recent scientific advances—then it cannot be patented.  Yet, the mere idea for a 
drug alone is generally of little value to the public.  Without clinical trials prov-
ing the drug’s safety and efficacy, which is a prerequisite for approval by the 
Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)  and  acceptance  by  the  medical 
community,  that  drug  is  unlikely  to  benefit  the  public.    Given  the  immense 
investment  needed  to fund clinical trials  on  drugs and  the ability of generic 
manufacturers to rely on those tests to secure regulatory approval for their own 
products, pharmaceutical companies are rarely willing to develop drugs without 
patent protection.  The novelty and nonobviousness requirements make no con-
cession for the development costs of inventions and thus cause patents to be 
withheld from drugs that are unlikely to reach the public without that protection.  
This gap in the patent system for drugs has created a pervasive problem in the 
pharmaceutical industry, causing firms to regularly screen their drugs during 
the  research-and-development  process  and  discard  ones  with  weak  patent 
protection.  The harm to the public from the loss of these drugs is potentially 
quite significant.  Congress can easily avoid this problem by ensuring that the 
successful completion of the FDA’s rigorous clinical-trial process is rewarded 
with a lengthy exclusivity period enforced by the FDA. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127742
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I.  Introduction 
Pharmaceutical patents are often held out as an example of the patent 
system at its best.
1  It is widely accepted that patents play an essential role in 
motivating  private  investment  in  pharmaceutical  R&D,  and  those  invest-
ments  have  yielded  tremendous  social  gains  through  the  resulting 
introduction of new drugs.  For this  reason, pharmaceutical innovation is 
thought to be the patent system’s greatest success story. 
Amid  this  general  optimism  about  the  effectiveness  of  patents  in 
promoting  pharmaceutical  innovation,  scholars  have  overlooked  a  critical 
flaw in the system: socially valuable drugs often cannot be patented even 
though  they  are  unlikely  to  be  developed  for  public  use  without  that 
protection.  If the idea for a drug is not novel or is obvious—perhaps because 
it was disclosed in an earlier publication or made to look obvious by recent 
scientific advances—then it cannot be patented.  Yet the mere idea for a drug 
 
1. See,  e.g.,  JAMES  BESSEN  &  MICHAEL J.  MEURER,  PATENT  FAILURE:  HOW  JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, A N D  LAWYERS  PUT  INNOVATORS  AT  RISK  88–89  (2008)  (noting  the  great 
importance  of  patents  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry  in  comparison  to  most  other  industries); 
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT 
SYSTEM  IS  ENDANGERING  INNOVATION  AND  PROGRESS, A N D  WHAT  TO  DO  ABOUT  IT  39–41 
(2004) (noting that patents provide incentives for costly drug development that would not otherwise 
occur). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  505 
 
 
alone is generally of little value to the public.  Without clinical trials proving 
the drug’s safety and efficacy—a prerequisite for approval by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and acceptance by the medical community—that 
drug is unlikely to benefit the public.  Given the immense investment needed 
to fund clinical trials on drugs and the ability of generic manufacturers to rely 
on those tests to secure regulatory approval for their own products, pharma-
ceutical  companies  are  rarely  willing  to  develop  drugs  without  patent 
protection.  The novelty and nonobviousness requirements make no conces-
sion for the development costs of inventions and thus cause patents to be 
withheld  from  drugs  that  are  unlikely  to  reach  the  public  without  such 
protection.  This gap in the patent system for drugs has created a serious 
problem, causing firms to regularly screen their drugs in R&D and discard 
ones with weak patent protection.  The potential harm to the public from the 
loss of these drugs may be enormous. 
Part  I  of  this  Article  describes  how  the  public  currently  depends  on 
patents to promote pharmaceutical innovation and how it benefits from the 
system via the introduction of new drugs.  At a time when many scholars be-
lieve that patents often do more harm than good,
2 the pharmaceutical industry 
is  widely  thought  to  showcase  the  benefits  of  patents.
3    Pharmaceutical 
companies spend hundreds of millions of dollars on clinical trials to satisfy 
the FDA’s safety and efficacy standards, while generic drugs are exempted 
from those requirements and enter the market at minimal cost.  Without some 
way to postpone competition from generics, pharmaceutical companies can-
not recoup their R&D costs in the competitive market.  Under the protection 
of a patent, firms are able to delay generic entry for ten to fourteen years on 
average, providing time to profit from their R&D efforts.  The promise of 
that reward spurs private industry to invest billions of dollars in pharmaceuti-
cal  R&D  each  year,  and  those  investments  have  yielded  immense  social 
returns in the form of valuable new medical treatments.  The public pays a 
price  for  this  progress  because  patented  drugs  typically  cost  substantially 
more than generics, and consumers suffer from those high prices for the du-
ration of the patent term.  Without patents, however, the large majority of 
drugs likely would not be developed, and the health gains they produce might 
never be realized. 
Part II identifies a previously unrecognized and serious defect in the 
patent system for pharmaceuticals: put simply, not all drugs are patentable, 
 
2. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 14–16 (showing that patent-defense litigation 
costs are often greater than the profits derived from patents); COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 35–38 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter PATENT SYSTEM] 
(noting the “uncertain benefits” of patents in most industries); FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: 
THE PROPER BALANCE  OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 30, 34–41, 44, 50–55 
(2003) (discussing problems that patents cause in the computer-hardware and software industries). 
3. See, e.g., FTC, supra note 2, at 14 (concluding that patents are “critical” to innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry). 506  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
and there is little reason to believe that the drugs denied protection are any 
less valuable than patentable drugs.  The theoretical point underlying this 
observation is straightforward.  Whenever the costs of developing and com-
mercializing an invention are both substantial and vulnerable to free riding 
(as is the case with most drugs), patents can be essential for promoting those 
post-invention efforts.  Under the novelty and nonobviousness requirements, 
however, patents are denied to inventions when the idea for them is not new 
or is obvious, regardless of whether a patent is needed for their development.  
Those doctrines can therefore prevent valuable inventions from reaching the 
public.  To this author’s knowledge, this Article is the first to recognize that 
the novelty requirement can deter innovation when development and com-
mercialization  costs  are  high.    With  respect  to  the  nonobviousness 
requirement, other scholars have noted the potential for such a problem, but 
the issue has received little attention in the literature, and its implications for 
the pharmaceutical industry have been largely overlooked. 
Subpart  II(A)  analyzes  the  novelty  requirement  for  pharmaceuticals, 
demonstrating how it frequently interferes with the patenting of potentially 
valuable drugs.  In the pharmaceutical industry, merely disclosing the idea 
for a drug can prevent it from later being patented.  Although researchers 
generally  try  to  patent  the  new  drugs  they  discover,  current  law  allows 
seemingly insignificant disclosures to undermine the novelty of drugs, which 
makes it easy for researchers to unwittingly disclose their discoveries.  In 
university laboratories, the pressure to publish often leads researchers to dis-
close new drugs prematurely.  Private industry may be an even worse culprit, 
with companies regularly filing overly broad patent applications to establish 
priority  over  large  numbers  of  potential  new  drugs.    As  their  research 
advances, the companies typically disclaim most of those compounds from 
their applications, leaving only the prior disclosure of the drugs.  Practices 
such as these have created a significant body of potentially valuable drugs 
that cannot be patented. 
Subpart II(B) examines the nonobviousness requirement’s effect as an 
impediment  to  drug  patenting.    Much  like  the  novelty  requirement,  the 
nonobviousness requirement denies patents to drugs before they have been 
developed  and  made  available  to  the public.    Its  consequences  are  likely 
more perverse than those of the novelty standard, however, since “obvious” 
drugs are defined as ones that would have been reasonably expected to suc-
ceed at the time of their invention.  Under the nonobviousness test, therefore, 
the drugs that initially look most likely to be effective are often the least 
likely to be patentable.  The nonobviousness standard also has the ironic ef-
fect of turning progress in the pharmaceutical sciences against itself because 
the standard withholds patent protection from drugs based on the scientific 
advances that allowed researchers to identify them as ones that are likely to 
be effective.  These counterintuitive policies embodied in the nonobvious-
ness standard can have a significant effect on the ability of firms to patent 
promising new drugs. 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  507 
 
 
Part III argues that the novelty and nonobviousness requirements are not 
just a potential threat to pharmaceutical innovation; they are actually costing 
the public access to valuable drugs.  Since pharmaceutical companies rely on 
the patent system to recoup their R&D investments, they regularly screen 
their  drug  candidates  during  development  to  discard  ones  that  appear 
unpatentable.  In fact, the companies use redundant reviews to catch these 
drugs—screening through their products at least three separate times before 
clinical  trials—and  frequently  abandon  promising  drug  candidates  on  ac-
count of perceived weaknesses in their patent protection.  It is impossible to 
know how many of these abandoned drugs would prove socially valuable 
given  the  early  stage  at  which  they  are  dropped  from  development.  
Nevertheless,  the  frequency  with  which  this  phenomenon  occurs  suggests 
that the injury to the public is substantial. 
 P a r t   I V   e x p l o r e s   v a r i o u s   p o l i c i e s   t h a t   C o n g r e s s   c o u l d   a d o p t   t o   e n c o u r a g e  
the development of unpatentable drugs and ultimately recommends that the 
FDA guarantee protection for newly developed drugs from generic competi-
tors  by  enforcing  an  automatic  period  of  market  exclusivity  after  the 
successful completion of clinical trials.  This Part also discusses other possi-
ble  strategies,  including  reforming  the  patent  laws  to  ensure  that  drugs 
remain patentable until they are developed and using the government to fund 
the development of unpatentable drugs.  These latter approaches both have 
significant  drawbacks,  however,  since  the  patent  reforms  might  open  the 
door to abusive patenting strategies, and a government-funded development 
program would be incredibly difficult to implement successfully at present.  
FDA-administered periods of exclusivity would provide a much more sensi-
ble solution to the problem of unpatentable drugs.  Unlike patent reforms, 
they link the reward of exclusivity to the need for that protection since the 
exclusivity  is  given  in  exchange  for  successfully  completing  the  FDA’s 
clinical-trial requirements, and those requirements are themselves what make 
the  reward  of  exclusivity  necessary.   M o r e o v e r ,  u n l i k e  a  g o v e r n m e n t - r u n  
drug-development program, Congress could easily implement the proposed 
FDA-administered exclusivity periods because current law already provides 
for certain short delays in the approval process for generics.  Those existing 
regulatory delay periods are rarely long enough to motivate the development 
of an unpatentable drug, but Congress could simply lengthen them to correct 
this problem. 
II.  Background: Patents and Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Pharmaceutical innovation is often seen as the golden child of the patent 
system, with patents taking credit for the discovery and development of valu-
able new drugs that provide tremendous health benefits to the public.
4  The 
 
4. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
717, 720–21 (2005). 508  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
purpose of the patent system is to encourage socially valuable investments in 
R&D that firms would not otherwise make due to the profit-eroding effects 
of competition.  In the pharmaceutical industry, firms must invest hundreds 
of millions of dollars in clinical trials on their drugs before they can be sold 
to the public, while their generic rivals are exempted from those require-
ments and can enter the market at low cost.  Without some way to delay 
generic competition, therefore, pharmaceutical companies would usually find 
it impossible to recoup their R&D investments and would likely invest their 
money elsewhere.  With strong patent protection, however, firms can expect 
to enjoy a lengthy monopoly over their drugs, providing them an opportunity 
to profit from their investment in R&D.  Although the public suffers from 
high prices for drugs while they are covered by a patent, most of those drugs 
probably  would  not  have  been  developed  without  that  protection.    As  a 
result, it is widely thought that the benefits of drug patents far outweigh their 
costs. 
The economic function of the patent system is to promote the creation, 
development, and commercialization of inventions.
5  Successful innovation 
can be of great value to society, but it often requires significant investments 
in  R&D.
6  T h e  p u b l i c  r e l i e s  o n  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  t o  p r o v i d e  m o s t  o f  t h a t  
investment,
7 and unless firms expect to profit from their R&D efforts, they 
are likely to spend their money on something else.  Appropriating the returns 
from an R&D investment can be difficult in a competitive market since other 
firms may be able to imitate successful inventions without incurring the same 
costs and risks.
8  The resulting price competition can undermine the original 
inventors’ profits as competitors free ride off of their efforts.  The patent 
system is an attempt to preserve the incentive to invest in R&D that would 
otherwise be vulnerable to free riding by awarding inventors temporary ex-
clusive rights to make, use, and sell their inventions, thereby protecting them 
from the profit-eroding effects of competition.
9 
 
5. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 
247–48 (1994) (explaining that the patent system promotes R&D “investment in innovation” by 
creating property rights in inventions). 
6. See Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 1119, 1119–21, 1129, 1133–34 (1998) (estimating the lower bound of social return on R&D 
investment in developed countries to be 30%, and concluding that the optimal R&D investments 
would be at least two to four times current investment levels). 
7. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (2007). 
8. Id. at 1. 
9. STEVEN  SHAVELL,  FOUNDATIONS  OF  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  138  (2004);  Peter 
Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
1476 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  It is worth noting that the patent system 
is just one of many ways to correct for the otherwise inadequate incentives for R&D that sometimes 
exist in a competitive market.  See Suzanne Scotchmer, Investing in Knowledge, in INNOVATION 
AND INCENTIVES 31–58 (2004) (describing alternative incentive systems such as prizes and research 
grants). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  509 
 
 
  Although patent-law scholars typically focus on the role of patents in 
promoting inventive activity,
10 patents can be equally important in encourag-
ing  investment  in  the  subsequent  development  and  commercialization  of 
inventions.
11  The idea for an invention is usually of little value to the public 
until it has been turned into a marketable product,
12 and the process of doing 
so can be both risky and expensive.  Indeed, the cost and risk of bringing an 
invention to market is often much greater than that faced during the initial 
research that gave rise to the invention.
13  If competitors can produce and sell 
copies of the invention while avoiding its development and commercializa-
tion costs, then there may be little or no incentive for firms to ever bring that 
invention to market.  Under these circumstances, a patent can be essential for 
the investment that enables the practical use of an invention—a fact known 
to economists for at least 100 years.
14  Even when patents are unnecessary for 
 
10. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (describing the “traditional economic justification for intellectual 
property”  as  ensuring  that  “creators  [can]  recoup their  investment  in  creating  the[ir]  idea[s]”); 
Robert  Mazzoleni  &  Richard R.  Nelson,  Economic  Theories  About  the  Benefits  and  Costs  of 
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1034 (1998) (“[M]uch discussion about the benefits of patents 
proceeds as if motivating useful invention were the only social purpose served by patents . . . .”). 
11. See FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 36, 36–
38  (Comm.  Print  1958)  (explaining  that  patents  are  sometimes  “needed  as  [stimuli] . . . to  the 
practical use of new inventions”); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 
7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 69 (1992) (“[P]atents may spur development more than invention per se.”). 
12. WILLIAM  J.  BAUMOL,  THE  FREE-MARKET  INNOVATION  MACHINE:  ANALYZING  THE 
GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 10 (2002). 
13. MACHLUP, supra note 11, at 36; see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 277 (1977) (explaining that investments in the development of 
an invention “can be large and produce information as to product manufacture and design that 
would be appropriable by competitors absent the original patent”). 
14. MACHLUP, supra note 11, at 37–38.  The traditional economic justification for patents has 
likely always encompassed the promotion of development and commercialization efforts in addition 
to  inventive  activity.    F.M.  SCHERER,  INDUSTRIAL  MARKET  STRUCTURE  AND  ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 440–41 (2d ed. 1980).  The idea that patents encourage post-invention efforts is now 
most often associated with Edmund Kitch’s “prospect” theory of patents.  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (2004); Lemley, supra note 
10, at 132 (both discussing Kitch’s prospect theory).  In his seminal 1977 article, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, Kitch argued that the patent system benefits society not only by 
promoting  R&D  investments,  but  also  by  enabling patent  holders  to  coordinate  post-invention 
investments efficiently and thus avoiding wasteful or duplicative R&D.  Kitch, supra note 13, at 
276.    Much  of  Kitch’s  observation  about  patents  assumes  efficient  licensing,  see M e n e l l  &  
Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 1501–03, and his argument has proven controversial.  See, e.g., Duffy, 
supra, at 441; Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 
305,  315  (1992);  Lemley,  supra  note  10,  at  141;  Donald G.  McFetridge  &  Douglas A.  Smith, 
Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 203 (1980); Menell 
& Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 1504; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics  of  Patent  Scope,  90  COLUM.  L.  REV.  839,  843  (1990);  Arti  Kaur  Rai,  Regulating 
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 
120–21 (1999) (all criticizing Kitch’s theory).  This debate is largely unrelated to the traditional 
economic justification for patents, which is that without a patent system, the threat of competition 
deters investment in R&D.  See MACHLUP, supra note 11, at 36–37. 510  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
motivating the creation of an invention, therefore, they can still be critical for 
encouraging the subsequent investment in its development. 
Of course, not all inventions need a patent to incent their development 
and commercialization.
15  In many cases the costs and risks of getting an in-
vention to market are relatively small, and the inherent lead-time advantage 
that the inventors will enjoy over competitors is sufficient for them to recoup 
their R&D investments.
16  In other cases patents are unnecessary for motivat-
ing post-invention spending because those investments are not vulnerable to 
free riding.  For example, a firm might be willing to build an expensive new 
manufacturing plant to produce an unpatented invention because competitors 
would have to make the same investment in building their own plant before 
they could launch an imitation product.
17  Additionally, on some occasions 
the underlying invention does not need a patent because the efforts to de-
velop  and  commercialize  it  give  rise  to t h e i r  o w n  p a t e n t a b l e  i n v e n t i o n ,
18 
which can make it difficult for competitors to capitalize on the innovative 
firm’s post-invention expenses.
19  In any of these situations, the absence of 
patent protection for an invention may not deter its development. 
For  some  inventions,  however,  patents  do  play  an  essential  role  in 
promoting  development  and  commercialization,  and  drugs  are  a  clear 
example.
20  Pharmaceutical companies on average spend upwards of $800 
million on R&D for each new drug that reaches the market.
21  Roughly half 
 
15. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10, at 1048 (asserting that patents are unnecessary for 
promoting  the  development  and  commercialization  of  inventions  “in  a  wide  range  of 
circumstances”);  Wesley  M.  Cohen  et  al.,  Protecting  Their  Intellectual  Assets:  Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf. 
16. See Cohen et al., supra note 15, at 6, 10  (reporting that in many industries  lead-time 
advantage is more effective than patents in recouping R&D investments); Mazzoleni & Nelson, 
supra note 10, at 1048 (“[T]he advantages conferred by a head start . . . seem to provide ample 
incentive for the follow-on work.”). 
17. Kitch, supra note 13, at 276; see also F.M. Scherer, Pharmaceutical Innovation 27–28 
(AEI–Brookings Joint Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-19, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
902395 (“Even without patents, the firm that would seek to imitate the Boeing 787 would [end 
up] . . . spending very nearly as much as Boeing did to develop its 787.”). 
18. See  Suzanne  Scotchmer  &  Stephen M.  Maurer,  Innovation  Today:  A  Public–Private 
Partnership, in INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 9, at 227, 243–44. 
19. But cf. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 721 (explaining that patents have “remained unavailable” 
for the clinical-trial data); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2015 (2005) (noting that patent protection for process innovations is often 
ineffective because it can be difficult to detect infringement). 
20. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1676–77 (2003) (using pharmaceutical development as an example of where the patent system is 
essential for promoting innovation). 
21. See, e.g., Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug 
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 420 (2006) (estimating a total cost 
of $868 million); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: 
Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 469, 475 (2007) (estimating a total 
R&D cost per drug of $1.24 billion for large-molecule biopharmaceuticals); Joseph A. DiMasi et 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  511 
 
 
of  that  money  is  spent  satisfying  the FDA’s  clinical-trial  requirements  to 
establish the safety and efficacy of new drugs,
22 producing data that cannot 
be  protected  with  patents.
23    Meanwhile,  generics  are  exempted  from  the 
FDA’s clinical-trial requirements and enter the market based on the clinical-
trial data submitted by the original pharmaceutical company.
24  As a result, 
generic-drug manufacturers spend on average only about $2 million on the 
approval process.
25  Once they are on the market, those drugs dramatically 
reduce the sales of (and profits from) the brand-name drugs they imitate.
26  
Pharmaceutical companies therefore rely on a lengthy period of market ex-
clusivity to recoup their investments in developing new drugs.  With strong 
patent protection, they are usually able to keep generics off the market for 
somewhere between ten and fourteen years
27 and will invest hundreds of mil-
lion  of  dollars  in  R&D  in  anticipation  of  this  reward.
28    For  this  reason, 
scholars often view drug development as “the paradigm of patents spurring 
innovation.”
29 
Relying  on  the  patent  system  to  promote  pharmaceutical  innovation 
admittedly has its costs, since patents allow manufacturers to charge pre-
mium prices for their products.
30  Although pharmaceutical companies sink 
vast  sums  of  money  into  R&D  of  new  drugs,  the  actual  costs  of 
 
al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 
180–83 (2003) (estimating a total R&D cost per drug of $802 million). 
22. See DiMasi et al., supra note 21, at 165 (estimating clinical-period costs of $467 million per 
drug). 
23. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 721. 
24. See  21  U.S.C.  § 355(j)  (2006)  (laying  out  the abbreviated  FDA  application  process  for 
generic drugs). 
25. Big Generic Pharma, ECONOMIST, July 30, 2005, at 58. 
26. CONG.  BUDGET  OFFICE,  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 16 (2006); see Richard G. Frank & Erica Seiguer, Generic Drug Competition in the U.S., 
in BUSINESS BRIEFING: PHARMATECH 56, 56–58 (2003), available at http://www.touchbriefings. 
com/download.cfm?fileID=493 (contending that generic manufacturers have seen significant gains 
in market share vis-à-vis brand-name manufacturers because of lower pricing). 
27. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 
INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109–17 (2000) (estimating between ten and twelve years); Henry G. 
Grabowski  &  Margaret  Kyle,  Generic  Competition  and  Market  Exclusivity  Periods  in 
Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492 (2007) (pegging the “maximum 
effective patent life” at fourteen years). 
28. Carmelo Giaccotto et al., Drug Prices and Research and Development Investment Behavior 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J.L. & ECON. 195, 212 (2005); F.M. Scherer, The Link Between 
Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical R&D Spending: An Analysis that Answers the Question: 
What Does the Pharmaceutical Industry Really Do with Its Profits?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 216, 220 
(2001); see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
29. FTC,  supra  note  2,  at  14;  John H.  Barton  &  Ezekiel J.  Emanuel,  The  Patents-Based 
Pharmaceutical Development Process: Rationale, Problems, and Potential Reforms, 294 JAMA 
2075,  2077  (2005);  cf. J AFFE  &  LERNER,  supra  note  1,  at  39–41  (claiming  that  while  patents 
increase drug costs, companies would not develop those drugs without patent protection). 
30. Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 34–39. 512  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
manufacturing those drugs is usually quite low.
31  Generic drugs are sold at 
prices that reflect these lower production costs, whereas patented drugs are 
priced much higher.
32  When a drug is patented, therefore, some consumers 
who would be willing to buy it at the generic price are forced out of the 
market,  and  they  must  wait  until  the  patent  on  the  drug  expires  before 
benefiting from its use.  Economists refer to this harm as deadweight loss, 
and it is a problem inherent in the patent system.
33  With pharmaceuticals, the 
deadweight loss caused by patent protection is especially troubling because 
some people must forgo the use of drugs that would improve their health and 
sometimes even save their lives.
34 
Although the temporary high prices that result from patent protection 
are a significant problem, the benefits of the patent system can sometimes 
outweigh these  costs.   The public  may suffer  for a time from the higher 
prices charged for a patented invention, but that harm is necessarily smaller 
than the injury that would result if no one ever created or developed the in-
vention in the first place, or if it had taken much longer for the invention to 
reach the public.  As a rule of thumb, therefore, patents are socially desirable 
when, in their absence, the public would not otherwise benefit from the in-
vention or there would be a substantial delay in the public’s receipt of that 
benefit.
35 
The  pharmaceutical  industry  is  probably  the  best  example  of  where 
patents are socially desirable under this rule of thumb because patents appear 
 
31. See  James  W.  Hughes  et  al., “Napsterizing”  Pharmaceuticals:  Access,  Innovation,  and 
Consumer Welfare 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9229, 2000), available 
at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=334321  (indicating  a  6:1  ratio  of  price  to 
marginal cost for branded drugs). 
32. Id. 
33. There are alternative mechanisms for promoting innovation that avoid this deadweight-loss 
problem, such as a rewards system or direct government investment in R&D.  Scotchmer, supra 
note 9, at 41–46; Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property 
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 535–36 (2001).  In the context of pharmaceuticals, another way to 
minimize the deadweight-loss problem caused by patents is through government provision of, or 
subsidies for, prescription-drug insurance—a policy that operates much like a reward system. 
34. Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation 
Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomic Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 187–88. 
35. This rule of thumb is more of a heuristic than an absolute economic principle.  An exact 
account of the social-welfare consequences of patent grants would have to consider the numerous 
positive and negative externalities of issuing patents.  These include the effect on wasteful and 
duplicative R&D spending; the administrative and enforcement costs of patents; reduced spending 
on  the  protection  of  trade  secrets  (and  perhaps  increased  labor  mobility  from  less  reliance  on 
employee noncompetition covenants); the potential stifling of related innovation or improvements 
because  of  overly  broad  patent  claims,  unclear  patent  boundaries,  high  licensing  costs, 
anticommons, and patent thickets; R&D spillovers from patents; and reducing licensing costs in 
comparison to trade secrets.  Although these secondary economic effects can be important, they are 
often  hard  to  calculate,  and  at  least  with  respect  to  pharmaceuticals,  they  do  not  appear  to 
overwhelm the social value of the inventions brought forth from patent protection.  See BESSEN & 
MEURER, supra note 1, at 92–93, 138, 152–55 (“In the pharmaceutical industry . . . we see definite 
evidence that patents do . . . sometimes provide positive private incentives for innovation.”); see 
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to  be  a  prerequisite  for  the  vast  majority  of  pharmaceutical  innovation.
36  
Given their high R&D costs compared to those of their generic rivals, phar-
maceutical  companies  rely  on  lengthy  periods  of  market  exclusivity—
normally ten or more years for the drugs currently developed—to support 
their investments in bringing drugs to market.
37  Not surprisingly, firms in the 
industry consistently report that patent protection is essential to their efforts 
to  discover  and  develop  new  drugs.
38  M o r e o v e r ,  i t  i s  w e l l  k n o w n  t h a t  
pharmaceutical companies generally refuse to develop new drugs unless they 
have  strong patent  protection  over  them.
39    Indeed,  drug  researchers  who 
work  in  government  and  academia  report  that  when  they  are  looking  for 
partners  in  private  industry  to  fund  the  development  of  the  drugs  they 
discover,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  attract  interest  unless  the  drugs  are 
patented.
40 
Some scholars even worry that the patent system may be too effective at 
promoting pharmaceutical innovation,
41 although the available evidence indi-
cates that society’s investment in pharmaceutical R&D continues to generate 
substantial positive returns.  In theory, the patent system could be harming 
the public by causing wasteful and duplicative R&D in “patent races.”
42  In 
 
36. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 
174–75  (1986)  (reporting  survey  results—compiled  before  the  Hatch–Waxman  Act  was 
implemented—finding that 65% of new pharmaceuticals would not have been introduced absent 
patent protection). 
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; cf. Henry Grabowski, Are the Economics of 
Pharmaceutical  Research  and  Development  Changing?:  Productivity,  Patents  and  Political 
Pressures,  22  PHARMACOECONOMICS  15,  21  (Supp.  2,  2004)  (noting  that  for  all  but  the  most 
profitable drugs, it takes at least ten years for firms to recoup the mean R&D investment). 
38. For a concise summary of this evidence, see F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent 
Policy Reform in the United States 6–8, 13 (Dynamics of Insts. & Mkts. in Eur., Intellectual Prop. 
Rights  Working  Paper  No.  26,  2006),  available  at  http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/IPR-
WORKING-PAPER-26_Scherer.pdf. 
39. See BERNICE SCHACTER, THE NEW MEDICINES: HOW DRUGS ARE CREATED, APPROVED, 
MARKETED, A N D  SOLD  52  (2006);  C. Merle  Crawford,  Defining  the  Charter  for  Product 
Innovation,  in G ENERATING  TECHNOLOGICAL  INNOVATION  165,  175  (Edward B.  Roberts  ed., 
1987); Peter Gwynne & Gary Heebner, Protecting the Assets, 297 SCIENCE 2083, 2086 (2002); 
Lester A. Mitscher & Apurba Dutta, Contemporary Drug Discovery, in 1 DRUG DISCOVERY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 103, 115 (Mukund S. Chorghade ed., 2006). 
40. See  Jason  Owen-Smith  &  Walter W.  Powell, To  Patent  or  Not:  Faculty  Decisions  and 
Institutional Success at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99, 108 (2001) (quoting a 
university life-science professor as saying that “we would have very little to go on [in attracting 
industry  investment]  without  a  patent  application or  issued  patent.    But  if  you  go  to  the  same 
pharmaceutical company or venture capitalist and say I have an issued patent, then things would 
look a lot different.”); see also Letter from Harold E. Varmus, Dir., NIH, to James Love, Dir., 
Consumer Project on Tech. (Oct. 19, 1999), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/varmus 
letteroct19. html (“It is well documented that technologies with potential as therapeutics are rarely 
developed  into  products  without  some  form  of  exclusivity,  given  the  large  development  costs 
associated with bringing the product to the market.”); Telephone Interview with Brian J. Druker, 
M.D., Professor of Med., Or. Health & Sci. Univ. Cancer Inst. (Dec. 5, 2006). 
41. E.g.,  WILLIAM  M.  LANDES  &  RICHARD A.  POSNER,  THE  ECONOMIC  STRUCTURE  OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 315–16 (2003). 
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the  case  of  pharmaceuticals,  however,  numerous  economic  studies  have 
found that the social benefits produced by new medical technologies signifi-
cantly  outweigh  the  costs  of  society’s  investment  in  medical  R&D.
43  
According to one estimate, the average new drug launch in the United States 
increases average life expectancy among the U.S. population by about one 
week, leading to a cost-effectiveness ratio for pharmaceutical R&D spending 
of $6,750 for each additional year of life saved.
44  Since most studies put the 
value of a year of life at $75,000 to $150,000,
45 the social return on pharma-
ceutical R&D investments appears to be extraordinarily high.
46  This is not to 
say that all investments in pharmaceutical R&D are beneficial, because some 
of that spending goes toward drugs that fail to complete the FDA’s clinical-
trial requirements,
47 drugs that offer little or no therapeutic advantage over 
existing drugs,
48 and sometimes even drugs that do more harm than good,
49 
 
43. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth 
It?: When Costs and Benefits Are Weighed Together, Advantages Have Proved to Be Worth Far 
More than Their Costs, 20 HEALTH AFF. 11, 23 (2001); Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Benefits to 
Society of New Drugs: A Survey of the Econometric Evidence, in ENGAGING THE NEW WORLD: 
RESPONSES TO THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 204, 205–19 (Bhajan S. Grewal & Margarita Kumnick 
eds., 2006); Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, The Value of Health and Longevity, 114 J. POL. 
ECON. 871, 899 (2006); Hughes et al., supra note 31, at 10–14; Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh, 
Effects of Incentives on Pharmaceutical Innovation 5–9 (July 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Texas Law Review), available at http://www.oberlin.edu/economic/Papers/Health 
Conf/Sloan.pdf (all indicating that the social benefits of medical–technological innovation outweigh 
its social costs). 
  Another reason to doubt that patent races in the pharmaceutical industry undermine the social 
welfare produced by innovation is that drug manufacturers often appropriate only a small fraction of 
the social surplus arising from their new technologies.  See, e.g., Tomas J. Philipson & Anupam B. 
Jena, Surplus Appropriation from R&D and Health Care Technology Assessment Procedures 3  
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W12016, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=881250  (indicating  that  HIV/AIDS-drug  inventors  appropriated  only  a  fraction  of  the 
social surplus arising from the new technologies). 
44. Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Impact of New Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence from 
Longitudinal, Disease-Level Data from 52 Countries, 1982–2001, 5 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & 
ECON. 47, 71 (2005); see also Pierre-Yves Cremieux et al., Pharmaceutical Spending and Health 
Outcomes, in P HARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, A N D  COST–BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 226, 227 (Chee-Ruey Hsieh & Frank A. Sloan eds., 
2007) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION] (“[P]harmaceutical spending is a worthwhile 
investment with high rates of return.”); Chee-Ruey Hsieh et al., Pharmaceutical Innovation and 
Health Outcomes: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra, at 
242, 258 (concluding that the incremental cost–effectiveness ratio of new drug launches in Taiwan 
is $1,704 per life year saved); Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Impact of New Drugs on U.S. Longevity 
and Medical Expenditure, 1990–2003: Evidence from Longitudinal, Disease-Level Data, 97 AM. 
ECON. REV. 438, 442 (2007) (finding that for the United States’ investment in pharmaceuticals, the 
net cost for each life year saved before age seventy-five is $15,974). 
45. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY  OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE  FOR AMERICA’S 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 16 (2004). 
46. See supra note 43. 
47. E.g., DiMasi et al., supra note 21, at 153. 
48. E.g., Rai, supra note 34, at 205–06. 
49. E.g., Jerry Avorn, Dangerous Deception—Hiding the Evidence of Adverse Drug Effects, 
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such as the now-infamous pain reliever Vioxx
®.
50  On the whole, however, 
society’s investments in discovering and developing new drugs seem to yield 
substantial net benefits. 
The discussion above demonstrates why the case for the patent system 
is at its strongest in the pharmaceutical industry: innovation in the field is 
incredibly valuable to society and most of it would not occur without the pat-
ent system.
51  Indeed, it is considered well established that the availability of 
patent protection for drugs improves social welfare.
52  This is not to say that 
the patent system is perfect; no one questions that the public suffers greatly 
from high drug prices.  At the moment, however, the public depends on the 
patent system to promote pharmaceutical innovation, and the public usually 
benefits when the system is successful in that task. 
III.  The  Patentability  Standards  for  Pharmaceuticals:  Rewarding  the 
Invention of Drugs but Not Their Development 
When scholars recount the story of pharmaceutical innovation as the 
patent system’s great triumph, they focus on how patents are a necessary in-
centive  for  the  discovery  and  development  of  most  drugs.
53    It  is  often 
assumed that patent protection is always available to promote the develop-
ment of drugs that need it.
54  That assumption is wrong.  When the idea for a 
drug is insufficiently new or inventive, it cannot be patented, even when that 
drug has not yet been proven safe and effective in clinical trials and thus 
cannot be approved by the FDA for sale to the public.
55  This Part explores 
 
50. See generally Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and 
Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007) (detailing the approval and eventual withdrawal 
from the market of Vioxx
®, a drug found to have significant cardiovascular risks). 
51. See supra note 38. 
52. See, e.g., PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 41. 
53. See supra note 1. 
54. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION  58  (2006)  (“[T]he  overall  [patent]  system  tends  to  be 
reliable, especially for pharmaceutical patents.”). 
55. This observation is relevant to the burgeoning literature on “reverse payment” settlements 
of drug-patent litigation, discussing settlements where pharmaceutical companies pay the generic 
manufacturers challenging their patents to delay releasing their products until near the end of the 
patent  terms.   E.g.,  BUREAU  OF  COMPETITION,  FTC,  AGREEMENTS  FILED  WITH  THE  FEDERAL 
TRADE  COMMISSION  UNDER  THE  MEDICARE  PRESCRIPTION  DRUG,  IMPROVEMENT, A N D  
MODERNIZATION ACT  OF 2003: SUMMARY  OF AGREEMENTS FILED  IN FY 2006, at 4–5 (2007).  
These agreements have been criticized for enabling pharmaceutical companies to “pay for delays” 
in generic competition, which forces consumers to pay higher prices for drugs.  E.g., Competition in 
the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 15–24 (2001) (statement of Molly Boast, Director, Bureau 
of Competition, FTC) (describing agreements between the brand-name manufacturers and generic 
manufacturers that induced the generic manufacturer to delay the date of market entry rather than let 
litigation  resolve  the  question  of  patent  validity);  C. Scott  Hemphill,  Paying  for  Delay: 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1557 
(2006).  Such criticisms presume that if the patent on a drug is invalid, then the public is best served 
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the  gap  in  protection  left  by  this  rule  and  explains  how  the  novelty  and 
nonobviousness  requirements,  two  of  the  three  basic  standards  of 
patentability,
56 operate to prevent valuable drugs from being patented before 
they have been developed for public use. 
At a more general level, this Part notes that whenever the post-invention 
costs of developing and commercializing an invention are substantial and 
vulnerable to free riding by competitors, the novelty and nonobviousness re-
quirements can cause patents to be denied to inventions that are unlikely to 
reach the public without that protection.  This problem arises in the pharma-
ceutical industry because of the need for safety and efficacy testing, which 
forces pharmaceutical companies to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in 
clinical trials while generics can enter the market almost freely.  Although 
the analysis in this Part is limited to pharmaceuticals, it is possible that simi-
lar problems occur in other industries.
57  Of course, any such extension of the 
analysis below must be done with care.  One might assume that the same 
problems that arise for the traditional pharmaceuticals discussed below also 
arise  for  newer  biologic  drugs  (i.e.,  large-molecule  drugs  such  as  human 
growth  hormone)  since  both  are  subject  to  the  same  safety  and  efficacy 
standards.
58  In reality, however, the industries are quite different because 
there is no regulatory path for generics in the biologic industry
59 and thus no 
need for patents to prevent generics from using another firm’s clinical-trial 
 
correspond poorly to whether patent protection is necessary for a drug’s development.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 85–87, 178–81.  To analyze the social-welfare consequences of these 
settlement agreements, then, attention should be paid to the grounds upon which the patent is being 
challenged and whether that patent was likely necessary for the drug’s development. 
56. To be patentable, inventions must be new, not obvious, and useful.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 
(2000).  Unlike the novelty and nonobviousness standards, the utility requirement cannot alone deny 
patent protection to a valuable drug because any drug lacking utility is not valuable.  In fact, the 
utility requirement is often considered perfunctory, although it has some bite with pharmaceutical 
patents, STEPHEN A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 6:31 (2006), because it forces 
inventors to delay filing patents on drugs until they possess sufficient evidence to demonstrate their 
claimed utility.  See infra notes 91–94. 
57. Two  other  industries  where  the  novelty  and  nonobviousness  requirements  might  have 
similar  effects  are  the  agricultural-chemicals  and  medical-equipment  industries  because  each  of 
those industries is governed by a regulatory regime somewhat similar to the one for drugs.  See 7 
U.S.C.  § 136a  (2006)  (establishing  a  regulatory  regime  for  pre-market  approval  of  agricultural 
chemicals); 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c, 360d, 360e (2006) (establishing a regulatory regime for pre-market 
approval of medical devices). 
58. See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 674–98 
(3d ed. 2007) (describing the FDA’s regulatory procedures and standards in evaluating new drug 
applications). 
59. See Richard G. Frank, Regulation of Follow-On Biologics, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 841, 
841–43 (2007) (noting that the Hatch–Waxman framework for small-molecule drugs, which creates 
a regulatory pathway for generic competition, does not apply to biopharmaceuticals, and arguing 
that Congress must create a new regulatory regime for biopharmaceuticals if it wishes to foster 
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data to enter the market.
60  Given the sensitivity in the analysis to industry 
variations,  this  Part  focuses  only  on  patent  protection  for  traditional 
pharmaceuticals,  even  though  the  thesis  can  be  stated  more  broadly  as 
applying whenever post-invention costs are significant and subject to free 
riding. 
A.  The Novelty Requirement 
More  than  any  of  the  other  doctrines  in  patent  law,  the  novelty 
requirement  epitomizes  the  patent  system’s  failure  to  adequately  promote 
pharmaceutical innovation by ignoring the development and commercializa-
tion  costs  of  inventions.    This  failure  is  particularly  notable  because  the 
novelty requirement is probably the least controversial rule in patent law, 
stating only that an invention must be new to be patented.  In the pharmaceu-
tical industry, this rule means that a drug cannot be patented if the idea for it 
was previously disclosed to the public; no exception is made for when the 
disclosed drug has not yet been tested in clinical trials and thus has not been 
approved by the FDA.  This problem arises with surprising frequency in the 
industry because it is not uncommon for scientific publications to disclose a 
drug in a manner that later prevents it from being patented.  Courts exacer-
bate the situation by invaliding drug patents on the basis of seemingly trivial 
disclosures, often made before anyone recognized the value of the drug or 
knew enough about it to file a patent.  As a result, the novelty requirement 
makes it easy for valuable drugs to become unpatentable before they have 
been developed for public use. 
Section  III(A)(1)  of  this  discussion  explains  how  the  novelty 
requirement  operates  with  respect  to  pharmaceutical  inventions,  barring 
patent protection for drugs on the ground that the idea for them was previ-
ously disclosed in some manner.  Section III(A)(2) examines how the courts 
exacerbate  this  problem  with  an  expansive  interpretation  of  novelty  that 
makes it easy for researchers to inadvertently undermine the patentability of 
the drugs they discover.  Section III(A)(3) discusses how drug researchers at 
universities and in private industry sometimes fall into this trap, disclosing 
drugs prematurely such that they cannot later be patented. 
1.  The Novelty Requirement as Applied to Drugs.—Only new drugs can 
be patented, and the patent system judges novelty based on whether the idea 
for  an  invention  is  new,  not  on  whether  the  public  has  access  to  the 
invention.  It is well accepted that the disclosure of an idea for a drug can 
prevent it from later being patented, even if that drug is not yet available to 
the public.  Under these circumstances the patent system offers no incentive 
for developing drugs into FDA-approved products. 
 
60. If firms in the biologic industry are expecting Congress to change these regulations soon to 
permit generic entry, the problems with the novelty and nonobviousness requirements discussed 
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  The novelty requirement provides that an invention is only patentable if 
it is a new idea.
61  Inventions that have been freely disclosed to the public are 
considered  part  of  the  “public  domain”  and  are  “no  longer  patentable  by 
anyone.”
62  The novelty doctrine therefore precludes the patenting of any 
invention that “was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the in-
vention thereof by the applicant for patent.”
63  The rule also states that once 
an invention is disclosed to the public, either by being “patented or described 
in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale 
in this country,” the inventors have just one year to submit a patent applica-
tion on it.
64  After that one-year grace period, their invention belongs to the 
public.
65  Pursuant to the novelty doctrine, therefore, a patented invention 
that was disclosed to the public before the patentees invented it, or disclosed 
more than a year before they filed their patent application, is “anticipated” by 
the prior disclosure, and the patent is invalid. 
  The  economic  rationale  for  the  novelty  requirement  is  so  widely 
accepted  among  patent-law  scholars  that  it  is  almost  canonical:
66  if  an 
invention is not new, then it is presumed that the public already has access to 
it, and thus that there is no reason to issue a patent for it.  The patent system 
is designed to reward only those inventions that the public would not have 
gained access to absent the inducement of a patent.  Underlying the novelty 
requirement, therefore, is the assumption that disclosing an invention to the 
public  provides  free  access  to  its  benefits,  making  patent  protection 
unnecessary.
67  This assumption is so deeply entrenched in the literature on 
 
61. 35 U.S.C. § 101; 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2006). 
62. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explicating the “printed publication” bar 
of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)). 
63. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
64. Id. § 102(b). 
65. Id.  For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to §§ 102(a) and 102(b) together as the 
novelty requirement, although they are usually treated separately.  E.g., CHISUM, supra note 61, 
§ 3.01.  Section 102(a) prohibits someone from patenting an invention if, before she conceived of it, 
it had been invented and disclosed to the public by someone else.  Section 102(b) prohibits anyone 
from patenting an invention that was disclosed by anyone more than one year before the patent 
application was filed, including by a subsequent inventor or even the patent applicant.  As a result, 
§ 102(b) is often referred to as a “statutory bar” or “loss of right” provision, and it encourages 
inventors to file their patent applications early.  ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD 
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 541–42 (3d ed. 2002).  At the same 
time, § 102(b) also acts as a more administrable version of the novelty requirement.  For purposes 
of this Article, the distinction between §§ 102(a) and 102(b) is usually irrelevant. 
66. See  Duffy,  supra  note  14,  at  502–03  (characterizing  the  novelty  requirement  as 
“uncontroversial”); Merges, supra note 11, at 12.  Scholars sometime question certain details of the 
novelty doctrine, but rarely the basic rule.  E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and 
Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088–91 (2000). 
67. See Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 2088 (“Granting patents on technologies that are not new 
would  impose  the  social  costs  of  monopolies  without  the  countervailing  benefits  of  promoting 
development and introduction of welfare-enhancing inventions.”); Merges, supra note 11, at 12–13 
(“The logic behind [the novelty requirement] is fairly straightforward [because if] information is 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  519 
 
 
patents that scholars have defined the very purpose of the patent system as 
“the promotion of new and improved works,”
68 and the novelty requirement 
is said to lie “at the heart of the patent system.”
69  The Supreme Court has 
even stated that the novelty bar is an “inherent requisite[] in a patent system 
which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts,’”
70 and intellectual property scholars routinely cite this proposition with 
approval.
71  There appears to be near uniform agreement that the novelty rule 
is always a sensible limit on the government’s authority to grant patents, 
regardless of the invention at issue. 
This consensus view on the novelty requirement ignores the crucial role 
that patents sometimes play in encouraging the development and commer-
cialization  of  inventions;  the  doctrine  bars  the  patenting  of  old  ideas  for 
inventions regardless of whether a patent is needed for those inventions to 
reach the public.  As discussed in Part I, it is well-known that patents are 
sometimes necessary for motivating the efforts to develop an invention into a 
marketable product.
72  A patent is only awarded in exchange for the creation 
and disclosure of inventions,
73 but not for their subsequent development or 
commercialization.
74  Scholars have assumed that if an invention needs pat-
ent  protection  to  be  made  available  to  the  public,  then  it  will  in  fact  be 
patentable.
75  Under the novelty doctrine, however, the investment necessary 
to develop and commercialize an invention is irrelevant to its patentability.  
Once the idea for an invention ceases to be novel, the incentive provided by 
 
already in the public domain when the ‘inventor’ seeks to patent it[,] society has no need to grant a 
patent to get this information.”). 
68. Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 1475; see also Barton & Emanuel, supra note 29, at 
2076  (stating  that  the  novelty  requirement  “ensure[s]  innovation  by  precluding  patents  for 
something already invented”). 
69. CHISUM, supra note 61, § 3.01; see also MACHLUP, supra note 11, at 3 (characterizing the 
English Statute of Monopolies as “the ‘Magna Carta of the rights of inventors’” for providing that 
“only the first and true inventor could be granted a monopoly patent”). 
70. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6, 5–6 (1966) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8); accord Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
71. E.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art 
in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 687 (2003); John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 
475, 487–88 (2003); Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection 
Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 117 (2005); Robert Patrick 
Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 45, 57–58 (2000). 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 11–14. 
73. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). 
74. See Ki t c h ,  supra  note  13, at  276  (“[T]he  development  of  patented  inventions  generally 
requires significant investments that lead to unpatentable information.”). 
75. See,  e.g.,  F. Scott  Kieff,  Property  Rights  and  Property  Rules  for  Commercializing 
Inventions,  85  MINN.  L.  REV.  697,  714  (2001)  (praising  the  patent  system  for  promoting  the 
commercialization of inventions while arguing that “[t]he tests of novelty, nonobviousness, and 
adequacy of disclosure serve [a valuable] decisional function” in allocating the patent reward); 
Kitch, supra note 13, at 283 (explaining that patents should not be granted for known technical 
information to promote their development and commercialization because for “known information 
the proper incentives for its acquisition and use exist without a property right”). 520  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
the patent system for bringing it to market disappears, no matter how critical 
that  incentive  might  be.    Although  this  point  may  seem  obvious,  to  this 
author’s knowledge it has not been made before now.
76 
This aspect of the novelty requirement takes on great importance in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where new drugs can cease to be “novel” inventions 
long before they have undergone the clinical trials needed to establish their 
medicinal value and thus can become unpatentable before the public ever 
gains access to them.  Unless a new drug is proven safe and effective in 
clinical trials, neither the FDA nor the medical community will accept its use 
in the practice of medicine.
77  A publication that merely discloses the idea for 
a  new  drug  is  rarely  enough  for  the  public  to  benefit  from  that  drug’s 
discovery.  Nonetheless, such a disclosure can prevent anyone else from later 
patenting that same drug since it is no longer a novel invention.
78  Once a 
year has passed from the date of publication, not even the scientists who first 
invented the drug can patent it, and the invention falls permanently into the 
public domain.
79  The novelty requirement therefore creates a substantial gap 
in the scope of patent protection for pharmaceuticals, wherein a new drug can 
become unpatentable before it has been tested in clinical trials. 
A  recent  Federal  Circuit  decision  aptly  demonstrates  this  problem, 
showing how the novelty requirement can render a drug unpatentable prior to 
clinical trials and thus before the public can benefit from its use.
80  The case 
involved the analgesic drug Ultracet
®, a combination of two older drugs that 
interact synergistically to provide added pain relief with a lower incidence of 
side effects.
81  The idea of combining the two drugs first appeared in a 1972 
publication  but  was  mentioned  just  briefly
82 a n d  w e n t  u n n o t i c e d  b y  t h e  
 
76. A related point about the novelty requirement, made by William Kingston, is that the patent 
system  fails  to  adequately  promote  innovation  when  final  commercialized  products  bear  little 
relationship to individually patented inventions, because the link between the patent grant and the 
incentive to commercialize a product is then weak.  William Kingston, The Unexploited Potential of 
Patents, in DIRECT PROTECTION  OF INNOVATION 9, 30–32 (William Kingston ed., 1987).  This 
view leads Kingston to conclude that patents fail to adequately promote innovation in most fields 
other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals, where the “invention-innovation link is . . . strong.”  Id. 
at xi. 
77. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 58, at 624–734 (detailing the FDA-approval process for new 
drugs); Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to 
Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420 (1992). 
78. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).  For examples of such cases, see infra notes 99–103. 
79. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
80. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 (Fed. 
Cir.  2007)  (recounting  how  a  prior  publication  forced  Ortho-McNeil  to  narrow  its  patent  on 
Ultracet
® to such an extent that it could no longer prevent generic companies from entering the 
market). 
81. Ultracet
® is a fixed-dose combination of acetaminophen and tramadol.  Id. at 1323. 
82. The publication that first disclosed the idea of combining acetaminophen and tramadol was 
the  original  1972  patent  on  tramadol,  which  mentioned  it  in  a  long  list  of  many  other  drug 
combinations involving tramadol.  See U.S. Patent No. 3,652,589 (filed July 27, 1967) (issued 
Mar. 28, 1972).  The patent did not claim the tramadol–acetaminophen combination as part of the 




83  Physicians did not begin prescribing the combination 
until 2001,
84 after a pharmaceutical company established its safety and effi-
cacy  and  received  FDA  approval  to  market  it  under  the  trade  name 
Ultracet
®.
85  That company, which was unaware of the prior disclosure in the 
1972 publication,
86 received its own patent on the combination in 1994
87 and 
thereafter funded the clinical trials necessary for regulatory approval.  Once 
the 1972 publication came to light, however, the company was unable to en-
force  its  patent  and  generic-drug  companies  soon  entered  the  market.
88  
Although the benefits of Ultracet
® were unknown to the public before the 
pharmaceutical company patented it and established its safety and efficacy, 
the idea for the combination was not new, and for better or worse, the nov-
elty requirement “assure[s] that ideas in the public domain remain there for 
the free use of the public.”
89 
2.  Expanding the Novelty Requirement into a Trap for the Unwary.—
Although there is a strong financial incentive for drug researchers to secure 
patent rights to their inventions, the novelty requirement contains several pit-
falls  that  make  it  easy  for  researchers  to  unwittingly  undermine  the 
 
83. The first peer-reviewed article to discuss using acetaminophen and tramadol combined as 
an analgesic (in animal experiments) was published in 1996.  See generally Ronald J. Tallarida & 
Robert B. Raffa, Testing for Synergism over a Range of Fixed Ratio Drug Combinations: Replacing 
the Isobologram, 58 LIFE SCIS., at PL-23, PL-23 (1996).  One of the authors of the article, Robert 
Raffa, is a named inventor in the patent at issue in the Ultracet
® case.  U.S. Patent No. 5,336,691 
(filed Nov. 10, 1992) (issued Aug. 9, 1994). 
84. Based on a search in PubMed, the first medical-journal article to recommend combining 
acetaminophen and tramadol, authored by one of the named inventors in the Ultracet
® patent, was 
published in 2001, just after FDA approval.  See R.B. Raffa, Pharmacology of Oral Combination 
Analgesics: Rational Therapy for Pain, 26 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 257, 262 
(2001); cf. D.J.R. Duthie, Remifentanil and Tramadol, 81 BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA 51, 56 (1998) 
(speculating  that  an  acetaminophen–tramadol  combination  “may”  be  useful  for  managing  post-
operative  pain);  Paul A.  Moore,  Pain  Management  in  Dental  Practice:  Tramadol  vs.  Codeine 
Combinations, 130 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 1075, 1077 (1999) (suggesting clinical trials to evaluate 
the combination of tramadol and an NSAID analgesic in post-operative pain management). 
85. Letter from Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research to Natasha Nogozenski, Dir., Regulatory 
Affairs, R.W. Johnson Pharm. Research Inst. (Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
cder/foi/nda/2001/21123_Ultracet_Approv.pdf. 
86. Ortho-McNeil did not learn of the reference to combining acetaminophen and tramadol in 
the 1972 patent disclosure until 2004, at which point it initiated a reissue proceeding with the PTO 
in an attempt to salvage its patent.  Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., No. 
04-CV-73698, 2005 WL 2679788, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2005).  Although one might have 
expected Ortho-McNeil to find this reference sooner, the 1972 patent used an obscure synonym of 
acetaminophen, p-acetamino phenal, in its reference to the combination.  See ’589 Patent col.12 
l.75.  The reference was likely overlooked for that reason.   
87. See ’691 Patent. 
88. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 2005 WL 2679788, at *1.  The first generic version of Ultracet
® 
entered the U.S. market in late 2005, just over four years after Ortho-McNeil began selling it.  Press 
Release, Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. Wins Appeal for 
Generic Ultracet (Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT 
=104&STORY=/www/story/01-19-2007/0004509401&EDATE=. 
89. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 522  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
patentability of new drugs.  A cursory disclosure containing little information 
about a drug is often enough to later prevent it from being patented.  In fact, 
it is well-settled law that a disclosure can be “entirely adequate to anticipate a 
claim to [an invention] . . . and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to sup-
port the allowance of such a claim.”
90  As a result, a new drug can become 
unpatentable before anyone ever has a chance to patent it.  There are at least 
three different scenarios in which this situation arises: (1) when researchers 
publish preliminary research about a drug but do not have enough evidence 
to demonstrate its therapeutic value; (2) when researchers mistakenly believe 
a new drug is ineffective and disclose it as such; and (3) when researchers 
disclose a new drug without recognizing their own discovery. 
In the first scenario, which is probably the most common of the three, a 
drug becomes unpatentable because the researchers who first disclose it do 
not have the evidence needed to demonstrate its medicinal value so they can 
patent it.  Patents only cover inventions that are “useful,”
91 and drug patents 
must  contain  “more  than  respectable  guesses  as  to  the  likelihood  of  [the 
drugs’] success.”
92  Although the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) does 
not require clinical-trial data,
93 it usually demands evidence from laboratory 
or  animal  experiments  to  substantiate  the  asserted  therapeutic  utility  of  a 
drug
94  and  often  rejects  drug  patents  for  failing  to  meet  this  standard.
95  
While the disclosure of a new drug without adequate preclinical evidence is 
not  enough  to  support  a  patent,
96  such  a  disclosure  can  still  anticipate  a 
subsequently filed patent on the drug
97—even if that disclosure was an earlier 
patent application rejected by the PTO for lack of utility.
98  In the Ultracet
® 
 
90. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969); accord In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 
1122, 1123–24 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 563–64 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
91. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
92. Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005); accord 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).  The statutory foundation for this requirement lies in 
the utility and enablement standards of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112.  Rasmusson, 413 F.3d at 1323. 
93. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567–68 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
94. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2107.03 (8th ed. 2001) (stating that animal testing is generally sufficient to support therapeutic 
utility). 
95. BECKER, supra note 56, § 6.31. 
96. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
97. See, e.g., In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (invalidating a patent on 
artificial resins). 
98. The combination of the novelty and utility requirements can create a significant barrier to 
patenting drugs for diseases that are currently difficult to treat.  Patent applications are typically 
published eighteen months after being filed.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).  Once published, they are 
considered printed publications and can anticipate other patents, regardless of whether the PTO 
rejected them for lack of utility.  Id. § 102(e).  If a different set of researchers later tries to patent the 
drug, its claim will likely be anticipated by the prior application.  The researchers who submitted the 
original patent application can submit another one that includes sufficient evidence of utility, but 
only  if  they  are able  to  do  so within  twelve  months  of  the  publication  of  their  original  patent 
application.  Id. § 102(b).  The PTO usually requires evidence of efficacy from laboratory or animal 
models  for  the  targeted  conditions  that  are  known  to  correlate  with  efficacy  in  humans,  but  if 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  523 
 
 
case, the initial disclosure merely speculated about the drug’s effects and 
offered no evidence that it would actually work.
99  There are at least four 
other analogous cases, involving an anti-inflammatory drug,
100 a treatment 
for  prostate  cancer,
101 a  d r u g  f o r  h y p e r t e n s i o n  a n d  a n g i n a ,
102  and  an 
osteoporosis treatment.
103  In each of these cases, the courts invalidated a 
 
scientists have not yet had any success in treating a disease, these models are difficult to verify.  See 
Iver P. Cooper, Training Materials for Examining Patent Applications with Respect to 35 U.S.C. 
Section  112,  First  Paragraph—Enablement  Chemical/Biotechnical  Applications,  3 
BIOTECHNOLOGY & L. 90–104, app. at H15-1 (2002); see also Ex parte Balzarini, No. 91-0958, 
1991 WL 332576, at *3–7 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 21, 1991) (rejecting a patent application on a drug to treat 
HIV because the animal models at the time were not sufficiently predictive of human efficacy).  
Consequently, even this thirty-month time frame can be a problem for drugs that target conditions 
that  are  poorly  understood  or  are  resistant  to  treatment.   See,  e.g.,  Rasmusson  v.  SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (invalidating two patents on a prostate-cancer 
treatment as anticipated by an earlier filed patent application on the treatment that was rejected for 
insufficient  evidence  of  utility); In  re  MacLeod,  No.  2001-1651,  2003  WL  25277951,  at  *3–9 
(B.P.A.I. Sept. 4, 2003) (rejecting a patent application for a cancer drug as anticipated by an earlier 
patent application filed by the inventor, which claimed the drug but was rejected for insufficient 
disclosure of its utility). 
99. Ortho-McNeil  Pharm.,  Inc.  v.  Caraco  Pharm.  Labs.,  Ltd.,  No.  04-CV-73698,  2005  WL 
2679788, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2005).  The 1972 disclosure did not contain evidence of the 
synergistic benefit of combining tramadol and acetaminophen, see U.S. Patent No. 3,652,589 col.12 
l.45 (filed July 27, 1967) (issued Mar. 28, 1972), which was critical for its patentability.  Cf. Merck 
& Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 808–09 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining that the discovery 
of unexpected synergistic benefits can impart patentability to an otherwise obvious combination of 
drugs). 
100. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that 
a  patent  on  nabumetone  (Relafen
®),  an  anti-inflammatory  drug,  was  invalidated  by  an  earlier 
publication that merely disclosed the chemical structure of the compound, without any mention of 
its possible medicinal uses.  No. 01-1611, 2002 WL 1890708, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2002); In 
re ’639 Patent Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 157, 162 (D. Mass. 2001).  Although SmithKline Beecham 
held a separate patent on Relafen
®’s medical use that was not anticipated by the prior disclosure, 
that patent expired less than three years after the FDA first approved the drug, which was much 
earlier than the patent on Relafen
® itself.  In re ’639 Patent Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 159, 166 n.8. 
101. In  Rasmusson  v.  SmithKline  Beecham  Corp.,  the  Federal  Circuit  invalidated  several 
patents on the use of finasteride (Proscar
®) to treat prostate cancer, finding them to be anticipated 
by a previous, unsuccessful attempt to patent the same treatment, even though that earlier attempt 
“fail[ed] to provide any data to demonstrate the effects of finasteride in treating prostate cancer.”  
413 F.3d at 1322.  At the time of this decision, finasteride was already on the market as a treatment 
for  benign  prostatic  hyperplasia  and  male-pattern  baldness.    Robert L.  Leibowitz  &  Steven J. 
Tucker,  Treatment  of  Localized  Prostate  Cancer  with  Intermittent  Triple  Androgen  Blockade: 
Preliminary Results in 110 Consecutive Patients, 6 ONCOLOGIST 177, 178 (2001).  The drug’s role 
as a treatment for prostate cancer remains experimental.  See id.; William K. Oh et al., Finasteride 
and  Flutamide  Therapy  in  Patients  with  Advanced  Prostate  Cancer:  Response  to  Subsequent 
Castration  and  Long-Term  Follow-Up,  62  UROLOGY  99,  99  (2003)  (both  discussing  studies 
indicating that finasteride had demonstrated the potential to aid patients with prostate cancer). 
102. In  In  re  Metoprolol  Succinate  Patent  Litigation,  494  F.3d  1011  (Fed.  Cir.  2007),  the 
Federal Circuit invalidated the patent on metoprolol succinate (Toprol-XL
®), a controlled-release 
drug for hypertension and angina, based on an earlier patent filed by the patentee that claimed a 
specific  formulation  of  the  drug, id.  at  1021,  even  though  the  older  patent  was  too  narrow  to 
effectively block generic competition.  Id. at 1020. 
103. In Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the 
Federal Circuit invalidated a patent on the once-weekly dosage of Fosamax
®, an osteoporosis drug, 524  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
drug patent based on a publication that failed to provide an adequate disclo-
sure of the drug and its claimed utility.
104  Whenever researchers disclose a 
drug without establishing its therapeutic value, therefore, they can potentially 
undermine the novelty of the drug, rendering it unpatentable. 
The second scenario in which valuable new drugs sometimes enter the 
public domain prematurely is when those drugs initially appear to be ineffec-
tive in early experiments.  On at least two separate occasions, courts have 
invalidated patents that claimed what later became FDA-approved uses for 
the  drugs—a  chemotherapy  treatment
105  and  a  treatment  for  peptic 
ulcers
106—based on publications that discussed the later patented uses for 
those drugs, but described those uses as being ineffective.
107  These decisions 
reflect the courts’ highly formalistic approach to the novelty requirement, 
wherein  “[a]  reference  is  no  less  anticipatory  if,  after  disclosing  the 
invention, the reference then disparages it.”
108  As a result of this rule, the 
 
based on an article in an industry newsletter that suggested a similar dosing schedule.  Id. at 1373–
77 (invalidating the patent on grounds of obviousness, rather than anticipation, because the article 
recommended a slightly different dosage).  Although the article that invalidated the patent was not 
peer reviewed, presented no evidence on the safety or efficacy of using Fosamax
® once weekly, and 
was authored by a person with no formal training in pharmacology or medicine, see Merck & Co. v. 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 601, 618 (D. Del. 2003), the Federal Circuit found that 
“Merck’s idea added nothing to what came before,” and that there was no reason “why Merck and 
not [the author of the article] should get credit for the idea.”  Merck, 395 F.3d at 1375.  The court 
did not mention that the author never patented the idea. 
104. See supra notes 100–02. 
105. The decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2001), involved two patents on a method of reducing blood toxicity during chemotherapy 
by administering paclitaxel (Taxol
®) over a three-hour period.  Id. at 1377–81.  Although physicians 
initially administered Taxol
® over a twenty-four-hour period, that practice changed after the release 
of the clinical-trial data demonstrating the safety and efficacy of a three-hour administration period.  
See C. WILLIAMS ET AL., SHORT VERSUS LONG DURATION OF INFUSION OF PACLITAXEL FOR ANY 
ADVANCED  ADENOCARCINOMA  1,  7–8  (2002),  available  at h t t p : / / m r w . i n t e r s c i e n c e . w i l e y . c o m /  
cochrane/clsysrev/articles/CD003911/pdf_fs.html (concluding that the side effects of paclitaxel are 
lessened by a shorter administration time).  A generic version of Taxol
® was already on the market 
when the Federal Circuit invalidated Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent, and thus it is unclear whether 
the decision had any financial repercussions for the patentee.  Jennifer E. Smith, Generic Taxol Gets 
Production Boost, DRUG STORE NEWS, July 23, 2001, at 16. 
106. The decision in Astra Akteibolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), related to several patents on the use of omeprazole (Prilosec
®), including a patent 
on the use of that drug in the treatment of ulcers.  Id. at 591–98.  The use of Prilosec
® along with 
antibiotics now plays an important role in the treatment of peptic ulcers, see NIH Consensus Dev. 
Panel on Helicobacter Pylori in Peptic Ulcer Disease, Helicobacter Pylori in Peptic Ulcer Disease, 
272 JAMA 65, 67–68 (1994), although it took a long time for the medical community to embrace 
this treatment.  Barry J. Marshall, The Discovery That Helicobacter Pylori, a Spiral Bacterium, 
Caused Peptic  Ulcer  Disease, in H ELICOBACTER PIONEERS:  FIRSTHAND  ACCOUNTS  FROM  THE 
SCIENTISTS  WHO  DISCOVERED  HELICOBACTERS:  1892–1982,  at  199–201  (Barry  Marshall  ed., 
2002).  For a discussion of the debate among physicians over the use of acid-blocking drugs and 
antibiotics in the treatment of peptic ulcers, along with the intellectual property issues that affected 
that debate, see infra note 324. 
107. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 246 F.3d at 1377–81; Astra Akteibolag, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 596–98. 
108. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 246 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l 
Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  525 
 
 
novelty requirement prevents the patenting of medical treatments that were 
initially thought to be ineffective, even when it later appears that those treat-
ments work and would be valuable if proven safe and effective in clinical 
trials. 
The  third  situation  in  which  this  problem  arises  is  when  researchers 
disclose  a  new  drug  to  the  public  without  realizing  what  they  have 
discovered,  thereby  failing  to  patent t h e  n e w  d r u g  w h i l e  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  
making it impossible for anyone else to patent it.  While this scenario may 
sound farfetched, in 2005 and 2006 alone, the Federal Circuit invalidated 
three  pharmaceutical  patents—covering  an  inhalation  anesthetic,
109 a n  
antidepressant,
110 and a drug used to assess calcium metabolism and bone 
health
111—under these exact circumstances.  In each of the three cases, not 
only was the public not using the product before the patentee rediscovered 
and developed it for medical use, but prior to the patentee’s efforts, no one 
even  knew  the  product  existed.
112  U n d e r  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  i n h e r e n t  
 
109. In  Abbott  Laboratories  v.  Baxter  Pharmaceutical  Products,  Inc.,  the  Federal  Circuit 
invalidated  a  patent  on  the  mixture  of  water  and  sevoflurane  (a  “fast-acting,  highly  effective 
inhalation anesthetic”), a combination that prevents the sevoflurane from degrading and becoming 
toxic during transportation and storage.  471 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  The court held that 
the patent was inherently anticipated by an older patent covering a process of purifying sevoflurane, 
which involved adding water and then distilling away all the water and other impurities.  Id. at 
1369.    Although  “knowledge  of  the  beneficial  nature  of  a  water-sevoflurane  mix  was  wholly 
lacking”  before  the  patentee  discovered  that water  prevented  sevoflurane  from  becoming  toxic 
while  in  storage,  the  court  explained  “that  a  reference  may  anticipate  even  when  the  relevant 
properties of the thing disclosed were not appreciated at the time.”  Id. at 1367.  The original patent 
on sevoflurane expired before the drug was approved by the FDA.  Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. 
Prods., Inc., No. 01-C-1867, 2005 WL 2347221, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2005). 
110. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent on 
the antidepressant drug paroxetine hydrochloride (Paxil
®) on the ground that it had previously been 
produced in trace, undetected amounts during the process of manufacturing an older, experimental 
version of the drug.  403 F.3d 1331, 1343–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The court acknowledged that the 
newer version of Paxil
® “was not even discovered until years after” the older version was first 
manufactured, but explained that “inherent anticipation does not require a person of ordinary skill in 
the art to recognize the inherent disclosure in the prior art at the time the prior art is created.”  Id. at 
1343.  The patent on the older version expired before the FDA ever approved the drug, and the 
patent on the newer version was not set to expire until 2006.  SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005).  The first generic version of Paxil
® entered the U.S. market in September 2003.  Press 
Release, Apotex Corp., Apotex Launches First Generic Version of Paxil
® (Sept. 8, 2003), available 
at http://www.apotexcorp.com/press/GenericPaxil09082003.htm. 
111. In Nichols Institute Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Laboratory, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit  held  that  a  patent  on  certain  antibodies—used  to  measure  the  blood  levels  of  human 
parathyroid hormone (human PTH)—was anticipated by the inventors’ own abstract, in which they 
had unwittingly disclosed the patented antibodies.  No. 06-1087, 2006 WL 2686734, at *1–5 (Fed. 
Cir. Sept. 20, 2006).  The abstract disclosed ten separate blood serums, each containing a mixture of 
antibodies that, according to the abstract, “provide[d] the possibility to specifically detect . . . human 
PTH.”  Id. at 948.  Although “the significance of the claimed antibody was not known until after the 
abstract  was  submitted,”  the  court  still  held  that  the  patent  was  inherently  anticipated  by  the 
abstract.  Id. at 952. 
112. Abbott Labs., 2006 WL 2347221, at *1–2; Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, 2006 WL 2686734, 
at *5; SmithKline Beecham, 403 F.3d at 1343. 526  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
anticipation, however, the disclosure of a drug in some unrecognizable form 
is still sufficient to invalidate a later filed patent on that drug because the 
prior “lack of knowledge [about the drug] is wholly irrelevant to the question 
of  whether  the . . . patent  claims  something  ‘new’  over  the  [earlier] 
disclosure.”
113  Consequently, whenever a drug is unknowingly disclosed to 
the public, it can cease to be novel before anyone knows about it, and the 
patent system will no longer reward any efforts to discover it or establish its 
therapeutic value. 
As strange as these three rules might sound, they have been relatively 
uncontroversial  among  patent-law  scholars.
114  I n d e e d ,  i t  i s  s o m e t i m e s  
thought that an expansive novelty requirement is needed to prevent pharma-
ceutical companies from abusing the patent system by continually filing new 
patents on old drugs to delay entry by generic competitors, a practice known 
as “evergreening.”
115  The courts could use other doctrines to more precisely 
target and block these abusive strategies, however, such as an equitable de-
fense  to  infringement  for  generic  manufacturers.
116  T h e  n o v e l t y  d o c t r i n e  
may prevent some evergreening,
117 but it can also prevent researchers from 
patenting therapeutically valuable drugs that have not yet been developed, as 
seen with many of the drugs mentioned above.
118  The rule is designed to 
 
113. Abbott Labs., 471 F.3d at 1368.  Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, who defend the inherent-
anticipation doctrine, describe it as a “categorical judgment that an invention already being used by 
the public shouldn’t be patentable because someone discovers information about how it works.”  
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 383–84 (2005).  There 
are two problems with this argument.  First, recent opinions from the Federal Circuit—including the 
ones discussed above—establish that an invention is inherently anticipated if it merely existed in 
prior literature or practice, regardless of whether anyone has previously benefited from it.  See infra 
text accompanying note 120.  Second, Burk and Lemley incorrectly assume that “in cases in which 
the public is already benefiting from the invention, the additional value of learning exactly how or 
why they benefit does not seem worth withdrawing from the public the use of an invention that they 
already enjoy.”  Burk & Lemley, supra, at 383.  While this may be true for some inventions, it is 
not  for  others;  the  value  of  pharmaceutical  innovation,  for  example,  depends  heavily  on  the 
production  of  information  about  whether  a  drug  is  safe  and  effective.    See J ERRY A VORN, 
POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 39–68 (2004) 
(discussing the need for randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trials to identify socially valuable 
drugs). 
114. E.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 65, at 388–89 (asserting that the rule regarding prior 
art is a “basic rule”). 
115. Natalie  M.  Derzko,  The  Impact  of  Recent  Reforms  of  the  Hatch–Waxman  Scheme  on 
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 186–87, 220–21 
(2005).  See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 & n.37 (2007) (providing background on the strategy of 
evergreening).  The phenomenon of evergreening dates back to at least the 1930s.  See MACHLUP, 
supra note 11, at 10 n.50 (citing to the 1939 TNEC Hearings, which discussed the patenting of 
minor improvements to continue protection of the original invention). 
116. E.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1043–52 (N.D. 
Ill. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
117. Some of the drugs mentioned above were possibly the subjects of abusive patent litigation 




®.  See supra notes 105, 106, 110. 
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prohibit  researchers  from  patenting  any  drug  that was  previously  used  or 
described in a publication, regardless  of whether the earlier disclosure al-
lowed the public to benefit from the drug’s use or even whether it would 
have allowed the inventor to patent the drug.  Under the novelty requirement, 
therefore, negligible disclosures can prevent—and have prevented—socially 
valuable drugs from being patented. 
3.  The  Scope  of  the  Problem.—Given  the  current  structure  of  the 
novelty  requirement,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  new  drugs  to  be  disclosed 
prematurely such that they cannot be patented later.  The hair-trigger ap-
proach to the novelty requirement discussed above is particularly problematic 
for drugs discovered at universities, where researchers are rewarded more for 
publishing their research results than for patenting them and are thus prone to 
disclosing new drugs before securing patent rights over them.  This same 
problem occurs in private industry, although under different circumstances.  
Pharmaceutical companies often disclose drugs prematurely by filing broad 
patent applications that cover many more drugs than they plan to develop and 
subsequently discarding most of those drugs into the public domain.  The 
regularity with which potential drugs are disclosed under these circumstances 
suggests that the Ultracet
® case is not an isolated occurrence and that there 
are likely many other drugs that lose their novelty before the public gains 
access to them.  The large number of PTO decisions rejecting drug-patent 
applications for lack of novelty is consistent with this conclusion. 
Novelty  is  often  a  barrier  to  the  patenting  of  drugs  discovered  in 
university  laboratories.    Academic  researchers  are  frequently  the  first  to 
identify new drugs,
119 and publishing is an important part of their work.
120  
Although many academics try to keep their inventions secret before filing 
patent applications,
121 it is not always clear what information must be with-
held to preserve the novelty of an invention,
122 and the pressure to publish 
makes it difficult for them to keep their research secret for any extended pe-
riod of time.
123  As a result, it is not uncommon for university inventions to 
 
119. Of  the  new  drugs  approved  by  the  FDA  between  1998  and  2003,  at  least  15%  were 
originally identified through publicly funded research.  Robert Kneller, The Origins of New Drugs, 
23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 529, 529 (2005). 
120. See Richard Monastersky, The Number That’s Devouring Science: The Impact Factor, 
Once a Simple Way to Rank Scientific Journals, Has Become an Unyeilding Yardstick for Hiring, 
Tenure, and Grants, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 14, 2005, at A12. 
121. Eric G. Campbell & Eran Bendavid, Data-Sharing and Data-Withholding in Genetics and 
the Life Sciences: Results of a National Survey of Technology Transfer Officers, 6 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 241, 249–50 (2003); Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent 
System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 63–75 (2004). 
122. See, e.g., Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 06-1087, 
2006 WL 2686734 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2006) (discussed at supra note 111). 
123. See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, 
Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry–University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 
208 (2002) (discussing the pressure to publish in the academic arena). 528  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
be disclosed to the public more than one year before anyone tries to patent 
them.
124    According  to  a  recent  survey,  82%  of  universities  with  large 
medical-research programs were unable to patent at least one of their life-
science inventions during the previous year “because research outcomes were 
already published,” and 71% of the universities were unable to find a com-
mercial partner to develop one or more of their life-science inventions for the 
same reason.
125  These survey results are consistent with anecdotal evidence 
that  universities  sometimes  fail  to  or  are  unable  to  patent  their  faculty 
members’ inventions,
126 including new drugs.
127 
  This  problem  extends  beyond  the  drugs  discovered  at  universities, 
however, as pharmaceutical companies themselves regularly disclose drugs 
in  a  manner  that  later  prevents  them  from  being  patented.    Although 
 
124. Cf. Louis P. Berneman & Kathleen A. Denis, University Licensing Trends and Intellectual 
Capital,  in L ICENSING  BEST  PRACTICES:  THE  LESI  GUIDE  TO  STRATEGIC  ISSUES  AND 
CONTEMPORARY REALITIES 227, 239 (Robert Goldscheider ed., 2002) (noting various difficulties 
facing universities in filing timely patent applications on their employees’ inventions). 
125. Campbell & Bendavid, supra note 121, at 252.  Some of these life-science inventions are 
likely  to  be  new  drugs.    E.g.,  Mark G.  Edwards  et  al.,  Value  Creation  and  Sharing  Among 
Universities, Biotechnology and Pharma, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 618, 618 (2003).  Others 
are probably research tools used to discover new drugs.  E.g., Annetine C. Gelijns & Samuel O. 
Thier,  Medical  Innovation  and  Institutional  Interdependence:  Rethinking  University–Industry 
Connections, 287 JAMA 72, 73–74 (2002).  Some, but not all, of the life-science research tools 
developed at universities may need a patent to be fully and commercially developed.  Jeannette 
Colyvas et al., How Do University Inventions Get into Practice, 48 MGMT. SCI. 61, 65 (2002); 
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh–Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 302–03 (2003). 
126. E.g., Paul Citron, Research Interactions Between Industry and Academia: A Corporate 
Perspective, 39 PHYSIOLOGIST 81, 92 (1996); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are 
Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1380–81 (2007); Owen-Smith & Powell, 
supra note 40, at 109–10; Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower?: 
Sources  of  Growth  in  University  Licensing,  48  MGMT.  SCI.  90,  93  (2002).    One  reason  why 
universities  are  unable  to  patent  all  of  their  important  drug-related  discoveries  is  that  faculty 
members sometimes fail to inform the universities of their inventions in a timely manner.  See, e.g., 
Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 40, at 109–10; Thursby & Thursby, supra, at 93.  Another 
reason is that universities have limited resources available to fund their patenting offices.  Owen-
Smith & Powell, supra note 40, at 102–03; Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristics and 
Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, 
66 (2001).  They therefore file patent applications on only a portion—usually about 50% to 60%—
of the inventions disclosed to them by university employees.  ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, 
U.S.  LICENSING  SURVEY:  FY2005,  SURVEY  SUMMARY  29–31  (2007),  available  at  http://www. 
autm.net/pdfs/AUTM_LS_05_US.pdf.    Although  universities  try  to  patent  the  inventions  most 
likely to prove commercially viable, their sorting process is necessarily imperfect; important drug-
related discoveries can be left unpatented because they seem too speculative or their commercial 
possibilities too remote.  Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting 
Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 263–64 (2006); NIH: Moving Research from 
the Bench to the Bedside: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce,  108th  Cong.  57  (2003)  (prepared  statement  of  Andrew  Neighbour,  Assoc.  Vice 
Chancellor for Research, University of California, Los Angeles) (comparing the process of selecting 
the “good” inventions to patent to the process of “the princess kissing frogs in search of a prince”). 
127. E.g., Ex parte Behr, No. 2006-2417, 2006 WL 2711012, at *2–5 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 18, 2006); 
Ex  parte  Bergeron,  No.  2004-1008,  2004 WL  1646439,  at  *2–4  (B.P.A.I.  Jan.  1, 2004);  In  re 
Weichselbaum, No. 09/545,071, 2006 WL 4494416, at *1–2 (Comm’r Pat. May 3, 2006). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  529 
 
 
researchers in the private sector occasionally publish without realizing that 
they are undermining the novelty of their inventions,
128 these types of mis-
takes are more common at universities.
129  When pharmaceutical companies 
disclose drugs prematurely, it is often while they are prosecuting their patents 
before the PTO.  Pharmaceutical companies file their drug patents during 
early R&D, when they are still trying to select a lead compound from numer-
ous  potential  drugs  with  similar  yet  distinct  properties.
130    Not  knowing 
which compound they will end up developing, the pharmaceutical companies 
draft their initial patent applications broadly to disclose—and hence establish 
priority over—as many of the compounds under consideration as possible.
131  
As  their  research  progresses,  the  companies  decide  which  compounds  to 
develop,  and  they  narrow  their  patent  claims  and  allow  many  of  the 
originally disclosed compounds to fall into the public domain.
132  Although 
these discarded drugs could prove valuable in subsequent research,
133 their 
prior disclosure will likely defeat any later claim of novelty, thus preventing 
them from being patented. 
An  analogous  problem  arises  with  the  drugs  that  pharmaceutical 
companies  patent  but  later  abandon  before  completing  their  development.  
Pharmaceutical companies usually investigate thousands of compounds be-
fore finding one that they are willing to take into clinical trials.
134  Although 
firms try hard to identify and develop the drugs that will prove safe and ef-
fective  (and  profitable),  their  selection  process  is  far  from  perfect.
135  
Subsequent  scientific  developments  might  make  a  drug—previously 
 
128. See  Maria  Souleau,  Legal  Aspects  of  Product  Protection—What  a  Medicinal  Chemist 
Should Know About Patent Protection, in T HE PRACTICE  OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 707, 721 
(Camille Georges Wermuth ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“Inventors’ previous patents and publications often 
complicate the situation . . . .”). 
129. Cf.  Policy  Statement,  GlaxoSmithKline,  Global  Public  Policy  Issues:  Disclosure  of 
Clinical  Trial  Information  5  (Jan.  2007),  available  at  http://www.gsk.com/responsibility/down 
loads/GSK-Public-Policy-on-Disclosure-of-Clinical-Trial-Information.pdf  (clarifying  a  pharm-
aceutical  company’s  policy  of  delaying  manuscript  submissions  in  order  to  seek  necessary 
intellectual property protection). 
130. Bruno Galli & Bernard Faller, Discover a Drug Substance, Formulate and Develop It to a 
Product, in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 687, 688; Stephen T. 
Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications: How the PTO’s Proposed New 
Rules Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent System with Hundreds of Years of History, 
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 556, 557 (2006); Souleau, supra note 128, at 721. 
131. ASS’N  OF  THE  BRITISH  PHARM.  INDUS.,  RESPONSE  TO  THE  GOWERS  REVIEW  OF 
INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  CALL  FOR  EVIDENCE  4  (2006);  GRAHAM  PATRICK,  MEDICINAL 
CHEMISTRY 177–78 (2001); Schreiner & Doody, supra note 130, at 557; Souleau, supra note 128, 
at 721. 
132. See Schreiner & Doody, supra note 130, at 557. 
133. See infra note 138. 
134. E.g., Mitscher & Dutta, supra note 39, at 104. 
135. Pedro Cuatrecasas, Drug Discovery in Jeopardy, 116 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATIONS 2837, 
2837 (2006).  “Scientists and other professionals in the industry are poor in predicting complex 
responses to drugs . . . .  As a direct result, drug development remains part science and part art.”  
TAMAS BARTFAI & GRAHAM V. LEES, DRUG DISCOVERY FROM BEDSIDE TO WALL STREET 258 
(2006). 530  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
abandoned  by  private  industry  due  to  a  perceived  lack  of  therapeutic 
promise—look  promising.    Moreover,  given  the  unpredictability  of  drug 
development,  company  scientists  can s i m p l y  m i s j u d g e  t h e  t h e r a p e u t i c  
potential of a drug, selecting a compound for development that dead-ends 
while  ignoring  others  that  would  have  proven  effective  if  tested.
136  
Corporate executives sometimes make similar errors, dropping drugs from 
their companies’ pipelines due to mistaken judgment about their therapeutic 
value or market potential.
137  By the time these drugs are discarded, many 
have already been patented, and the clocks on their patent lives are running 
down.  Even if another company believes that a drug might be valuable, the 
diminishing window of potential market exclusivity over the drug usually 
deters licensing.
138  When pharmaceutical companies drop drugs from their 
pipelines, therefore, they often stop paying the upkeep fees on the patents, 
hastening the drugs’ entrances into the public domain.
139 
Although it is impossible to know exactly how many drugs fall into the 
public domain under these circumstances, the number appears to be large.  
The extent of the problem is reflected in part by the PTO’s rejection of nu-
merous pharmaceutical patents for lack of novelty,








136. See,  e.g.,  Ralph  Hirschmann,  Introduction t o  I NTEGRATION  OF  PHARMACEUTICAL 
DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT: CASE HISTORIES 2, 2–3 (Ronald T. Borchardt et al. eds., 1998) 
(providing an example of this kind of misjudgment). 
137. Cuatrecasas, supra note 135, at 2837–39; Graham A. Showell & John S. Mills, Chemistry 
Challenges in Lead Optimization: Silicon Isosteres in Drug Discovery, 8 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 
551, 551 (2003).  There are a number of reasons why a therapeutically valuable drug might be 
mistaken for one not worth developing and thus dropped from a company’s pipeline, including 
errors in estimating the costs of clinical trials or likelihood of success, miscalculation of potential 
market size, poor patient compliance or incorrect dosing during clinical trials, inadequate patient 
recruitment in clinical trials, and inadequate trial size.  See BARTFAI & LEES, supra note 135, at 43, 
57–60, 133–34, 158–59.  Therapeutically valuable drugs can also be dropped from a company’s 
pipeline for reasons related to internal company politics.  Id. at 58. 
138. See Telephone Interview with Theodore J. Torphy, Ph.D., Corporate Vice President of Sci. 
and Tech., Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 2, 2007) (explaining that competing pharmaceutical companies 
rarely license compounds from one another during early development).  Occasionally an executive 
or  R&D  manager,  upon  leaving  a  pharmaceutical  company,  will  negotiate  to  have  one  of  the 
company’s “failed” drugs out-licensed to her so that she may pursue its development.  See BARTFAI 
& LEES, supra note 135, at 59.  Licensing is more practical under these circumstances because the 
departing executive is aware of the company’s earlier research on the drug and, unlike an outside 
company, would not have to start the entire research project over again. 
139. ASTRAZENECA, RESPONSE TO GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CALL FOR 
EVIDENCE  5  (2006),  available  at  http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/2/D/astra_zeneca_305_ 
46kb.pdf; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1543 
(2005) (finding that biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents are significantly less likely to be 
maintained than patents on computer hardware and software). 
140. E.g.,  Ex  parte  Ames,  No.  2007-1138,  2007  WL  1033514,  at  *3–4  (B.P.A.I.  Mar.  28, 
2007); Ex parte Bhagwat, No. 2003-1424, 2004 WL 366282, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 6, 2004); Ex parte 
Feldmann, No. 2002-0253, 2003 WL 25281968, at *2–4 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 21, 2003); Ex parte Saito, 
No. 94-4009, 1999 WL 33230062, at *5–6 (B.P.A.I. June 9, 1999). 
141. Ex parte Williams, No. 2005-0902, 2005 WL 4773220, at *4 (B.P.A.I. June 22, 2005); Ex 





147  The large number of such decisions is consistent 
with reports from universities that they are frequently unable to patent their 
life-science inventions due to early disclosures and the widespread practice 
among pharmaceutical companies of disclosing more drugs in their patent 
applications than they ultimately choose to develop.  These drugs are apt to 
fall through the system unprotected as a result of the novelty requirement. 
B.  The Nonobviousness Requirement 
Much  like  the  novelty  doctrine,  the  nonobviousness  requirement 
excludes valuable drugs from the patent system by ignoring the development 
and commercialization costs of inventions.  The test for nonobviousness fo-
cuses on the level of risk in the research that produced the invention, but it 
does not consider the costs and risks of developing that invention into a mar-
ketable  product.    A  new  drug  with  beneficial  therapeutic  properties  is 
therefore considered obvious if those properties would have been reasonably 
expected at the time it was invented.  Without clinical trials to demonstrate 
the drug’s safety and efficacy, however, it will not receive FDA regulatory 
approval and be made available for sale in the United States.  As a result, the 
nonobviousness requirement withholds patent protection from the drugs that 
seem most promising before they have been developed.  Advances in the 
pharmaceutical sciences often exacerbate this problem by making the drug-
discovery process more predictable, which makes it harder for researchers to 
establish the nonobviousness of new drugs.  This perverse tendency in the 
nonobviousness doctrine leaves a significant gap in the scope of patent pro-
tection afforded to new drugs, rendering unpatentable many promising new 
drugs while penalizing scientific progress in drug discovery. 
Section  III(B)(1)  examines  the  basic  test  for  nonobviousness  as  it  is 
applied to new drugs, noting how the doctrine ignores the development and 
commercialization costs in the industry and how previous scholars have ei-
ther  overlooked  or  underestimated  this  flaw  in  the  drug-patent  regime.  
Section III(B)(2) explores the results of this mismatch between the nonobvi-
ousness requirement and the economics of drug development. 
 
the claims on a compound proposed as a treatment for HIV, but allowing the method-of-use claims 
to issue); Ex parte Murrer, No. 95-2603, 1995 WL 1696811, at *5 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1995). 
142. Ex parte MacLeod, No. 2001-1651, 2003 WL 25277951, at *7–9 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 4, 2003) 
(rejecting the compound claims, but allowing several method-of-use claims to issue); cf. Ex parte 
Behr, No. 2006-2417, 2006 WL 2711012, at *2–5 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 18, 2006) (involving a treatment 
for certain side effects associated with particular cancer treatments). 
143. Gilbert v. Levin, No. 2004-1391, 2004 WL 1697793, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex 
parte Picard, No. 95-2879, 1995 WL 1696846, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1995). 
144. Ex parte Bennett, No. 2003-1678, 2004 WL 318775, *4–5 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004). 
145. Ex  parte  Sander-Struckmeier,  No.  2005-1150,  2005  WL  4773290,  at  *3–5  (B.P.A.I. 
Aug. 25, 2005). 
146. Ex parte D’Antonio, No. 1998-1987, 2001 WL 35825743, at *6–10 (B.P.A.I. July 24, 
2001). 
147. Ex parte Bergeron, No. 2004-1008, 2004 WL 1646439, at *2–4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004). 532  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
1.  The  Nonobviousness  Requirement  as  Applied  to  Drugs.—Obvious 
inventions  cannot  be  patented.    In  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  this  rule 
means that a drug is unpatentable if its relevant properties were reasonably 
expected at the time of its invention, regardless of whether it has yet to be 
proven safe and effective in clinical trials.  If the idea for a drug is obvious, 
therefore, the patent system offers no incentive for private industry to invest 
in securing its regulatory approval. 
  The  purpose  of  the  nonobviousness  requirement  is  to  prevent  trivial 
inventions from being patented.
148  Originally crafted by the courts
149 and 
later codified by Congress, the nonobviousness doctrine provides that an in-
vention cannot be patented if it would have been obvious to other skilled 
artisans in the pertinent field at the time it was made.
150  When this test is 
applied correctly,
151 it excludes “the results of ordinary innovation” from pat-
ent  protection
152 w h i l e  r e w a r d i n g  t h e  i n v e n t o r s  w h o  u n d e r t a k e  h i g h l y  
uncertain research projects that initially seem unlikely to succeed.
153  This 
test  is  often  described  as  “the  most  important  of  the  basic  patent 
requirements,”
154  and  the  Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly  suggested  that 
nonobviousness is a constitutional limitation on the scope of Congress’s pat-
ent power.
155 
In  the  context  of  pharmaceutical  patents,  the  nonobviousness 
requirement is designed to stop researchers from patenting drugs that they 
“[r]eached  by  means  of  routine  procedures . . . producing  only  predictable 
results.”
156    Pharmaceutical  patents  are  considered  obvious  if there  was a 
“reasonable expectation” that the drug “would work for its intended purpose” 
at  the  time  it  was  invented  and  if  there  is  inadequate  “[e]vidence  of 
 
148. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 65, at 644. 
149. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11–17 (1966). 
150. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000): 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought 
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
151. The ultimate question of obviousness is not a bright-line rule.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739–40 (2007).  It can be difficult for the courts to apply the test in a 
predictable manner.  E.g., Harries v. Air King Products Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (1950).  In 
Harries, Justice Learned Hand observed that the nonobviousness standard—known at the time as 
the invention standard—is “as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the 
whole paraphernalia of legal concepts.”  Id. 
152. KSR Int’l, 127 S. Ct. at 1746. 
153. Merges, supra note 11, at 2. 
154. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 65, at 643; accord Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 
1485. 
155. See, e.g., KSR Int’l, 127 S. Ct. at 1746; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (all discussing 
constitutional limitations on Congress’s patent power). 
156. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989); accord Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1365–69 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  533 
 
 
unexpected  results”  in  the  drug’s  performance.
157  C o u r t s  a p p l y  t h i s  t e s t  
through the eyes of a hypothetical “skilled artisan” in the field,
158 whom they 
generally define as an experienced drug researcher or medicinal chemist.
159  
Unless such a person would have been surprised by the drug’s properties and 
successful  test  results,  it  cannot  be p a t e n t e d  u n d e r  t h e  n o n o b v i o u s n e s s  
standard. 
Much like the novelty doctrine, the doctrinal test for nonobviousness 
ignores the development and commercialization costs of inventions, assum-
ing  that  once  the  idea  for  an  invention  becomes  accessible  to  the  public 
through its obviousness, the invention itself will also be available.
160  The 
goal of the nonobviousness requirement is to ensure that the patent system 
rewards only those inventions that would not have been created absent the 
inducement of a patent.
161  Since obvious ideas are likely to occur to people 
even without a potential patent as a reward, patent protection is thought to be 
unnecessary.
162  In reality, the public often cannot benefit from a new idea 
until  someone  has  invested  in  its  development  and  commercialization.
163  
Nonetheless, these post-invention costs are irrelevant to judicial determina-
tions of obviousness.
164  The nonobviousness standard is therefore based on 
the dubious assumption that obvious inventions do not have significant de-
velopment costs, or that firms will always be willing to incur those costs 
without having patents on the inventions. 
This policy of ignoring post-invention costs is particularly important in 
the pharmaceutical industry, where the nonobviousness requirement results 
in the denial of patent protection to potentially valuable drugs before they 
have been developed for public use.  Although a new drug is considered 
 
157. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1368–69.  To be more precise, a reasonable expectation of success 
makes the claimed compound prima facie obvious, and the applicant may rebut that presumption of 
obviousness with evidence of unexpected results.  See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., 
Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a “reasonable expectation of 
success” supports a prima facie case of obviousness); In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)  (“With  a . . . prima  facie  case  of  obviousness  shown,  the  burden  shifts  to  applicants  to 
demonstrate that their claimed [drugs] possess an unexpected property over the prior art.”). 
158. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1361; see supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
159. E.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Merck 
& Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 
2d 390, 423 (D.N.J. 2007); Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 653–54 (D.N.J. 2006); Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 341, 
373 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
160. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592 n.41 (1999). 
161. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11–17 (1966); Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. 
John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301 (both explaining that the 
underlying policy of the patent system is to protect “inventions which would not be discovered or 
devised but for the inducement of a patent”). 
162. E.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 65, at 646; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom?: 
Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004). 
163. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
164. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 11 (outlining the basic nonobviousness test). 534  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
obvious if an experienced drug researcher would have reasonably expected it 
to possess its beneficial properties,
165 that expectation will not satisfy the 
FDA’s regulatory requirements.  Without clinical trials to demonstrate the 
drug’s safety and efficacy, it will not be approved by the FDA and thus will 
not  be  made  available  to  the  public.
166    The  cost  of  those  clinical  trials 
alone—without considering the risk of failure—still runs in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars on average,
167 and even a drug with a reasonable expecta-
tion of success at the time it is invented usually faces significant uncertainty 
in clinical trials.
168  Yet the patent system offers no reward for investing in 
those clinical trials if the drug to be tested is considered obvious under the 
patent laws. 
This policy of ignoring the development and commercialization costs of 
drugs may seem like a glaring failure in the nonobviousness standard, but it 
has received little attention thus far from patent-law scholars.  Several schol-
ars have criticized the test for nonobviousness on the ground that it overlooks 
the  costs  of  the  inventive  process,
169 b u t  f e w e r  h a v e  c o m m e n t e d  o n  t h e  
doctrine’s  failure  to  consider  the  post-invention  costs  and  uncertainty  of 
developing and commercializing inventions.
170  At least one scholar, Robert 
Merges,  actually  argued  against  considering  the  development  and 
 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 157–72. 
166. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
167. If success were guaranteed, the mean out-of-pocket cost for clinical trials on a new drug, 
including the time value of money, would still be over $250 million.  See DiMasi et al., supra note 
21, at 172. 
168. Only about one-fifth of the new drug candidates that begin clinical trials ever complete the 
process and are approved by the FDA.  DiMasi et al., supra note 21, at 165; Joseph A. DiMasi, 
Risks in New Drug Development: Approval Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 69 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 297, 298 (2001).  Very few drugs are ever guaranteed success 
in clinical trials.  Cf. George Lasezkay, An Overview: Attracting Partners in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 25 RETINA, at S104, S104 (Supp. 8, 2005) (noting the inherent risks in clinical trials). 
169. E.g.,  John  H.  Barton,  Non-Obviousness,  43  IDEA  475,  491–93  (2003);  Menell  & 
Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 1485–86; Merges, supra note 11, at 4.  This argument was first outlined 
by Robert Merges, who noted that the nonobviousness requirement can deter research “where initial 
experimentation is very costly” because it fails to account for risk aversion among inventors.  Id. at 
4.  Merges observes that when the expected returns from various research projects are equal, risk-
averse  firms  will  prefer  the  lower  cost  and  lower  variance  projects  because  they  offer  safer 
investments.  Id. at 43–65.  He therefore recommended “a modest lowering of the standard . . . for 
research which is very expensive in the early stages.”  Id. at 69. 
170. E.g., SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 152 n.31; Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s 
Afraid of the APA?: What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 
278  (2007);  Burk  &  Lemley,  supra  note  20,  at  1678.    Karen  Boyd  suggested  lowering  the 
nonobviousness standard for biotechnology inventions, arguing that given “the cost and likelihood 
of commercial success” in biotechnology, a lower standard is appropriate to “give[] the needed 
incentive to overcome the risk aversion that is otherwise problematic in the industry.”  Karen I. 
Boyd, Nonobviousness and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic 
Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 339 (1997).  Much like Merges, see supra note 11, 
Boyd does not advocate lowering the nonobviousness standard to account for situations where the 
development and commercialization costs of an obvious invention are greater than the expected 
profits from marketing it without patent protection.  Instead, she argues that the nonobviousness 
standard should be adjusted to correct for risk aversion.  Boyd, supra, at 316–18, 337–41. 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  535 
 
 
commercialization  costs  of  inventions  in  the  test  for  nonobviousness,
171 
although his brief treatment of the issue glossed over the possibility that an 
obvious invention might not reach the public without a patent to motivate its 
development.
172  Dan Burk and Mark Lemley recognized the theoretical point 
that the nonobviousness requirement should account for the costs and uncer-
tainties  of  post-invention  efforts  and  even  noted  that  such  an  adjustment 
could be important for pharmaceuticals.
173  Like Merges, however, they dis-
counted the risk of valuable inventions being considered obvious
174 and thus 
saw little problem with the existing nonobviousness standard for drugs.
175  A 
few other scholars, including John Barton, Stuart Benjamin, and Arti Rai, 
have recognized that valuable drugs might in fact be obvious and thus in 
 
171. Merges  defended  the  nonobviousness  doctrine’s  exclusive  focus  on  “the  level  of 
uncertainty  facing  the  inventor  just  prior  to  the  crucial  experiment  leading  up  to  the  patent,” 
contending that “the intrinsic social value of producing information in the face of highly uncertain 
technical  challenges”  justifies  patent  protection,  whereas  the  information  produced  in  the  post-
invention stages of product development and commercialization “would seem to produce relatively 
few positive externalities.”  Merges, supra note 11, at 34, 33–34.  In other words, he believes that 
awarding patents on the basis of development and commercialization expenses is unwise because 
those  efforts  do  not  “contribute[]  valuable  technical  information  to  the  relevant  technical 
community.”  Id. at 34, 65–69. 
172. Although Merges focuses on the potentially smaller spillover benefits from developing 
inventions,  see  supra  note  171,  spillover  benefits  are  of  secondary  importance  when  deciding 
whether to grant a patent on an “obvious” invention that would not reach the public without such 
protection  because  of  its  development  and  commercialization  costs.    See  supra  note  35  and 
accompanying  text.    Moreover,  the  spillover  benefits  from  commercializing  inventions  can 
sometimes  be  substantial.    Cf. O FFICE  OF  TECH.  ASSESSMENT,  INNOVATION  AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION  OF EMERGING  TECHNOLOGIES  35  (1995)  (“Many  innovations  derive  not 
from advances in science, but from . . . recognizing potential new markets . . . .  [L]essons learned 
from  manufacturing  and  marketing  operations  can  feed  back  into  the  product  development 
process.”). 
173. Burk  &  Lemley,  supra  note  20,  at  1678  (“If  patents  are  to  drive  innovation  in 
biotechnology,  rather  than  merely  invention, . . . courts  must  take  account  of  the  cost  and 
uncertainty of post-invention testing and development.”). 
174. Reflecting the widely held assumption that a valuable drug would be patentable, Burk and 
Lemley downplay the threat of losing important new drugs due to the nonobviousness requirement, 
assuming that the nonobviousness requirement deters only the development of unimportant drugs.  
Id. at 1681–82 (“Lowering the obviousness threshold makes it more likely that marginal inventions 
will be patented, and . . . [i]f getting from invention to market is the costly and uncertain part of the 
endeavor, it is the[] more significant inventions that we need to worry about rewarding.”). 
175. To  prevent  drug  companies  from  designing  around  the  patents  on  their  competitors’ 
successful  drugs,  Burk  and  Lemley  recommend  “a  fairly high  [non]obviousness  threshold”  for 
biologic drugs, and perhaps the same for traditional pharmaceuticals as well.  See id. at 1682, 1684–
86  (emphasis  added).    This  suggestion  follows  from  their  view  that  the  pharmaceutical  and 
biotechnology  industries  “fit  well  into  [Kitch’s]  prospect  theory,”  and  thus  they  advise  issuing 
“[f]ewer and broader patents” in those industries.  Id. at 1686.  Using the nonobviousness standard 
for this task is problematic, however, because it necessarily creates a zone of unpatentable drugs 
around each new drug patent or publication, and those unpatentable drugs might have great social 
value.    See  infra  text  accompanying  notes  201–12.    Moreover,  it  is  unclear  whether  a  smaller 
number of broad patents in pharmaceuticals would be better for promoting innovation because it is 
unclear whether society is harmed by competition in the race to develop drugs, or whether that 
competition is necessary for producing successful drugs.  See infra note 192. 536  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
danger of never being developed.
176  They described this problem only as it 
relates to certain new-drug technologies, however, and did not extend the 
observation into a general critique of the nonobviousness requirement as it 
applies to pharmaceuticals.  The patent-law literature generally shows little 
awareness of how the economic logic underlying the nonobviousness test 
unravels in the pharmaceutical industry, where any drug (including an obvi-
ous  one)  that  is  subject  to  the  FDA’s  rigorous  clinical-trial  requirements 
likely needs a patent to incent its development. 
C.  The Perverse Consequences of the Nonobviousness Test for Drugs 
In  an  industry  like  pharmaceuticals,  where  patents  are  necessary  for 
promoting the development and commercialization of inventions, the nonob-
viousness requirement performs a pernicious economic function.  It denies 
patent protection to the drugs that appear most likely to succeed at the time 
they are invented and that have expected beneficial properties, i.e., the drugs 
that appear most promising in early research.  The courts and PTO apply this 
test  without  hesitation,  finding  drugs  to  be  unpatentable  whenever  their 
therapeutic properties are considered unsurprising.  Although some of these 
drugs are obvious because their chemical structure is nearly identical to that 
of existing drugs—which means they may have the same therapeutic effects 
and be of little value—the patent system is largely incapable of distinguish-
ing these low-value “me-too” drugs from important, new medicinal agents.  
In fact, the PTO rejects drug-patent applications for obviousness long before 
the  therapeutic  properties  of  those  drugs  can  be  reliably  predicted.  
Moreover,  because  the  nonobviousness  test  focuses  on  whether  the 
therapeutic properties of a drug are expected and not on whether the drug is 
socially valuable, the PTO and courts have rejected patent applications on 
drugs even though they are expected to be superior to known treatments and 
thus  are  expected  to  have  great  social  value  if  developed.    This  test  for 
nonobviousness  is  particularly  problematic  for  the  efforts  of  medicinal 
chemists  to  create  new  drugs  by  enhancing  the  therapeutic  properties  of 
known compounds because they often enhance those compounds in ways 
that they reasonably expect to produce beneficial effects.  Ironically, scien-
tific  advances  in  medicinal  chemistry  actually  worsen  this  problem  by 
making the drug-discovery process more predictable, which generally makes 
 
176. Barton, supra note 169, at 506 (“[T]here is a strong argument that it would be obvious to 
try particular human proteins as pharmaceuticals, and there would be no investment without the 
patent  system.”);  Benjamin  &  Rai,  supra  note  170,  at  307  (“[G]iven  the  rapid  advances  of 
biotechnology, it might be technically obvious to identify a gene that could be used therapeutically,” 
but  “without  a  patent  no  one  would  have  the  incentive  to  develop  the  potential  therapeutic 
product.”);  Philippe G.  Ducor,  New  Drug  Discovery  Technologies  and  Patents,  22  RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 369, 461 (1996) (“[T]he screening of combinatorial molecular libraries by 
high-throughput  receptor  assays  is  potentially  powerful  enough  to  render  its  products  (ligands) 
unpatentable  due  to  obviousness[,] . . . [which]  threatens  the  incentives  of  the  pharmaceutical 
industry to invest in the ligand’s development.”). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  537 
 
 
the drugs discovered through those advances more obvious.  Given the per-
versity of these rules, there are likely a great number of drugs that cannot be 
patented  under  the  nonobviousness  requirement,  something  evidenced  by, 
among  other  things,  the  numerous  PTO  decisions  rejecting  drug-patent 
applications on the ground that the claimed invention is obvious. 
 T h e   m o s t   t r o u b l i n g   a s p e c t   o f   t h e   n o n o b v i o u s n e s s   r e q u i r e m e n t   i s   t h a t   i t  
denies patent protection to inventions because they seem likely to work while 
ignoring  the  question  of  whether  a  patent  is  needed  to  motivate  that 
invention’s development.  The nonobviousness doctrine was crafted under 
the assumption that patents are only necessary for encouraging research that 
involves significant uncertainty and seems unlikely to produce a working 
invention.
177  While it is true that the inventions arising out of high-risk re-
search are more likely to require patent protection because investors might be 
unwilling to finance that research if competitors could duplicate their suc-
cesses without taking the same risks, this situation is not the only one where 
patents are necessary.  If the investment required to develop and commer-
cialize an invention is significant and—like the initial research— vulnerable 
to free-riding imitators, then patent protection becomes increasingly impor-
tant for the results of both high- and low-risk research projects.  Since the 
standards of nonobviousness ignore these post-invention costs, the rule can 
discourage investment in research projects that initially appear to have a high 
probability of success. 
Applying the doctrinal test for nonobviousness to drug patents thus has 
a perverse effect on the incentives for pharmaceutical innovation because it 
bars patent protection whenever a firm pursues research that appears likely 
from the start to yield an effective drug.  A new drug is considered obvious if 
an experienced drug researcher would have expected it to possess its benefi-
cial properties at the time it was invented.
178  As a general rule, therefore, the 
more likely it appears that a new drug will be successful, the less likely it is 
to be patentable under the nonobviousness requirement.
179  Consequently, the 
incentive normally provided by patents to invest in the development of new 
drugs does not exist for the ones that seem most promising in early research. 
  On some occasions this effect may be rather benign, such as when it 
denies patent protection to drugs that are so closely related to an older drug 
that they are unlikely to provide any additional therapeutic benefits.  These 
me-too drugs, as they are known, are sometimes characterized as worthless 
 
177. Merges, supra note 11, at 2. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 157–59. 
179. See, e.g., Ex parte Childers, No. 2003-0890, 2003 WL 25277879, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 
2003) (rejecting the claims on compounds said to be useful in treating stroke victims because “one 
of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected the compounds . . . [to] continue to 
exhibit the property of binding to the [target] receptor”). 538  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
inventions that serve only to increase pharmaceutical companies’ profits;
180 
indeed, some have advocated more vigorous enforcement of the nonobvious-
ness requirement to discourage their development.
181  Under current law, if 
the similarities between an existing and a me-too drug create a reasonable 
expectation that the me-too drug will succeed in early experiments, then the 
me-too drug is considered obvious unless it possesses unexpectedly superior 
properties compared to the older drug.
182  The nonobviousness requirement 
can therefore prevent researchers from patenting a me-too drug that is not 
genuinely superior to its predecessor.  It is unclear whether the public bene-
fits by not having access to such drugs.
183  Regardless, to the extent that the 
nonobviousness standards deny patent protection to me-too drugs that pro-
vide little or no therapeutic advantage over existing drugs, the doctrine does 
not pose a catastrophic threat to public welfare. 
  Unfortunately, the patent system is largely incapable of distinguishing 
unimportant  me-too  drugs  from  drugs  of  significant  medicinal  value,  and 
there is little reason to trust that the drugs deemed “obvious” under current 
law would not provide great benefit to society.  By introducing small changes 
into the chemical structure of an existing drug, scientists sometimes create a 
superfluous me-too product, but other times they produce a novel drug with 
substantially improved therapeutic properties.
184  A new drug that looks simi-
lar  to  an  older  one  can  therefore  represent  a  major  advance  in  medical 
technology.
185  A l t h o u g h  t h e s e  i m p r o v e d  v e rsions  of  known  compounds 
 
180. E.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE 
US  AND  WHAT  TO  DO  ABOUT  IT  75  (2004);  Peter  Lansbury,  Editorial,  An  Innovative  Drug 
Industry?  Well, No, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at B2. 
181. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 180, at 240; Jerry Avorn, Editorial, Sending Pharma Better 
Signals, 309 SCIENCE 669, 669 (2005). 
182. Compare Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 713, 755 (N.D. 
W.  Va.  2004)  (“Even  if  [the  defendant]  had  successfully  established  a  prima  facie  case  [of 
obviousness] . . . , the surprising properties and advantages of levofloxacin are strong evidence of 
nonobviousness.”), with Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330, 
373 (D. Del. 1991) (finding the patent on atenolol to be invalid as obvious because of “atenolol’s 
lack of unexpected properties and advantages over the prior art beta-blockers”). 
183. Compare ANGELL, supra note 180, at 80–83 (arguing that me-too drugs have little or no 
therapeutic value), with Albert Wertheimer et al., Too Many Drugs?: The Clinical and Economic 
Value  of  Incremental  Innovations,  in I NVESTING  IN  HEALTH:  THE  SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION 77, 79–82 (Irena Farquhar et al. eds., 2005) (arguing that 
me-too drugs provide patients with valuable choices). 
184. János Fischer & Anikó Gere, Timing of Analog Research in Medicinal Chemistry, in 1 
DRUG  DISCOVERY  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  supra  note  39,  at  199–209;  W. Soudijn,  The  Role  of 
Medicinal Chemistry in Drug Research, 13 PHARMACEUTISCH WEEKBLAD SCI. EDITION 161, 162–
65 (1991); Camille G. Wermuth, Strategies in the Search for New Lead Compounds or Original 
Working Hypotheses, in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 69, 72, 71–
72 (explaining that me-too drugs are sometimes “as different from the parent molecule as a recent 
car compared with a forty-year-old model”). 
185. See  supra  note  184; cf.  Albert I.  Wertheimer  et  al., The  World  Health  Organization’s 
Essential Medicines List: An Endorsement of Incremental Innovation and Follow-On Research, 17 
J. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING & MGMT. 25, 29–30 (2005) (finding that 81% of the drugs on the 
World Health Organization’s list of essential medicines are me-too products). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  539 
 
 
should still be considered nonobvious if they have unexpected and superior 
properties,
186 the PTO is normally required to evaluate the patentability of 
drugs long before any reliable evidence exists of their possible, unexpected 
benefits.
187  Pharmaceutical patents are typically filed when drugs are in early 
preclinical research,
188 whereas the important properties of drugs are often 
not known until later on in preclinical development,
189 and accurate predic-
tions  of  their  therapeutic  value  are  almost  always  impossible  before  the 
completion of clinical trials.
190  Nevertheless, patent examiners are left to 
judge the therapeutic properties of new drugs based on the results of early 
preclinical experiments, sometimes rejecting patents on potentially lifesaving 
new drugs because, in their judgment, those preclinical test results were not 
sufficiently surprising.
191  At a point in the process where neither physicians 
nor the FDA would dare hazard a guess as to the therapeutic effects of a 
drug,  the  nonobviousness  doctrine  requires  the  PTO  to  make  those 
judgments.  As such, to the extent that the patent system is used to diff-




186. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
187. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 94, §§ 2141, 2143.02, 2144.09. 
188. Galli & Faller, supra note 130, at 688; Harold C. Wegner & Stephen B. Maebius, The 
Global  Biotech  Patent  Application,  in B IOTECHNOLOGY  LAW:  BIOTECHNOLOGY  PATENTS  & 
BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 87, 129–30 (2001). 
189. Galli & Faller, supra note 130, at 689; Wermuth, supra note 184, at 72. 
190. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, 
BUSINESS,  REGULATORY, A N D  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  ISSUES  CITED  AS  HAMPERING  DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 25–26 (2006) (stating that the inability of drug sponsors to consistently 
predict the efficacy of drug compounds has led to an increasing number of clinical failures). 
191. See, e.g., Ex parte Cuthbertson, No. 2007-1140, 2007 WL 1766994, at *4, *3–5  (B.P.A.I. 
May 24, 2007) (rejecting the claims to a cancer-diagnostic agent because there was “no evidentiary 
support  for  Appellants’  statement  that  the  results  obtained  with  ‘present  invention’  are 
‘unexpectedly’  better  and  ‘superior’  when  compared  to  [the  older]  compounds”);  Ex  parte 
Stapleton, No. 2005-1797, 2006 WL 1665384, at *5, *3–6 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2006) (rejecting a patent 
on an HIV drug for obviousness because there was insufficient evidence that it “exhibited any 
unexpected benefit over that taught by the combination of prior art relied upon by the examiner”); 
Ex parte Bodmer, No. 2001-1044, 2004 WL 77132, at *3–8 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004) (rejecting a 
patent on a drug for pulmonary and other fungal infections on grounds of obviousness because there 
was “no evidence that the claimed compositions [had] any unexpected properties compared to the 
closest prior art”); Ex parte Del Bianco, No. 1996-0756, 1996 WL 1799830, at *1, *1–2 (B.P.A.I. 
Jan. 1,  1996)  (rejecting  the  claims  to  a  method  of  treating  breast cancer  through  the  combined 
administration  of  two  drugs  because  there  was  insufficient  evidence  that  the  “results  [were] 
unexpectedly synergistic”). 
192. Even  if  the  patent  system  were  capable of  identifying  me-too  drugs  that  would  have 
virtually identical therapeutic properties to previously patented drugs, it would still be dangerous to 
use the patent system to deter their development.  The me-too phenomenon in pharmaceuticals is 
largely  the  result  of  development  races,  where  competing  firms  begin  developing  similar 
compounds—i.e.,  drugs  in  the  same  therapeutic  class—at  roughly  the  same  time  and  end  up 
launching closely related drugs within a few years of one another.  See Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie 
Paquette,  The  Economics  of  Follow-On  Drug  Research  and  Development,  22 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1,  9–10,  10  fig.4  (Supp.  2,  2004)  (finding  that  two-thirds  of  follow-on 
drugs in the late 1990s had already entered phase III clinical trials by the time the first-in-class drug 
was approved).  The PTO could try to stop these races by denying patent protection to all of the 540  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
Even if the nonobviousness requirement could be administered reliably 
by the PTO to single out low-value drugs and deny them patents, which is 
doubtful, other aspects of the nonobviousness doctrine would work against 
this goal.  The test for nonobviousness does not target the drugs with phar-
macological properties that are equivalent to existing drugs on the market; 
instead, it denies patent protection to the drugs that have expected pharma-
cological properties.  That expectation often comes from prior disclosures of 
compounds that were never developed into FDA-approved drugs and thus are 
not available for use in medical practice.
193  Moreover, even when the PTO 
compares drugs to existing treatments, it will deny them patent protection if 
they  possess  expectedly  superior  properties.
194    If  there  is  a  reasonable 
expectation that a new drug will be superior to known treatments, or perhaps 
even  an  expectation  that  it  will  be t h e  o n l y  s u c c e s s f u l  t r e a t m e n t  f o r  a  
condition, then the drug is not truly inventive in the eyes of the PTO and will 
be deemed obvious.  For example, in a case where the court decided whether 
to grant a patent on a pain reliever that, in its own words, appeared to possess 
“substantially greater analgesic effectiveness than one of the most, if not the 
most,  active  analgesic  compound  of  the  art,”  the  court  rejected  the 
 
drugs in a class other than the first one (or few) to be patented.  To the extent to which these 
development races lead to wasteful R&D expenditures, preventing them would be beneficial.  See 
Rai, supra note 34, at 205–06.  Moreover, since me-too drugs reduce prices and steal market share 
from the breakthrough drug that preceded them, blocking their development would increase the 
expected  return  from  developing  breakthrough  products.    Frank R.  Lichtenberg  &  Tomas J. 
Philipson,  The  Dual  Effects  of  Intellectual  Property  Regulations:  Within-  and  Between-Patent 
Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceuticals Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 643, 646–47 (2002).  This 
strategy is risky, however, since the PTO would usually have to decide which drugs in the class can 
be patented before any of them have proven successful, and they might pick the wrong ones.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 205–07.  Drug development is very unpredictable and involves a 
high rate of failure.  See supra note 168.  The first drug in a class to be patented might fail in 
development, while a patent application claiming what appears to be a me-too drug could turn out to 
be the only drug in its class to be successfully developed.  Rejecting patent applications on me-too 
drugs could therefore prevent the public from receiving any drug from that class.  The PTO could 
try to avoid this problem by granting a single patent that covers the entire class of drugs, trusting the 
patent holder to select the best drugs of the class and make the socially optimal investment in their 
development.  Cf. Kitch, supra note 13, at 276 (outlining the prospect theory of patents).  Granting a 
broad monopoly at such an early stage in pharmaceutical R&D might stifle innovation, however.  
Cf. Merges & Nelson, supra note 14, at 871, 871–79 (challenging Kitch’s view “that coordinated 
development  is  better  than  rivalrous”).    There  is  great  uncertainty  involved  in  selecting  an 
appropriate lead compound for development and great difficulty in modifying that  compound’s 
structure to maximize its chances of success in clinical trials.  See Paul W. Erhardt, Medicinal 
Chemistry  in  the  New  Millennium:  A  Glance  into  the  Future,  in  1  DRUG  DISCOVERY  AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 39, at 17, 33 (explaining that the predictive value of the technologies 
used for selecting and optimizing lead compounds for development “is best likened to a deep, dark 
chasm”).  Hence, allowing multiple firms to tackle these problems may sometimes be required for 
the production of a single successful drug within a class.  Cf. Paul D. Leeson & Brian Springthorpe, 
The  Influence  of  Drug-Like  Concepts  on Decision-Making  in  Medicinal  Chemistry,  6  NATURE 
REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 881, 886, 889 (2007); Mitscher & Dutta, supra note 39, at 109, 108–
09 (“[T]wo different groups of investigators starting with the same lead molecule will usually finish 
with different final drugs.”). 
193. See infra text accompanying note 221. 
194. See supra note 191. 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  541 
 
 
application  because  it  thought  the  drug’s  superior  properties  were 
unsurprising in light of its chemical structure.
195  Although some obvious 
drugs may be simple clones of existing treatments, others may represent sig-
nificant advances in medical technology, and the nonobviousness doctrine 
pays little attention to the difference. 
The rule that drugs must have unexpectedly superior properties to be 
patented can make it especially difficult to patent the drugs created by en-
hancing  compounds  with  known  therapeutic  effects.
196    Pharmaceutical 
companies employ medicinal chemists to turn known compounds—perhaps 
existing drugs, failed drug candidates, or other public-domain compounds 
with known biologic effects—into safe and effective drugs by altering their 
structures to improve desirable pharmacological properties while minimizing 
negative ones.
197  Many of these drugs have proven immensely valuable to 
society,
198 but because medicinal chemists work by altering compounds in 
ways that they expect will produce positive results,
199 the drugs they invent 
are vulnerable to the “unexpected results” test of nonobviousness.  Indeed, 
the  courts  have  invalidated  numerous  drug  patents  under  these 
circumstances,
200 always in accordance with the principle that “any superior 
 
195. In re Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013, 1017, 1017–18 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
196. E.g., Alan Dove, Redesigner Drugs, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953, 953 (2004); see 
also Wermuth, supra note 184, at 70–72, 77–82 (describing the strategies employed by medicinal 
chemists to create new drugs by modifying known compounds). 
197. PATRICK, supra note 131, at 75; Shayne Cox Gad, Introduction to DRUG DISCOVERY 
HANDBOOK 1, 8 (Shayne Cox Gad ed., 2005); see also, e.g., David J. Carini et al., The Discovery 
and  Development  of  Angiotensin  II  Antagonists,  in I NTEGRATION  OF  PHARMACEUTICAL 
DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT: CASE HISTORIES, supra note 136, at 29, 29–30 (describing the 
development of losartan). 
198. Cuatrecasas, supra note 135, at 2841; see, e.g., Dove, supra note 196, at 953 (explaining 
that  medicinal  chemists  are  often  able  to  redesign  old  drugs  to  eliminate  harmful  side  effects, 
potentially  saving  lives);  Soudijn,  supra  note  184,  at  162–65  (noting  that  medicinal  chemists 
sometimes create new classes of drugs by manipulating the chemical structure of existing drugs). 
199. Camille G. Wermuth, Medicinal Chemistry: Definition and Objectives, the Three Main 
Phases  of  Drug  Activity,  Drug  and  Disease  Classifications,  in T HE  PRACTICE  OF  MEDICINAL 
CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 29, 34.  For an in-depth description of the processes employed by 
medicinal chemists to alter compounds to produce positive results, see generally THE PRACTICE OF 
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 173–600. 
200. See,  e.g.,  Pfizer,  Inc.  v.  Apotex,  Inc.,  480  F.3d  1348,  1368,  1371  (Fed.  Cir.  2007) 
(invalidating the patent on Norvasc
® (amlodipine besylate), a treatment for hypertension and angina 
that was designed by medicinal chemists to solve problems related to the stability of a closely 
related  compound  (amlodipine  maleate)  that  precluded  commercialization,  wherein  the  Federal 
Circuit found that Norvasc
® was obvious because the process that led to it “was ‘nothing more than 
routine’ application of a well-known problem-solving strategy”); see also Alza Corp. v. Mylan 
Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (invalidating the patent on controlled-release 
oxybutynin (Ditropan XL
®), a 24-hour urinary-incontinence drug, because “a person of ordinary 
skill  in  the  art  would . . . have  perceived  a  reasonable  likelihood  of  success”  in  the  controlled-
release formulation having therapeutic value); Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 
1345,  1345–47  (Fed.  Cir.  2006)  (denying  a  motion  for  a  preliminary  injunction  against  the 
defendant’s  sale  of  a  generic  version  of  Biaxin X L ,  a  c o n t r o l l e d - r e l e a s e  a n t i b i o t i c ,  b e c a u s e  i t s  
benefits  in  “the  reduction  of  systemic  side  effects  would  not  be  surprising  and  would  not  be 
unexpected”); Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (invalidating 542  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
property  must  be  unexpected t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  e v i d e n c e  o f  n o n -
obviousness.”
201  Strict adherence to this sort of nonobviousness standard 
generates a policy that systematically targets the drugs created by medicinal 
chemists that appear most likely to be effective and bars them from patent 
protection. 
 T h e   p r o b l e m   o f   o b v i o u s — a n d   t h u s   unpatentable—drugs  promises  to 
grow worse over time because the nonobviousness requirement, almost by 
definition, turns progress in the pharmaceutical sciences against itself; that is, 
it denies patent protection to new drugs based on the very advances in sci-
ence that led to their discovery.  In the past, the “unpredictable nature of 
chemical reactions” shielded most pharmaceutical patents from obviousness 
challenges.
202  Over the past twenty years, however, researchers have worked 
to reduce this uncertainty by developing more mechanistic and predictive 
approaches to drug discovery: ones that are less dependent on the trial-and-
error process.
203  Through their successes, medicinal chemists are beginning 
to  get  better  at  predicting  the  pharmacological  properties  of  compounds 
based on their structure.
204  While much progress remains to be made,
205 even 
 
the patent on Moduretic
®, a fixed-dose combination diuretic used to treat cardiovascular and renal 
diseases, because the favorable interaction between the two active ingredients “was to be expected 
from the known natriuretic properties of the two diuretics,” meaning that its therapeutic results were 
not “unexpectedly good”); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097, 1097–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(affirming the rejection of a patent on using amitriptyline to treat depression because a medicinal 
chemist “would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine [a known antidepressant] in the 
alleviation of depression in humans,” and there was no “evidence to show that the properties of the 
compounds differed in such an appreciable degree that the difference was really unexpected”); In re 
Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013, 1017, 1017–18 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (affirming the rejection of a patent 
application on an analgesic that had “substantially greater analgesic effectiveness than one of the 
most, if not the most, active analgesic compound[s] of the art” because the structural difference 
between  the  two  drugs  was  known  to  produce  greater  analgesic  activity  in  other  compounds); 
Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330, 371, 359–65, 369–71 
(D. Del. 1991) (invalidating the patent on atenolol (Tenormin
® & Tenoretic
®), a beta-blocker used 
to  treat  hypertension  and  angina,  because  it  found  the  defendant’s  expert  witness  to  be  more 
credible and persuasive than the plaintiff’s witnesses on the question of whether “atenolol produces 
unexpected  results,  such  as  increased  reductions  in  blood  pressure  and  heart  rate  and  a  lower 
incidence of [central nervous system] side effects . . . as compared to other beta-blockers”). 
201. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1371. 
202. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C, 2001 WL 1397304, 
at *5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2001); Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., No. Civ. 01-867-B, 2001 WL 
34125673, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001); cf. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 94, 
§ 2144.08(e) (“If the technology is unpredictable, it is less likely that structurally similar species 
will render a claimed species obvious because it may not be reasonable to infer that they would 
share similar properties.”). 
203. PATRICK, supra note 131, at 1; Lawrence J. Lesko et al., Optimizing the Science of Drug 
Development: Opportunities for Better Candidate Selection and Accelerated Evaluation in Humans, 
17 PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 1335, 1335 (2000); Oliver Schwardt et al., Drug Discovery Today, 3 
CURRENT TOPICS MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 1, 1 (2003). 
204. See, e.g., Alex Polinsky, High-Speed Chemistry Libraries: Assessment of Drug-Likeness, 
in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 147, 153 (discussing solubility, 
stability, and toxicity of compounds and the ability to make predictions about those properties based 
on  chemical  structure);  Han  van  de  Waterbeemd  &  Sally  Rose,  Quantitative  Approaches  to 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  543 
 
 
now medicinal chemists often try to synthesize and test only the most prom-
ising compounds when searching for a new drug candidate, thus helping to 
improve  the  efficiency  and  output  of  the  drug-discovery  process.
206  
Unfortunately, this more predictive approach to drug discovery comes at the 
expense of strong patent protection,
207 because the closer an invention gets to 
having been produced “according to known methods” that “yield predictable 
results,” the more likely it is to be considered obvious.
208  As researchers de-
velop  increasingly  effective  ways  to  identify  promising  drug  candidates 
without  trial-and-error  experimentation,  the  nonobviousness  doctrine  will 
likely become an ever-more serious barrier to the patentability of the drugs 
they discover.
209 
The  Supreme  Court’s  recent  decision  in  KSR  International,  Inc.  v. 
Teleflex
210 exacerbated this tension between the pharmaceutical sciences and 
the  unexpected-results  test  of  nonobviousness.    The  Court  chastised  the 
Federal Circuit for not applying the nonobviousness standard strictly enough 
and made it clear that when researchers pursue “a finite number of identified, 
 
Structure-Activity Relationships, in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 
351, 352 (chronicling advances in QSAR methods and chemometrics that have improved the ability 
to design drugs using quantitative analysis); Camille G. Wermuth, Specific Substituent Groups, in 
THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 303, 303–04 (explaining the effect of 
altering the substituent groups of a compound on its pharmacological properties). 
205. See Erhardt, supra note 192, at 79–80 tbl.2.10 (summarizing future developments in drug 
discovery). 
206. GARETH  THOMAS,  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  MEDICINAL  CHEMISTRY  95  (2003);  see 
Camille G.  Wermuth,  Application  Strategies  for  Primary  Structure–Activity  Relationship 
Exploration, in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 128, at 289, 289 (offering a 
proposal to make the discovery process “easier and more efficicacious”). 
207. Of  course,  if  the  science  of  medicinal  chemistry  were  to  ever  reach  the  point  where 
extensive clinical trials were no longer necessary, the now-inevitable clash between pharmaceutical 
science and the unexpected-results test for nonobviousness would disappear. 
208. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2007). 
209. Philippe Ducor made a similar argument about technological progress in drug discovery 
and the nonobviousness test, although his observation focused on specific types of drug-discovery 
tools and may have been mistaken about the legal effects of those technologies.  Ducor, supra note 
176, at 447–63.  Ducor, along with many others at the time, optimistically believed that high-
throughput screening (an automated process of trial-and-error testing that works simultaneously on 
large  numbers  of  distinct  compounds)  would  ultimately  “yield  products  having  predetermined 
properties with the highest possible degree of predictability.”  Id. at 446.  As a result, he concluded 
that  the  technique  would  “render  its  products . . . unpatentable  due  to  obviousness,”  thereby 
“threaten[ing] the incentives of the pharmaceutical industry to invest in the[ir] . . . development.”  
Id. at 461.  In truth, because high-throughput screening is just an efficient form of blind trial-and-
error  experimentation,  it  probably  shields  drugs  from  obviousness  challenges.    The  individual 
compounds tested in the experiment do not have a reasonable likelihood of success ex ante, and 
high-throughput screening does not always identify any promising leads.  See Wermuth, supra note 
184, at 75–76.  As a result, the drugs discovered through high-throughput screening will likely 
remain nonobvious.  Compare Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 
1356  (Fed.  Cir. 2007)  (explaining  that  to  support a  finding  of  obviousness,  the  choice  of  lead 
compounds must have been obvious based on the prior art), with Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 
F.3d 1348, 1367–69, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that the routine optimization of a known 
compound generally will not impart patentability to the resulting product). 
210. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 544  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
predictable  solutions,”  one  of  which  ultimately  “leads  to  the  anticipated 
success,” the resulting invention is unlikely to be patentable.
211  Although 
drug discovery continues to involve a great deal of uncertainty,
212 this height-
ened  standard  of  patentability  threatens  to  worsen  an  already  serious 
problem, perhaps preventing even more drugs from being patented.
213 
As with the novelty requirement, it is impossible to know exactly how 
many drugs are denied patent protection as a result of the nonobviousness 
standard, but the problem appears to be substantial.  The PTO has rejected 
numerous drug patents for being obvious in light of prior publications,
214 in-
cluding  patents  on  drugs  for  cancer,
215  HIV,
216 h y p e r t e n s i o n ,




220  One medicinal-chemistry textbook describes 
the nonobviousness requirement as a “significant problem in obtaining valid 
and effective patent protection” for drugs, and notes that that “[i]nventors’ 
previous patents and publications often . . . [give them] difficulty patenting 
 
211.  Id. at 1732. 
212. See  Rebecca  Deprez-Poulain  &  Benoit  Deprez,  Facts,  Figures  and  Trends  in  Lead 
Generation, 4 CURRENT TOPICS IN MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 569, 569 (2004) (remarking on the high 
failure rate in drug development). 
213. Shortly after KSR International v. Teleflex, several commentators predicted that the ruling 
would make it harder to patent certain types of new drugs.  E.g., Calvert D. Crary, Impact of KSR v. 
Teleflex on Pharmaceutical Industry, C.D. CRARY & CO. LITIGATION NOTES, May 2007, at 1–2; 
see also STEVEN R. LUDWIG & MATTHEW E. KELLEY, VENABLE LLP, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT AFTER KSR INTERNATIONAL V. TELEFLEX 2 (2007), available at http:// 
www. venable.com/docs/pubs/1684.pdf.  The drug patents predicted to be most affected by KSR are 
those covering new drug formulations, controlled-release drugs, enantiomers, new salt structures of 
known  drugs,  drugs  that  are  not  first-in-class,  combinations  of  known  drugs,  and  minor 
modifications to older compounds.  E.g., LUDWIG & KELLEY, supra, at 2; Crary, supra, at 1.  Of 
course, the true impact of KSR on pharmaceutical patents might be quite modest.  Much depends on 
how the lower courts implement the “obvious to try” standard. 
214. E.g., Ex parte Selzer, No. 2006-0760, 2007 WL 630222, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 28, 2007); Ex 
parte  Arbiser,  No.  2007-0091,  2007  WL  952197,  at  *1  (B.P.A.I.  Feb. 6,  2007);  Ex  parte 
Skurkovich, No. 2006-0624, 2006 WL 1665596, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2006); Ex parte Gormley, 
No. 2004-0543, 2004 WL 4980874, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 29, 2004); Ex parte Lapeurta, No. 2003-
1745, 2004 WL 318776, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex parte Bodmer, No. 2001-1044, 2004 WL 
77132, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004). 
215. E.g., Ex parte Cuthbertson, No. 2007-1140, 2007 WL 1766994, at *2 (B.P.A.I. May 24, 
2007); Ex parte Rajopadhye, No. 2007-0856, 2007 WL 2020938, at *1 (B.P.A.I. May 21, 2007); Ex 
parte Chen, No. 2006-3290, 2007 WL 902328, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 16, 2007); Ex parte Barbera-
Guillem, No. 2006-2466, 2006 WL 3502881, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 30, 2006); Ex parte Shawver, No. 
2004-0005, 2004 WL 4979076, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 4, 2004); Ex parte Linnenbach, No. 2001-1258, 
2004 WL 77144, at *6 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex parte Rosenblatt, No. 2004-1505, 2004 WL 
2733627, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex parte Bianco, No. 1996-0756, 1996 WL 1799830, at *1 
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1996). 
216. Ex parte Maury, No. 2007-1621, 2007 WL 2125099, at *2–7 (B.P.A.I. July 24, 2007); Ex 
parte  Stapleton,  No.  2005-1797,  2006  WL  1665384,  at  *3–6  (B.P.A.I.  Jan. 1,  2006);  Ex  parte 
Williams, No. 2005-0902, 2005 WL 4773220, at *4–6 (B.P.A.I. June 22, 2005). 
217. Ex parte Pershadsingh, No. 95-0885, 1997 WL 1897858, at *2–5 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 14, 1997) 
(rejecting on grounds of obviousness all but one of the claims in the patent application). 
218. Ex parte Childers, No. 2003-0890, 2003 WL 25277879, at *3–5 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2003). 
219. Ex parte Schmitke, No. 2007-0854, 2007 WL 2125094, at *5–6 (B.P.A.I. July 24, 2007). 
220. Ex parte Horwitz, No. 2002-1740, 2003 WL 25283780, at *5–7 (B.P.A.I. June 19, 2003). 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  545 
 
 
their chosen compounds because of their earlier public disclosure of com-
pounds  long  since  discarded.”
221    The  real  problem  is  the  nature  of  the 
nonobviousness requirement itself, which withholds patent protection from 
the drugs that appear most promising in early research and penalizes progress 
in the pharmaceutical sciences.  Given these strange tendencies within the 
doctrine, it is not surprising that drug researchers frequently encounter the 
nonobviousness requirement as a barrier to patenting their discoveries. 
 
IV.  Evidence  that  the  Patent  Standards  Are  Deterring  Pharmaceutical 
Innovation 
More than firms in any other industry, pharmaceutical companies rely 
on the patent system to secure a return on their R&D investments, particu-
larly the large investments they make in clinical trials.
222  Under the novelty 
and  nonobviousness  requirements,  socially  valuable  drugs  can  be  deemed 
unpatentable before they have been tested in those trials and thus before they 
can be sold to the public.  Without the patent system to incent these post-
invention efforts, private industry is apt to simply ignore such drugs, likely 
resulting in their loss to the public.  These missing drugs are nearly impossi-
ble to observe, however, because pharmaceutical companies rarely publicize 
the drugs that they drop from development.  To determine whether the nov-
elty and nonobviousness requirements are stifling pharmaceutical innovation, 
therefore,  this  Part  examines  how  patents  influence  the  R&D  decision-
making process inside pharmaceutical companies and finds that the patent 
standards routinely deter private industry from developing promising drug 
candidates.    According  to  academic  researchers,  industry  insiders,  and 
medicinal-chemistry  textbooks,  pharmaceutical  companies  systematically 
screen  their  drug  candidates  to  exclude  the  ones  lacking  strong  patent 
protection, checking their patentability at least three different times during 
drug development.  The existence of these screening procedures and the fre-
quency with which they influence companies’ R&D investments indicate that 
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements are likely denying the public 
access to new drugs. 
Pharmaceutical companies examine the patentability of their potential 
drug candidates at the beginning of each research project, and they regularly 
drop ones that appear to be in the public domain.
223  Some version of this 
 
221. Souleau, supra note 128, at 721. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 20–29. 
223. See  Telephone  Interview  with  Theodore  J.  Torphy,  supra  note  138  (explaining  that 
companies evaluate the patentability of their drug candidates before advancing them into preclinical 
development, and that unless they are confident that a candidate can be effectively patented, they 
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patent  screen  has  existed  since  at  least  the  early  1960s.
224  I n  m o d e r n  
practice,  company  scientists  often  start  preclinical  research  with  a  list  of 
compounds  being  considered  for  development  into  a  particular  type  of 
drug,
225 and their selection of compounds is often critical to the project’s 
success.
226  A c c o r d i n g  t o  m e d i c i n a l - c h e m i s t r y  t e x t b o o k s  a n d  a c a d e m i c  
researchers,  one  of  the  first  tasks  performed  in  narrowing  that  list  is  the 
crossing off of any compound that the scientists think cannot be patented,
227 
applying a per se rule that unpatentable drugs will not be developed. 
In addition to this initial patent screen, pharmaceutical companies check 
the patentability of their drug candidates at least twice more before clinical 
trials, screening out any compounds with weak patent protection that escaped 
the prior review.  Once the researchers working on a particular project have 
narrowed their search down to just a few drug candidates, those compounds 
are given to a patent attorney to evaluate their patentability and file a patent 
over  them.
228    Later,  when  one  of  those  drug  candidates  (hopefully)  gets 
close to clinical trials, the firm will inspect its patent protection again, using 
in-house or outside counsel to perform a thorough review of the strength of 
its patents.
229  According to industry insiders, this last audit is considered a 
 
224. In  1962,  when  a  change  in  government  policy  made  it  difficult  for  pharmaceutical 
companies to effectively patent compounds that were originally synthesized through NIH-funded 
research,  pharmaceutical  companies  simply  stopped  screening  those  compounds  for  therapeutic 
activity.    Rebecca  S.  Eisenberg,  Public  Research  and  Private  Development:  Patents  and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1682–83 (1996).  
The standoff ended only when an investigation by the Comptroller General forced a change in the 
policy.  Id. at 1683–84. 
225. E.g., Malcolm MacCoss & Thomas A. Baillie, Organic Chemistry in Drug Discovery, 303 
SCIENCE 1810, 1810 (2004); Mitscher & Dutta, supra note 39, at 108–09. 
226. MacCoss & Baillie, supra note 225, at 1812. 
227. See George deStevens, Lead Structure Discovery and Development, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE 
MEDICINAL  CHEMISTRY:  THE  RATIONAL  DESIGN,  MECHANISTIC  STUDY  &  THERAPEUTIC 
APPLICATION OF CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS § 3.2, at 266 (Corwin Hansch ed., 1990) (“Needless to 
say, the lead structure series must be patentable.”); Mitscher & Dutta, supra note 39, at 115 (“[T]he 
costs of a new agent are so high that no drug will be introduced if there are insufficient proprietary 
rights in all significant global markets . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Brian J. Druker, supra note 
40 (stating that after identifying a possible lead compound, a drug company will immediately check 
its patentability, and if it discovers that the compound is in the public domain or has been patented 
by someone else, which happens frequently, standard practice is to drop the compound and look for 
another lead); cf. Showell & Mills, supra note 137, at 551 (“During the lead optimization phase of 
projects, additional factors contributing to subsequent failure may include poor portfolio decision-
making and a sub-optimal IP.”). 
228. Edlyn  S.  Simmons, Prior  Art  Searching  in  the  Preparation  of  Pharmaceutical  Patent 
Applications, 3 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 52, 54 (1998); Janice Klunder & Sian Griffiths, Legal 
Dep’t,  Millennium  Pharm.,  Inc.,  A  Beautiful  Friendship:  The  Information  Professional  and  the 
Patent Attorney/Agent, Presentation at the S.L.A. Pharmaceutical & Health Technology Division 
Spring Meeting (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://units.sla.org/division/dpht/meetings/spring2007/ 
klunder_griffiths_2007s.ppt. 
229. See  Telephone  Interview  with  Anonymous,  Dir.  of  Intellectual  Prop.,  mid-sized 
pharmaceutical company (Jan. 2007) (stating that companies will have thoroughly evaluated the 
patentability of their drug candidates roughly six to twelve months before filing an Investigational 
New Drug Application (INDA) with the FDA to begin clinical trials); Telephone Interview with 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  547 
 
 
“gate-keeping  event”  before  clinical  trials,
230  and  it  is  not  unusual  for  a 
pharmaceutical company to sour on an otherwise promising drug candidate 
after  their  attorneys  turn  up  a  prior  disclosure  that  threatens  its  patent 
protection.
231  These stories from industry insiders are consistent with reports 
from drug researchers in government and academia that private industry re-
fuses  to  take  over  the  development  of  their  drugs  without  patents
232 a n d  
reports from venture capitalists that strong patent portfolios are a prerequisite 
for  investing  in  biotechnology  companies.
233    A  basic  adage  in  the 
pharmaceutical industry is that drugs without strong patent protection are not 
worth developing,
234 and the purpose of these screening mechanisms is to 
ensure that companies do not move forward on drug candidates unless their 
patents over them are secure.
235 
The  screening  procedures  used  by  pharmaceutical  companies  are 
generally  focused  on  a  drug’s  patentability  in  the  United  States  and  thus 
exclude drugs from development that lack U.S. patent coverage even if they 
can be protected in other countries.  In the global drug market, roughly half 
of industry profits come from sales in the United States.
236  The other major 
markets—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, and the United Kingdom—
 
Theodore J. Torphy, supra note 138 (explaining that pharmaceutical companies use in-house or 
outside counsel to do a comprehensive patent search on their drug candidates during the later stages 
of preclinical development, before any “real money” is spent). 
230. Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Dir. of Intellectual Prop., supra note 229; see also 
BARTFAI  &  LEES,  supra  note  135,  at  113  tbl.12.1,  135  tbl.13.1;  Telephone  Interview  with 
Theodore J. Torphy, supra note 138 (explaining that drugs found to have weak patent protection at 
this stage are unlikely to advance into clinical trials). 
231. See  Telephone  Interview  with  Anonymous,  Senior  Intellectual  Prop.  Counsel,  large 
pharmaceutical company (Jan. 2007) (noting that a prior disclosure will usually kill a drug project); 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Dir. of Intellectual Prop., supra note 229 (explaining that 
the strength of patent protection influences the company’s decision over which drug candidates to 
pursue, and that when attorneys find a prior disclosure that weakens those patent rights, companies 
are much less likely to develop the drug). 
232. See supra note 40. 
233. E.g., Suzanne Berry, Biotech Meets the Investors, 20 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 370, 371 
(2002); Interview by Joanna Pinto with Hans Kupper, Partner, Global Life Sci. Ventures, in 9 DRUG 
DISCOVERY TECH. 909, 912 (2004). 
234. See BARTFAI & LEES, supra note 135, at 135 tbl.13.1; SCHACTER, supra note 39, at 52; 
Fredric J.  Cohen,  Macro  Trends  in  Pharmaceutical  Innovation,  4  NATURE  REVIEWS:  DRUG 
DISCOVERY 78, 80 (2005); Gwynne & Heebner, supra note 39, at 2086; Mitscher & Dutta, supra 
note 39, at 104, 115 (all indicating that the high cost of drug development explains pharmaceutical 
firms’  unwillingness  to  invest  in  drug  development  without  first  achieving  a  proprietary  patent 
position). 
235. Pharmaceutical companies also rely on these reviews to find patents held by other firms 
that they might infringe upon if they were to develop the drug candidate.  Telephone Interview with 
Theodore J. Torphy, supra note 138; see Warren D. Woessner, Preparing Patent Legal Opinions 
2006,  in P REPARING  PATENT  LEGAL  OPINIONS  2006,  at  85,  85–105  (2006)  (summarizing  the 
process and important aspects of preparing product clearing opinions). 
236. Press Release, IMS Health Inc., Global Pharmaceutical Sales by Region, 2006 (Mar. 20, 
2007),  available  at  http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/ 
Top_Line_Data/Global%20Pharmaceutical%20Sales%20by%20Region%202006.pdf. 548  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
generate a much smaller share of industry revenue.
237  As a result, private 
industry will screen drugs out of development based solely on their lack of 
patentability in the United States, paying little attention to the opportunities 
for protection elsewhere.
238 
  For most of these discarded drugs, the reason why their patent protection 
is inadequate relates either directly or indirectly to the novelty and nonobvi-
ousness  requirements  under  U.S.  law.
239    As  discussed  in  Part II,  prior 
publications that describe a drug or cause it to appear obvious can prevent 
anyone from later patenting it.
240  Those prior disclosures sometimes leave 
room for a narrow patent on the drug,
241 but many times those patents are 
ineffective,
242 because their limited scope would allow competitors to launch 
generics  without  infringing  the  patent.
243  A l t h o u g h  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  
 
237. Japan generated less than 10% of total global pharmaceutical sales, and the five major 
European markets—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom—together accounted 
for less than 20%.  See Press Release, IMS Health Inc., IMS Health Reports Global Pharmaceutical 
Market Grew 7.0 Percent in 2006, to $643 Billion (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ims 
health.com (follow Press Room link; then follow News Releases; then select 2007 from the drop-
down menu; then follow the link for the Press release). 
238. Cf. BARTFAI & LEES, supra note 135, at 138 (“[U]nless the American marketing arm of a 
multinational company says: ‘It will be marketed in the States,’ there is no real point even to make 
the drug.  If . . . a company doesn’t have a lot of patent life left, then the marketers in the United 
States won’t be interested.  And it is nonnegotiable . . . .”). 
239. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements define the scope of the public domain and 
are therefore the only doctrines that can prevent a valuable drug from being patented.  Courts and 
the PTO sometimes reject or invalidate drug patents based on other doctrines, including the utility 
and  enablement  requirements.    E.g.,  Cooper,  supra  note  98  (giving  examples  of  HIV  and 
Alzheimer’s drugs that were rejected due to the enablement requirement).  See generally JOHN R. 
THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 60–83, 204–08 (2005) (discussing the key concepts and 
case  law  relating  to  the  utility  and  enablement  requirements).    Without  the  novelty  and 
nonobviousness requirements, however, these failings could be corrected in a subsequent patent 
filing (unless the drug had no utility or could not be manufactured or used, in which case it would 
be of no consequence). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 119–47, 214–21. 
241. See Simmons, supra note 228, at 54. 
242. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1328–
29 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding no infringement of the patent on Ultracet
!, which was narrowed during 
a reissue proceeding to overcome a prior disclosure of the drug); Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. 
Co.,  384  F.3d  1333,  1341–42  (Fed.  Cir.  2004)  (upholding  the  validity  of  the  patent  on  the 
hypertension drug Plendil
! based on a narrow interpretation of its claim scope, but ruling that a 
generic version of the drug did not infringe the patent because of that same narrow interpretation); 
Novartis  Corp.  v.  Ben  Venue  Labs.,  Inc.,  271  F.3d  1043,  1045  (Fed.  Cir.  2001)  (affirming  a 
noninfringement  judgment  of  the  formulation  patent  covering  Aredia
!,  a  treatment  for  bone 
metastases, where the compound was not new and thus could not be patented). 
243. Certain types of drug patents are particularly vulnerable to these design-around efforts, 
while others are not.  If a drug only has one active ingredient and that ingredient is patented, then 
the patent will be difficult for generics to design around even if it is narrow since any change the 
generic  firms  make  to  the  active  ingredient  would  likely  trigger  the  FDA’s  clinical-trial 
requirements.  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.93(b) (2008) (defining the abbreviated application process for a 
new drug in which one active ingredient is substituted for another).  Similarly, if a pharmaceutical 
company has a patent on the only FDA-approved use for a drug, then generic manufacturers cannot 
receive FDA approval to sell that drug for its approved use without infringing the patent.  MARTIN 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  549 
 
 
companies can occasionally block those generics by arguing that they are 
functionally  equivalent  to  what  was  claimed  in  their  patent,
244  courts  are 
reluctant to apply this doctrine of equivalents,
245 and it can only be used 
when  the  novelty  and  nonobviousness  requirements  would  not  have  pre-
vented  the  patent  claims  from  encompassing  the  generics.
246  M o r e o v e r ,  
pharmaceutical companies are often estopped from invoking this doctrine by 
their own prior statements to the PTO, where they had to interpret their pat-
ent claims narrowly to overcome a PTO rejection for obviousness or lack of 
novelty.
247  Similar problems can arise if the pharmaceutical company failed 
to inform the PTO of a prior reference that was material to their drug’s nov-
elty or nonobviousness.
248  Deliberately withholding such a reference from 
the  PTO  is  considered  inequitable  conduct  and  can  render  the  patent 
unenforceable, even when the patent is valid.
249  Concerns over the patent 
protection on a drug related to any of these doctrines are likely to result in it 
being considered unpatentable, and thus, the drug is liable to be screened out 
of development. 
 A l t h o u g h   u n p a t e n t a b l e   d r u g s  o c c a s i o n a l l y  s l i p  t h r o u g h  t h e  
pharmaceutical companies’ screening procedures and are developed despite 
such  inadequacies  in  their  patent  protection,  given  the  careful  efforts  by 
 
A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA & PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-
CYCLE  MANAGEMENT  36–38  (2005).    If  the  novelty  or  nonobviousness  requirement  makes  it 
impossible to patent a drug’s active ingredient or the medical use(s) for which it will be approved, 
see supra notes 72–81, 100–03, 140–47, 191–98, 210–17 and accompanying text, then firms can 
sometimes receive a narrower patent, such as one on a particular crystalline or salt form of the drug, 
a route of administering it (including the addition of other ingredients to the drug that affect its 
absorption, distribution, or metabolism in the body), and particular dosage forms or strengths of the 
drug.  See VOET, supra, at 35–39 (describing the hierarchy of pharmaceutical patents including 
compound patents, medical-use patents, and formulation patents).  Unlike patents on a drug’s active 
ingredient or its FDA-approved uses, however, these narrower patents are often vulnerable to being 
designed around by generic manufacturers, as the FDA will allow generics onto the market that are 
“not identical to [the] listed drug in route of administration, dosage form, and strength” so long as it 
believes  the  differences  will  not  affect  the  safety  and  effectiveness  of  the  drug.    21  C.F.R. 
§ 314.93(b), (e)(1)(i). 
244. See Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1105–07 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming that 
Abbott Laboratories could rely on the doctrine of equivalents to prove infringement by Dey). 
245. Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters of 
Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113, 1113–14 (2006); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The 
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956–58 (2007); John R. 
Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 87 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 781, 783–89 (2005). 
246. E.g., Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1301–04 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(narrowing  the  patent  on  the  hypertension  drug  Diltiazem
®  based  on  statements  made  during 
prosecution to overcome prior art, such that a generic version of the drug did not infringe the 
patent); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 334, 340–47 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
247. E.g., Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371, 1375–78 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376–79 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
248. E.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Holdings Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 936, 942 (C.D. Cal. 
2005). 
249. E.g., Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684, 687–88 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 550  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
pharmaceutical companies to prevent this from happening, it is likely that the 
vast majority of those drugs never reach the public.  As seen in the cases dis-
cussed in Part II, pharmaceutical companies sometimes develop and market 
new drugs with patents that the courts later invalidate for lack of novelty or 
obviousness.
250  In most of these cases, however, the drugs at issue were 
developed  before  generic  manufacturers  started  to  aggressively  challenge 
pharmaceutical-company patents in the mid-1990s
251 and thus before it be-
came crucial for drugs to be protected by a valid patent.  Pharmaceutical 
companies are now more vigilant in policing their own patents, and with the 
advent of the Internet and browsing technology, it has become much easier 
for firms to locate prior disclosures.
252  In this environment, private industry 
is unlikely to make many mistakes, and drugs with weak patent protection 
will rarely enter clinical trials. 
When a drug is screened out of development under these circumstances, 
the resulting loss to the public is unlikely to be mitigated by the gain of some 
other drug developed in its place.  Good drugs are hard to find,
253 and firms 
cannot easily identify patentable drugs of comparable quality to replace the 
unpatentable ones they discard.
254  Moreover, unless two drugs are so closely 
 
250. See supra notes 100–12, 109–19, 200 and accompanying text. 
251. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 10, 57 
(2002).  Up until the late 1990s, FDA regulations made it difficult for generic-drug companies to 
receive  the  180-day  period  of  generic  exclusivity  intended  to  reward  them  for  successfully 
challenging a drug patent.  See ERNST R. BERNDT ET AL., DO AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS DETER 
PARAGRAPH IV CERTIFICATIONS?: RECENT EVIDENCE 5 (2007), available at http://www.analysis 
group.com/analysisgroup/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/PhRMA_Authorized_Generic_Entry.p
df.  In fact, between 1984 and 1997, there were only three occasions on which the FDA granted a 
180-day exclusivity period to a generic-drug company.  See FTC, supra, at 57.  Not surprisingly, 
generic companies initiated relatively few challenges on pharmaceutical company patents during 
those years.  See BERNDT ET AL., supra, at 19 exh.3; FTC, supra, at 10.  Starting in 1997, however, 
when a federal district court struck down the FDA’s interpretation of the statute regarding the grant 
of 180-day exclusivity periods, see Mova v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 140 
F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the number of generic challenges to pharmaceutical patents increased 
dramatically.  See BERNDT ET AL., supra, at 19 exh.3; FTC, supra, at 10.  Those challenges are now 
so  commonplace  that  the  patents  on  successful  new  drugs  are  almost  guaranteed  to  end  up  in 
litigation.  See Alicia Ault, Generic Drugs: A Big Business Getting Bigger, SCIENTIST, June 20, 
2005, at 36; Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 93, 102 (2004). 
252. See Telephone Interview with Declan Doogan, M.D., President of Research and Dev., 
Amarin  Corp.  (Jan. 25,  2007)  (explaining  that  browsing  technology  makes  it  much  easier  for 
pharmaceutical companies to find patent-busting literature on their own products). 
253. See NIH,  DEP’T  OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH RESPONSE  TO  THE CONFERENCE 
REPORT REQUEST FOR A PLAN TO ENSURE TAXPAYERS’ INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED (2001), http:// 
www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm (explaining that not all NIH-funded research leads to useful 
drugs, because “new chemical entities that could lead to therapeutic products are hard to discover”). 
254. During  early  preclinical  research,  when  company  scientists  are  trying  to  select  a  drug 
candidate  for  further  testing  among  a  list  of  numerous  compounds,  each  of  which  performed 
similarly  in  an  initial  laboratory  experiment,  the  scientists  are  likely  to  move  forward  with  a 
compound from the list, even if the most promising ones were ruled out as unpatentable.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 239–47.  On many occasions, however, there is no second-best alternative.  
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related as to be therapeutic substitutes, it is unclear why firms would shift 
resources over from an unpatentable drug to a patentable one.  The R&D side 
of the pharmaceutical industry is highly competitive,
255 and firms should be 
expected to pursue all drug candidates with anticipated net positive returns, 
not just the drugs with the highest anticipated net returns.  Unless firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry are for some reason unable to borrow money or are 
experiencing long-term labor shortages,
256 their decisions to drop a particular 
drug from development due to weak patent protection should have little ef-
fect on their decisions to develop other types of drugs.  When pharmaceutical 
companies  screen unpatentable drugs out of their pipelines, therefore, the 
public should not expect to receive other drugs in their places.  The loss of an 
unpatentable drug is simply that: a loss. 
The social costs of losing such drugs likely far outweigh any benefits to 
the  public  from  faster  access  to  inexpensive  generics  of  the  unpatentable 
drugs that actually reach the market.  As noted above, pharmaceutical com-
panies rigorously screen the drugs in their pipelines to exclude ones with 
weak patent protection, which suggests that the vast majority of those drugs 
are  never  made  available  to  the  public.
257    Of  course,  some  unpatentable 
drugs are developed despite their lack of protection, sometimes because the 
manufacturer mistakenly believed that the drug was adequately covered by a 
patent,
258 and sometimes because of unusual circumstances under which it is 
 
Discovery,  6  NATURE  REVIEWS:  DRUG  DISCOVERY  29,  32  (2007)  (reporting  that  in  the 
antimicrobial  field,  high-throughput  screening  for  drug  candidates  often  results  in  few  or  no 
acceptable “hits”).  Moreover, even if a second- or third-choice compound is available, by forcing 
the  firm  to  work  on  a  more  flawed  compound,  the  patent  system  significantly  reduces  the 
probability of ultimate success in producing a safe and effective drug.  “Indeed, finding a suitable 
starting molecule is often the most challenging feature of the search” for new drugs.  Mitscher & 
Dutta, supra note 39, at 104. 
255. See Scherer, supra note 17, at 29–33 (explaining how competitive R&D behavior among 
pharmaceutical companies has lowered profits). 
256. It  is  unlikely  that  drug  development  in  the  large  pharmaceutical  companies  is  being 
stymied by a shortage of capital.  Capital restraints might cause a pharmaceutical company to treat 
drug candidates as competing investment opportunities within a single budget year.  See BARTFAI & 
LEES, supra note 135, at 58.  However, those firms have access to the capital markets, and generally 
have  good  credit  ratings.    See  Standard  &  Poor’s,  A  Better  Prognosis  for  Big  Pharma, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM,  May  4,  2006,  http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2006/pi 
20060504_807192.htm (listing the eight major U.S. pharmaceuticals, each having a Standard & 
Poor’s  credit  rating  of  “A!”  or  higher).    Consequently,  pharmaceutical  companies  should  be 
expected to adjust their annual budgets, if need be by borrowing money, to ensure that they can 
develop all of the profitable drugs identified by their researchers.  Capital restraints might be more 
important for smaller biotechnology companies, where financing is often less predictable.  Also, it 
is possible that pharmaceutical companies—both big and small—are leaving profitable drugs on the 
table because the companies lack the human capital necessary for pursuing all of the profitable 
drugs in their pipelines.  In the long run, however, assuming that the labor market is functioning 
properly, the demand for workers should lead more people to enter the industry. 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 223–46, 250–56, 258–64. 
258. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text (discussing the development of Ultracet
®).  
Mistakes  like  these  are  likely  rare,  however,  since  pharmaceutical  companies  use  redundant 
checks—at  least  three  independent  reviews—to  screen  out  unpatentable  drugs.   See  supra  text 552  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
profitable to develop the drug without patent protection.
259  If these drugs had 
been patented, it would have taken years longer for generics to enter the 
market, and consumers would have suffered.  So long as private industry 
screens  the  bulk  of  unpatentable  drugs  out  of  development,  however,  the 
harm caused by their loss likely dwarfs any benefits from faster access to 
generics.
260 
Despite the seemingly great magnitude of this injury, it has gone largely 
unnoticed  by  the  public  because  of  the  early  stage  at  which  most  unpat-
entable drugs are screened out of development.  Pharmaceutical companies 
do not announce the drug candidates that they choose not to develop, in-
cluding the ones dropped on account of a prior disclosure that undermined 
their patent protection.  While industry insiders acknowledge that many such 
drugs exist,
261 the decisions to discard them are made behind closed doors.  
On occasion the public might catch a glimpse of one of these drugs, such as 
when the PTO rejects a drug-patent application for lack of novelty or for 
obviousness.  These PTO decisions, of which there have been many,
262 can 
 
accompanying notes 223–35.  When companies mistake a patentable drug for an unpatentable one, 
there are no built-in redundancies to prevent those drugs from being discarded.  As a result, there 
should be far fewer instances of firms unwittingly developing an unpatentable drug compared with 
mistakes made in excluding patentable drugs.  On balance, therefore, these mistakes likely harm the 
public. 
259. Pharmaceutical  companies  are  sometimes  willing  to  develop  “orphan  drugs”  without 
patent protection because they cost less to develop and market and are guaranteed seven years of 
marketing exclusivity.  New drugs receive orphan status if they are approved for the treatment of a 
“rare disease or condition,” defined as those “affect[ing] less than 200,000 persons in the United 
States,” or “for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing . . . a drug for 
such a disease or condition will be recovered from sales.”  21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2000).  Once a 
drug receives orphan status, the FDA will “not approve another application . . . for such drug for 
such disease or condition . . . until the expiration of seven years from the date of approval of the 
approved application.”  Id. § 360cc(a).  Compared with other drugs, orphan drugs are typically less 
expensive to develop because they require fewer clinical trials to secure FDA approval, complete 
their  clinical  trials  over  a  year  earlier  on  average,  and  are  approved  faster  by  the  FDA.    See 
Christopher-Paul Milne, Orphan Products—Pain Relief for Clinical Development Headaches, 20 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 780, 782 (2002) (describing the lower number and quicker completion 
time of clinical trials for orphan drugs and listing various ways the FDA speeds up the approval 
process for orphan drugs).  Moreover, because orphan drugs are generally prescribed by a small 
group of specialty physicians and have little competition from existing therapies, they cost much 
less to commercialize than ordinary drugs.  See id. at 783 (stating that due to market advantages, 
marketing is even cheaper than R&D for orphan drugs relative to mainstream drugs).  As a result, 
industry executives report that private industry is sometimes willing to develop an orphan drug with 
only  the  seven-year  period  of  market  exclusivity.   See  Telephone  Interview  with  Anonymous, 
Senior Intellectual Prop. Counsel, supra note 231; Telephone Interview with Declan Doogan, supra 
note 252 (both noting that for drugs that treat rare diseases, the seven years of marketing exclusivity 
provided under the Orphan Drug Act is sometimes enough for the company to move forward). 
260. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
261. Telephone  Interview  with  Anonymous,  Dir.  of  Intellectual  Prop.,  supra  note  229; 
Telephone  Interview  with  Anonymous,  Senior  Intellectual  Prop.  Counsel,  supra  note  231;  cf. 
Telephone Interview with Brian J. Druker, supra note 40 (commenting as an academic researcher 
who has worked with private industry). 
262. E.g.,  Ex  parte A m e s ,  N o .  2 0 0 7 - 1 1 3 8 ,  2 0 0 7  W L  1 0 3 3 5 1 4 ,  a t  * 1 – 4  ( B . P . A . I .  M a r .   2 8 ,  
2007); Ex parte Selzer, No. 2006-0760, 2007 WL 630222, at *1, *3–6 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 28, 2007); Ex 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  553 
 
 
end private industry’s efforts to develop the claimed drug.
263  Even under 
these circumstances, however, the injury to the public is usually obscured by 
the absence of clinical-trial data on the drug’s safety and efficacy,
264 prevent-
ing the public from knowing which of the drugs ultimately would have been 
approved by the FDA and how valuable those drugs would have been.  The 
public-health consequences of the novelty and nonobviousness requirements 
thus remain largely unobservable. 
There can be exceptions, of course, such as when the government funds 
its own clinical trials on an unpatentable drug, providing evidence of health 
benefits the public would have been receiving if private industry had devel-
oped the drug earlier.  One notable example involves the drug finasteride and 
its use in the prevention of prostate cancer.  The PTO held that this use for 
the drug was not novel because finasteride had already been developed as a 
treatment for benign enlarged prostates,
265 and anyone who used it for that 
purpose would inherently (i.e., unknowingly) benefit from its chemopreven-
tative effects.
266  With little incentive for pharmaceutical companies to invest 
 
parte  Arbiser,  No  2007-0091,  2007  WL  952197,  at  *4–7  (B.P.A.I.  Feb. 6,  2007);  Ex  parte 
Skurkovich, No. 2006-0624, 2006 WL 1665596, at *3–8 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2006); Ex parte Gormley, 
No. 2004-0543, 2004 WL 4980874, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 29, 2004); Ex parte Bodmer, No. 2001-
1044, 2004 WL 77132, at *2–6, *9 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex parte Lapuerta, No. 2003-1745, 2004 
WL  318776,  at  *2–3  (B.P.A.I.  Jan. 1,  2004);  Ex  parte  Feldmann,  No.  2002-0253,  2003  WL 
25281968, at *5–6 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 21, 2003); Ex parte Saito, No. 94-4009, 1999 WL 33230062, at 
*5–6 (B.P.A.I. June 9, 1999). 
263. When  the  PTO rejects  a  patent application  on  a  drug  for  lack  of  novelty,  it  does  not 
necessarily mean that the applicant will drop its research into the claimed drug since the applicant 
may  have  other  ways  of  securing  patent  protection  over  the  drug.    For  example,  in Ex  parte 
Hofmann, the PTO rejected the claims on a compound for treating HIV but allowed the claims on a 
method of using that compound for the treatment of HIV.  No. 1999-0729, 1999 WL 33548892, at 
*4–6 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 14, 1999).  Although these method-of-use patents are considered weaker than 
patents  on  the  compounds  themselves,  see  Anton  Hopen,  Intellectual  Property  in  Drug 
Development: A Report from a Breakout Session, 25 RETINA, at S95, S95 (Supp. 8 2005), and 
pharmaceutical companies are more likely to develop a drug when they have a patent on its active 
ingredient,  SCHACTER,  supra  note  39,  at  50,  method-of-use  patents  can  sometimes  provide 
sufficient protection to allow companies to develop drugs.  VOET, supra note 243, at 35–39.  In 
many  of  the  PTO  decisions  cited  above  and  throughout  this  Article,  however,  the  rejections 
encompassed  the  method  of  using  the  claimed  drug,  which  often  leaves  little  room  for 
pharmaceutical companies to draft an effective patent. 
264. Cf. A VORN, supra note 113, at 46–64 (discussing the difficulty in evaluating a drug’s 
therapeutic properties without randomized and placebo-controlled clinical trials). 
265. The FDA approved finasteride as a treatment for benign prostatic hyperplasia, although it 
is not widely prescribed for that purpose.  See Christopher S. Saigal et al., Economic Evaluation of 
Treatment Strategies for Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia—Is Medical Therapy More Costly in the 
Long Run?, 177 J. UROLOGY 1463, 1464 (2007) (finding that less than 10% of patients treated for 
benign prostatic hyperplasia are given finasteride). 
266. In re Gormley, No. 1997-2801, 2001 WL 1049136, at *3, *3–4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2001) 
(explaining that the mere discovery of “a new benefit of an old process cannot make the process 
again patentable”).  The PTO has rejected other drug patents on the same grounds of inherent 
anticipation, including an HIV drug and a drug for raising HDL (“good”) cholesterol levels.  E.g., In 
re Williams, No. 2005-0902, 2005 WL 4773220, at *4 (B.P.A.I. June 22, 2005); In re Levin, No. 
2004-1391, 2004 WL 1697793, *2–4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004). 554  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
in  this  newly  discovered  yet  non-novel  therapy,
267  the  National  Cancer 
Institute stepped in and funded its own clinical trial,
268 demonstrating that 
finasteride  reduces  the  incidence  of  prostate  cancer  in  men  age  fifty-five 
years and older by almost 25%.
269  Although there were concerns at first that 
finasteride might increase the risk for high-grade prostate cancer,
270 recent 
studies suggest the opposite,
271 and experts have grown increasingly confi-
dent that wider use of finasteride would significantly reduce the morbidity 
and mortality caused by prostate cancer.
272  Publicly funded research of this 
sort  is  often  slow  to  influence  physician  practices,
273 h o w e v e r ,  a n d  t h e  
 
267. Without patent protection, private industry was unlikely to ever fund clinical trials on 
finasteride’s chemopreventative benefits.  Even with a patent, however, industry would probably be 
reluctant to fund those trials without significant financial support from the public sector.  Cf. Ronald 
B. Herberman et al., Cancer Chemoprevention and Cancer Preventive Vaccines—A Call to Action: 
Leaders of Diverse Stakeholder Groups Present Strategies for Overcoming Multiple Barriers to 
Meet an Urgent Need, 66 CANCER RES. 11540, 11541–47 (2006) (discussing the various barriers to 
private investment in chemoprevention).  Clinical trials on chemopreventative drugs are not only 
expensive, they also take about five years longer on average than most other clinical trials, which 
shortens  their  effective  patent  lives  and  thus  deters  pharmaceutical  companies  from  developing 
them.  Id. at 11546.  With a patent, however, private industry might have invested in further clinical 
trials to resolve unanswered questions about the drug and market it to physicians. 
268. Press Release, Nat’l Cancer Inst., First Prostate Cancer Prevention Drug Found, But Not 
All Men Benefit: NCI Announces Results of Prostate Cancer Prevention Trial (June 24, 2003), 
available at http://www.cancer.gov/newscenter/pressreleases/PCPTresults. 
269. Ian M. Thompson et al., The Influence of Finasteride on the Development of Prostate 
Cancer, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 215, 217 (2003). 
270. E.g.,  Philip  Kantoff,  Prevention,  Complementary  Therapies,  and  New  Scientific 
Developments in the Field of Prostate Cancer, 8 REVIEWS IN UROLOGY, at S9, S10 (Supp. 2 2006); 
Peter T. Scardino, The Prevention of Prostate Cancer—The Dilemma Continues, 349 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 295, 295–96 (2003). 
271. E.g.,  Vahagn  R.  Ashughyan  et  al.,  Chemopreventive  Trials  in  Urologic  Cancer,  8 
REVIEWS IN UROLOGY 8, 12 (2006); Charles Bankhead, New Finasteride Trial Results Aim to Curb 
Controversy, 98 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1104, 1105 (2006); Anthony V. D’Amico & Claus G. 
Roehrborn, Effect of 1 mg/day Finasteride on Concentrations of Serum Prostate-Specific Antigen in 
Men with Androgenic Alopecia: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 8 LANCET ONCOLOGY 21, 24 
(2007);  Ian M.  Thompson  et  al.,  Effect  of  Finasteride  on  the  Sensitivity  of  PSA  for  Detecting 
Prostate Cancer, 98 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1128, 1133 (2006); J.F. Thorpe et al., A Review of 
Phase III Clinical Trials of Prostate Cancer Chemoprevention, 89 ANNALS ROYAL C. SURGEONS 
ENG. 207, 208–10 (2007). 
272. E.g.,  Edith  Canby-Hagino  et  al.,  Looking  Back  at  PCPT:  Looking  Forward  to  New 
Paradigms in Prostate Cancer Screening and Prevention, 51 EUR. UROLOGY 27, 32 (2007); Yair 
Lotan et al., Implications of the Prostate Cancer Prevention Trial: A Decision Analysis Model of 
Survival Outcomes, 23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1911, 1919 (2005); Mark A. Rubin & Philip W. 
Kantoff,  Effect  of  Finasteride  on  Risk  of  Prostate  Cancer:  How  Little  We  Really  Know,  91  J. 
CELLULAR BIOCHEMISTRY 478, 482 (2004). 
273. See  Elana  Hayasaka,  President’s  Cancer  Panel  Suggests  Ways  to  Accelerate  Cancer 
Treatment Advancements, 97 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 956, 956 (2005) (claiming that the current 
process  for  disseminating  new  treatment  information  to  doctors  and  the  public  is  “largely 
ineffective”);  Darren  K.  McGuire  et  al., Influence  of  the  Bypass  Angioplasty  Revascularization 
Investigation  National  Heart,  Lung,  and  Blood  Institute  Diabetic  Clinical  Alert  on  Practice 
Patterns: Results from the National Cardiovascular Network Database, 107 CIRCULATION 1864, 
1864, 1867–69 (2003) (finding that a large, publicly funded clinical trial comparing the survival 
benefits of surgical revascularization and balloon angioplasty for diabetic patients had limited or no 
impact on physician practices despite its publication and the release of a “Clinical Alert” that went 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  555 
 
 
concerns over high-grade cancer still deter most physicians from prescribing 
finasteride  as  a  prophylactic.
274    While  a  pharmaceutical  company  would 
likely have greater success in promoting finasteride,
275 none of them have an 
incentive to fund studies that would resolve lingering questions about the 
drug’s safety, to seek FDA approval for its use in preventing prostate cancer, 
or to market the therapy to physicians.  Without these commercialization 
efforts, it may be years before the medical community reaches a consensus 
on the appropriate role for this unpatentable therapy.
276 
 W h e n e v e r   t h e   p a t e n t   r u l e s   p r e v e n t   t h e   i n t r o d u c t i o n   o f   a   n e w   d r u g   o r  
therapy,  or  even  just  delay  it,  as  may  be  happening  with  finasteride,  the 
injury to the public can be severe.  Over 200,000 men will be diagnosed with 
prostate cancer in the United States this year, and over 27,000 will die from 
the disease.
277  If finasteride works as many experts anticipate, then the cur-
rent delay in its use could be causing thousands of unnecessary deaths.
278  
This is not the only example of a potentially valuable but unpatentable ther-
apy  the  public  is  not  using.    Untold n u m b e r s  o f  o t h e r  d r u g s  h a v e  b e e n  
screened out of development by pharmaceutical companies for reasons re-
lated to their patentability, perhaps including drugs for HIV, cancer, heart 
disease, stroke, diabetes, malaria, tuberculosis, and diarrhea
279—conditions 
that afflict and kill millions of people each year.
280  Losing an effective treat-
ment for any one of those conditions would be a tragedy, even if it offered 
only minor improvements in health outcomes. 
 T h e   p u b l i c   r e l i e s   o n   t h e   p a t e n t   s y s t e m   t o   p r o m o t e   p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  
innovation, encouraging not just the invention of new drugs, but also their 
development and commercialization.  When the system fails, and private in-
dustry  is  given  little  incentive  to  invest  in  developing  and  marketing 
 
out  to  physicians); cf. A VORN,  supra  note  113,  at  269–72  (discussing  some  of  the  difficulties 
physicians face in keeping up with the constant flood of new research on drugs). 
274. See  Bankhead,  supra  note  271,  at  1104;  Sarah L.  Zielinski,  Despite  Positive  Studies, 
Popularity of Chemoprevention Drugs Increasing Slowly, 96 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1410, 1410 
(2004) (both noting doctors’ continued reluctance to prescribe finasteride). 
275. Cf.  Michael  Privitera,  Large  Clinical  Trials  in  Epilepsy:  Funding  by  the  NIH  Versus 
Pharmaceutical  Industry,  68  REVIEWS/EPILEPSY  RES.  52,  56  (2006)  (referencing  the 
pharmaceutical industry’s superior ability to inform physicians about the results of clinical trials).  
Pharmaceutical companies are in the business of influencing physician practices, and—for better or 
worse—they are very good at it.  See, e.g., AVORN, supra note 113, at 292–312 (discussing the 
effectiveness of pharmaceutical-industry marketing strategies). 
276. Telephone Interview with Ian M. Thompson, M.D., Professor, Chairman of the Dep’t of 
Urology, Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Center at San Antonio (Nov. 27, 2006). 
277. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2007, at 4 (2007). 
278. Joseph M. Unger et al., Estimated Impact of the Prostate Cancer Prevention Trial on 
Population Mortality, 103 CANCER 1375, 1380 (2005). 
279. See supra notes 141–47, 215–20 and accompanying text. 
280. E.g., JOINT U.N. PROGRAM  ON HIV/AIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC 
UPDATE: DECEMBER 2006, at 1 (2006); WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES: 
A VITAL INVESTMENT 2"3, 6 (2005); Alan D. Lopez et al., Global and Regional Burden of Disease 
and Risk Factors, 2001: Systematic Analysis of Population Health Data, 367 LANCET 1747, 1751 
(2006). 556  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
potentially valuable new drugs, the public can suffer tremendous loss.  The 
widespread  practice  among  pharmaceutical  companies  of  screening  their 
drug candidates to remove ones with insufficient patent protection indicates 
that these losses are likely real.  Current patent policy, which withholds pat-
ent protection from drugs because they lack novelty or are obvious, therefore 
poses a substantial threat to the public’s well-being. 
V.  Solutions 
Patent  reform  is  now  a  popular  subject  among  scholars  and  policy 
makers,  but  the  calls  for  reform  rarely  seek  additional  protections  for 
pharmaceuticals.
281  Pharmaceuticals are actually thought to be one of the 
few places where the patent system is effective at promoting innovation.
282  
Since the patent system seems to be failing for many other industries,
283 sev-
eral scholars have suggested adopting technology-specific patent rules to deal 
with the distinct attributes of different technologies.
284  Others favor a system 
of unitary patent laws and often advocate for stricter enforcement of the ex-
isting patent standards.
285  With rare exception,
286 however, neither side of 
this debate has focused on ways of improving the U.S. patent system for 
drugs,
287 believing that its role in identifying and rewarding valuable drugs is 
largely  a  success  story  and,  except  for  some  concerns  over  evergreening 
patents,
288 should be left untouched.
289  Scholars have overlooked how the 
 
281. See Robert A. Armitage, The Conundrum Confronting Congress: The Patent System Must 
Be Left Untouched While Being Radically Reformed, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 268, 
268–73 (2006) (discussing sweeping reform efforts to disable or diminish patent remedies); Clarisa 
Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 45–47 (2008) (detailing ongoing statutory 
reforms to the U.S. patent system, none of which call for increased protection for pharmaceutical 
patent owners). 
282. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 14–16; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 39–41; 
Armitage, supra note 281, at 269–70; Scherer, supra note 38, at 6–7.  The most common call for 
drug-patent reform is to crack down on patent evergreening, where firms try to extend the patent 
lives on their drugs.  E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1687; Scherer, supra note 38, at 28–29. 
283. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 14–16; Scherer, supra note 38, at 41. 
284. See, e.g., William Fisher, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property: How the Laws of 
Intellectual Property Have Grown—and Grown Apart, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2004, at 24, 29–
31  (discussing  the  merits  of  the  disaggregation  of  intellectual  property  law);  Peter S.  Menell, 
A Method for Reforming the Patent System 14 (Berkeley Center for Law and Tech., Paper No. 34, 
2007), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/34 (suggesting reforms that would “afford 
different  classes  of  patentable  subject  matter  different  requirements  or  remedies”); cf. B u r k  &  
Lemley, supra note 20, at 1634–38 (arguing against industry-specific patent legislation). 
285. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 204, 203–05 (“[D]ifferential treatment is hard to 
implement, because as soon as patentees in a particular category get [special] treatment . . . there 
will  be  an  inevitable  tendency  for  people  to  position  themselves  to  get  the  most  favorable 
treatment.”); Long, supra note 281, at 49 (“[I]ndustry-level differentiation should not be written into 
the statute.”). 
286. See infra note 293. 
287. See supra note 281. 
288. See supra note 115. 
289. E.g., Armitage, supra note 281, at 270; cf. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 256–57 
(“[P]atents have worked best where boundaries can be staked in verifiable physical characteristics, 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  557 
 
 
patent standards suppress pharmaceutical innovation by limiting patents to 
innovative new ideas for drugs such that the system offers no incentive for 
the development of socially valuable drugs that were disclosed or made to 
look promising in earlier publications. 
 C o n g r e s s   h a s   s e v e r a l   t o o l s   a t   i t s   d i s p o s a l   t o   e n c o u r a g e   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t  
of these drugs, including patent-law reforms, direct government funding of 
clinical  trials,  and,  most  promisingly,  market-exclusivity  awards  enforced 
through the FDA.  Subpart V(A) outlines changes to the novelty and nonob-
viousness requirements that would prevent drugs from falling into the public 
domain prematurely and notes several drawbacks to this approach.  Subpart 
V(B) discusses Congress’s possible role in financing the development of un-
patentable drugs, and how presently the government is generally incapable of 
successfully prosecuting this task.  Subpart V(C) argues that the best way to 
motivate the development of unpatentable drugs is through FDA regulations.  
Although pharmaceutical companies now rely on the patent system to recoup 
their R&D investments, typically requiring ten or more years of market ex-
clusivity on the products they develop,
290 the FDA could provide this same 
period  of  exclusivity  by  simply  postponing  its  regulatory  approval  of 
generics.  Since the FDA’s clinical-trial requirements are the reason why 
firms  rarely  develop  drugs  without  protection  from  generic  competitors, 
FDA-administered exclusivity periods link the reward of exclusivity with the 
need for that protection, offering a convenient fix for the patent system’s in-
adequacies in promoting drug development. 
A.  Patent Reform 
  Perhaps the most obvious solution to the problem of unpatentable drugs 
is to make those drugs patentable again.  Congress could carve out an ex-
emption in the novelty and nonobviousness standards for drugs that must be 
proven safe and effective in clinical trials before they can be sold to the 
public.
291  This legislative response would likely have costs, however.  Such 
a dramatic change in the novelty and nonobviousness requirements might 
open the door to abusive patenting strategies and could even be considered 
unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent.  More modest re-
forms in the patent standards might avoid these problems but would only 
 
like  small  molecules.”);  Scherer,  supra  note  38,  at  29,  27–30  (“A  plausible  argument  can  be 
advanced that the [Hatch–Waxman] Act [and patent system] shaped an ideal compromise in terms 
of stimulating pharmaceutical innovation.”). 
290. See  Telephone  Interview  with  Anonymous,  Dir.  of  Intellectual  Prop.,  supra  note  229 
(explaining  that  firms  typically  invest  in  a  new  drug  only  if  they  expect  at  least  ten  years  of 
marketing exclusivity); cf. Grabowski, supra note 37, at 21 (discussing how a statutory five to 
seven-and-a-half-year floor of exclusivity for new drugs is generally insufficient for firms to recoup 
their R&D investments). 
291. Congress adopted a version of this approach for certain biologic drugs in 1996, inserting a 
special  provision  in  the  nonobviousness  statute  to  safeguard  the  patentability  of  particular 
biotechnological processes.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000). 558  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
help to incent the development of a much smaller group of drugs.  Patent re-
forms are therefore a second-best solution. 
 T o   a d d r e s s   t h e   p r o b l e m s   c a u s e d   b y   t h e   n o v e l t y   a n d   n o n o b v i o u s n e s s  
standards,  Congress  could  amend  those  rules  to  ensure  that  drugs  can  be 
patented if they must still complete the FDA’s clinical-trial requirements.  
With respect to the novelty requirement, it could carve out an exception that 
allows researchers to patent drugs that have not yet been developed and are 
not otherwise covered by a valid patent or pending patent application.
292  The 
nonobviousness requirement could be similarly adjusted to provide that a 
drug is not obvious unless there is no longer any need for it to be tested in 
rigorous clinical trials to satisfy the FDA’s safety and efficacy standards.  
Indeed, Congress could explicitly tie the nonobviousness standards for phar-
maceutical patents to the FDA’s regulatory requirements, such that a drug is 
nonobvious if it must complete the full panoply of FDA-required clinical tri-
als before the public can benefit from its use.
293  In circumstances where the 
FDA will approve a new drug based almost entirely on clinical-trial data 
submitted for another drug, as it does with generics and certain formulation 
changes in existing drugs, then the traditional nonobviousness test (or per-
haps a much stricter one) would be appropriate. 
 O n e   p r o b l e m   w i t h   t h e s e   p r o p o s a l s   f o r   a m e n d i n g   t h e   n o v e l t y   a n d  
nonobviousness requirements is that they might be difficult to implement 
 
292. It  is  possible  that  this  rule  might  violate  the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which states that “patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable  without  discrimination  as  to . . . the field  of  technology . . . .”    Agreement  on  Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, art. 27(1), 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1634.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. patent laws already contain certain industry-specific provisions designed to 
benefit the pharmaceutical industry, such as an exemption in the nonobviousness requirement for 
certain types of biotechnology patents, 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000), and patent-term extensions for 
pharmaceuticals, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).  The reason why these provisions have not yet been 
challenged is likely because the TRIPS provision can only be enforced through the World Trade 
Organization’s  (WTO)  dispute-resolution  procedures,  which  require  a  challenge  from  another 
member country.  See TRIPS, supra, art. 64(1).  The only remedy the WTO can provide is to 
authorize the challenger to impose trade sanctions against the violating member.  Id.  With respect 
to the law proposed above, which would exempt certain pharmaceutical patents from the novelty 
requirement, there is a chance that the law could be challenged by a country with a substantial stake 
in  the  generic-drug  industry,  such  as  India  or  Israel.    See  generally S HIMON  AMSELEM,  THE 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL  INDUSTRY  IN  ISRAEL  1–10  (2002),  http://www.touchbriefings.com/down 
load.cfm?fileID=545&action=downloadFile  (describing  Israel’s  growing  biotechnology  market); 
William Greene, The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical Industry and Implications for the U.S. 
Generic Drug Market 1–2 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Office of Econ. Working Paper No. 2007-05-
A, 2007), available at http://www.usitc.gov/ind_econ_ana/research_ana/research_work_papers/doc 
uments/EC200705A.pdf (presenting an overview of India’s pharmaceutical industry).  However, 
since the existing industry-specific patent provisions in U.S. law have not yet been attacked, the 
threat of such a challenge may be limited. 
293. Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have argued that the PTO already has authority to adopt 
regulations allowing it to grant patents on obvious inventions when patents are necessary to promote 
their development, citing gene therapies as an example of where this might be appropriate.  See 
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 170, at 308. 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  559 
 
 
without  inadvertently  allowing  firms  to  engage  in  abusive  patenting 
strategies.  Both requirements play an important role in limiting the scope of 
the patents that issue, preventing firms from asserting monopoly power over 
too  wide  an  expanse  of  technology.
294    To  prevent  overly  aggressive 
patenting, therefore, Congress would have to carefully tailor the proposed 
exemptions so that firms could only claim non-novel or obvious drugs in nar-
row patents.  The statute would have to walk a delicate line, allowing patent 
claims on drugs that are strong enough to prevent generic competitors from 
entering the market,
295 but not so strong as to prevent other pharmaceutical 
companies from pursuing related lines of research.
296  Other problems might 
also arise from changing the novelty and nonobviousness requirements, such 
as pharmaceutical companies’ using the new provisions to evergreen their 
drug patents by using new patent filings to block generic entry after their 
original patents expire.
297  Pharmaceutical companies have been very creative 
in their litigation tactics,
298 and any dramatic alterations to the patentability 
standards are likely to produce unexpected results. 
 A n   a d d i t i o n a l   c o n c e r n   w i t h   m o d i f y i n g   t h e   n o v e l t y   a n d   n o n o b v i o u s n e s s  
requirements to allow the patenting of undeveloped drugs is that it might be 
unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent.  Congress can only 
use the patent system to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts,”
299 and 
according  to  the  Supreme  Court,  this  rule  prevents  Congress  from 
“authoriz[ing] the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain.”
300  Since the Court has said the purpose 
of the novelty and nonobviousness requirements is “to exclude from consid-
eration  for  patent  protection  knowledge  that  is  already  available  to  the 
public,”
301  those  two  doctrines  may  be  constitutional  limitations  on 
Congress’s power to authorize the grant of patents.  As a result, the courts 
might strike down a law that permits the patenting of any old or obvious 
inventions, even a law directed toward drugs that are unlikely to reach the 
public without patent protection. 
 
294. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 65, at 383 (arguing that the prohibition on claiming 
subject matter contained in the prior art “is one of many examples of the way patent law attempts to 
tailor the magnitude of the reward to the inventor . . . to the social value of the inventor’s technical 
contribution”). 
295. See F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 927, 927 (2004) (“Drug patents provide particularly strong protection against competition 
from other companies because even a slightly different molecular variant must undergo the full 
panoply of clinical tests required by the FDA.”). 
296. One possible approach to crafting such a statute would be to tie the exemptions for non-
novel and obvious drugs to the FDA regulations governing the approval of generic products and the 
definition of a “bioequivalent” drug.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2000). 
297. See Derzko, supra note 115, 185–87 (discussing “evergreening” strategies previously used 
by the pharmaceutical industry). 
298. Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 348–49. 
299. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
300. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
301. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989). 560  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
There  are  other  doctrinal  reforms  that  would  partially  resolve  the 
problem  posed  by  the  novelty  requirement  without  running  afoul  of  the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Patent Clause, such as changing the 
law to make it harder for drugs to fall into the public domain.  One of the 
most significant problems with the current novelty doctrine is the ease with 
which it allows seemingly trivial disclosures to anticipate later filed patents 
on a drug.
302  This hair-trigger approach to the novelty doctrine is often to 
blame for the new drugs that fall into the public domain prematurely.
303  If 
Congress wishes to preserve the patentability of those drugs, it could simply 
increase the amount of information that must be disclosed about a drug be-
fore  it  is  considered  not novel.    In particular, Congress could am end the 
novelty requirement to ensure that pharmaceutical patents cannot be antici-
pated by prior disclosures unless those disclosures would themselves have 
been sufficient to support a patent on a drug.  This reform would resolve only 
some of the problems caused by the novelty requirement,
304 however, and 
none of the problems caused by the nonobviousness standard.  Additionally, 
since the heightened novelty requirement imposed by courts has been useful 
in blocking certain evergreening strategies, the courts might need to craft 
other doctrines to block those potentially abusive litigation techniques.
305 
 T h e   l o s s   o f   d r u g s   c a u s e d   b y   t h e   c u r r e n t   n o v e l t y   a n d   n o n o b v i o u s n e s s  
requirements  is  a  serious  problem,  and  Congress  would  be  justified  in 
reforming the patent laws to ensure that those doctrines no longer deter the 
development of socially valuable drugs.  These reforms would come at a 
price,  however,  and  the  most  effective  reforms  might  actually  be 
unconstitutional.  Modifying the novelty and nonobviousness requirements to 
avoid the problem of unpatentable drugs is therefore a second-best solution. 
B.  Direct Government Funding 
  Rather than relying on patent reforms to promote the development of 
socially  valuable  drugs  that  currently  cannot  be  patented,  Congress  itself 
could finance the development of those drugs.  This approach would allow 
generic manufacturers to enter the market immediately after a drug is ap-
proved  by  the  FDA,  saving  consumers  from  the  high  prices  of  patented 
drugs.  Unfortunately, the government lacks the capacity to reliably develop 
 
302. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra notes 91–113 and accompanying text. 
304. For  example,  many  of  the  drugs  disclosed  by  academic  researchers  in  scientific 
publications  might  still  be  considered  not  novel  under  this  proposed  rule.    Moreover, 
pharmaceutical companies and universities sometimes make inadvertent mistakes in their efforts to 
patent a drug by, for instance, creating a sufficient disclosure of the invention but failing to follow 
through on their patent application.  See, e.g., In re Weichselbaum, No. 09/545,071, 2006 WL 
4494416, at *2 (Comm’r Pat. May 3, 2006) (ruling that the assignees, the University of Chicago and 
the  Dana  Farber  Cancer  Institute,  abandoned  the  patent  application  when,  due  to  a 
miscommunication with their attorneys, they failed to reply to a PTO rejection of the application). 
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these drugs since it would be unable to identify most of them or complete 
their preclinical development, has a history of grossly underfunding clinical 
research, and usually fails to effectively disseminate knowledge of publicly 
developed therapies to medical practitioners.  Without a dramatic overhaul of 
the  current  system  for  financing  pharmaceutical  R&D,  therefore, 
government-funded  drug  development  is  not  a  feasible  solution  to  the 
problem of unpatentable drugs. 
The most intuitively appealing strategy for promoting the development 
of drugs that cannot be patented under the novelty and nonobviousness re-
quirements is for the government to directly fund the clinical trials needed 
for their approval by the FDA.  Information about the safety and efficacy of 
drugs is a classic example of a public good.
306  If the government were to 
produce that information on its own, allowing drug companies to manufac-
ture and sell old or obvious drugs without having to invest in clinical trials, 
the lack of patent protection would cease to be a problem.  Moreover, since 
these drugs would still be in the public domain, people would have access to 
them at generic prices right away and thus would be shielded from the hard-
ship caused by the higher prices of patented drugs.  In theory, therefore, the 
public  would  be  best  served  by  a  system  where  the  government  directly 
funded the necessary clinical trials on unpatentable drugs, as opposed to re-
lying  on  the  award  of  monopoly  rights  to  encourage  private  industry  to 
develop them. 
As a practical matter, however, there are a number of reasons why the 
government is probably incapable of reliably developing and commercializ-
ing these drugs.  First, in most cases the government would find it difficult to 
identify the old or obvious drugs to develop.
307  Those drugs may have been 
disclosed to the public in some sense, but their potential value is often known 
only to the pharmaceutical companies that chose not to develop them.  It is 
unlikely  that  those  companies  would  hand  over  such  drugs  to  the 
government, especially when it has taken on the role of a competing drug 
developer.  Without that assistance, the government would probably find no 
more than a handful of the old or obvious drugs discarded by industry.
308 
Second, even if the government were to know about the unpatentable 
drugs that private industry discards, those drugs are typically screened out of 
 
306. Public  goods  are  defined  by  their  non-rivalrous  nature,  such  that  “each  individual’s 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that 
good.”  Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 
387 (1954). 
307. There might be a few exceptions, such as an obvious controlled-release version of an 
existing drug. 
308. Perhaps  the  government  could  offer  rewards  to  private  industry  for  disclosing  the 
unpatentable  drugs  that  they  would  have  developed  but  for  the  absence  of  patent  protection.  
Establishing such a reward system would be complicated, however, because the government would 
need a reliable way of linking its reward to the actual value of the drug.  If such a reward system 
were ever devised, it is unclear why its use would be limited to unpatentable drugs. 562  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
development during early preclinical research, and the government is poorly 
equipped to complete that preclinical work.  At least two of the three patent 
screens that pharmaceutical companies run their drugs through occur before 
they have finished, or even begun, the preclinical development work needed 
to evaluate and improve their pharmacological properties.
309  This stage of 
research is not only an essential step in the drug-development process,
310 it is 
also one of the most complicated and difficult steps of the entire process,
311 
and government laboratories are not set up for this work.
312  The human and 
technological capital necessary for developing a lead compound into a drug 
ready for clinical trials and wide-scale production is located almost exclu-
sively in the private sector,
313 and neither government nor academia could 
easily replicate that infrastructure.
314  The government therefore lacks the 
technological capacity to develop most of the unpatentable drugs that phar-
maceutical companies drop from their pipelines. 
 T h i r d ,   i t   i s   d o u b t f u l   C o n g r e s s   w o u l d allocate sufficient funds for the 
development of unpatentable drugs.  Although the potential benefits from 
government  financing  of  clinical  research  are  substantial,
315  funding  for 
government-sponsored  clinical  trials i s  c h r o n i c a l l y  i n  s h o r t  s u p p l y ,
316 a n d  
recent spending cuts reflect Congress’s unwillingness to commit necessary 
resources to important clinical research.
317  Private industry likely underin-
 
309. See supra text accompanying notes 223–28. 
310. MacCoss & Baillie, supra note 225, at 1811. 
311. See Galli & Faller, supra note 130, at 689; MacCoss & Baillie, supra note 225, at 1812 
(both giving examples of difficulties encountered during early drug development). 
312. “Academic and government laboratories . . . are rarely organized . . . to embrace the drug 
discovery process in the multidisciplinary fashion[,] . . . that is the modern paradigm by which new 
hits or leads are . . . transformed into new viable medicines.”  MacCoss & Baillie, supra note 225, at 
1813. 
313. See J o h n  S .  L a z o ,  Roadmap  or  Roadkill:  A  Pharmacologist’s  Analysis  of  the  NIH 
Molecular Libraries Initiative, 6 MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 240, 241 (2006) (asserting that most 
academic centers lack the medicinal-chemistry experience found in the private sector that is “needed 
to refine lead structures into biologically useful substances and to scale up synthesis to enable full 
biological characterization”). 
314. Martina  Casenghi  et  al.,  New  Approaches  to  Filling  the  Gap  in  Tuberculosis  Drug 
Discovery, 4 PLOS MED. 1722, 1724 (2007). 
315. See S. Claiborne Johnston et al., Effect of a US National Institutes of Health Programme of 
Clinical  Trials  on  Public  Health  and  Costs,  367  LANCET  1319,  1324  (2006)  (finding  that  the 
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke’s program that invested in clinical trials 
generated  major  health  benefits  that  had  a  much  greater  value  than  the  costs  of  the  increased 
expenditures). 
316. See, e.g., Jennifer Couzin, Tight Budget Takes a Toll on U.S.-Funded Clinical Trials, 315 
SCIENCE 1202, 1202–03 (2007); Mike Mitka, Scientists Warn NIH Funding Squeeze Hampering 
Biomedical  Research,  297  JAMA  1867,  1867  (2007);  Charlie  Schmidt,  Public  vs.  Private?: 
Cooperative Groups  Say NCI Trials  Funding  Inadequate;  Some  Turn  to  Industry, 99  J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 830, 830–32 (2007); Nancy S. Sung et al., Central Challenges Facing the National 
Clinical  Research  Enterprise,  289  JAMA  1278,  1284  (2003)  (all  documenting  the  effects  of 
shortfalls in government funding for clinical trials). 
317. Joseph Loscalzo, The NIH Budget and the Future of Biomedical Research, 354 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1665, 1665–66 (2006); Mitka, supra note 316, at 1867. 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  563 
 
 
vests in clinical trials as well because the social costs of clinical trials are 
often much lower than their private costs—which sometimes include the en-
tire cost of medical care for study participants even though most of them 
would otherwise be receiving alternative medical treatments paid for by their 
insurer
318—and monopoly profits from the sale of patented drugs are lower 
than  their  social  value.
319    Nevertheless,  the  public  still  relies  on  private 
industry to finance the bulk of clinical research.
320  There is little reason to 
believe that the funding would be adequate if Congress were tasked with 
paying for the development of non-novel or obvious drugs. 
  Fourth,  assuming  that  the  government  funds  clinical  trials  on 
unpatentable drugs and establishes their safety and efficacy, that research can 
fall on deaf ears without private industry to promote it.  Unlike pharmaceuti-
cal companies, who aggressively market their products, the government is 
often  content  with  publishing  research  outcomes  in  medical  journals,
321 
which  frequently  have  a  limited  impact  on  physician  practices.
322  T h e  
government-funded  clinical  trial  on  the  use  of  finasteride  for  cancer 
prevention,  described  in  Part  IV,  appears  to  be  an  example  of  where  the 
government’s failure to market a potentially life-saving drug is delaying (or 
perhaps preventing) its widespread use.
323  There are likely other examples as 
well,  including  the  slow  pace  at  which  the  medical  profession  adopted 
antibiotics as a treatment for ulcers.
324  Although pharmaceutical marketing 
 
318. See Charles L. Bennett et al., Clinical Trials: Are They a Good Buy?, 19 J. CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY 4330, 4330 (2001) (describing barriers to insurance reimbursement for participation in 
clinical trials); Dana P. Goldman et al., Incremental Treatment Costs in National Cancer Institute-
Sponsored Clinical Trials, 289 JAMA 2970, 2974–75 (2003) (finding that in government-funded 
clinical trials for cancer research, the total cost of the trials is only 6.5% higher than the cost of care 
those patients would have received outside of the trials). 
319. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 33, at 529. 
320. Hamilton Moses III et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 JAMA 1333, 
1335 (2005). 
321. See A VORN,  supra  note  113,  at  292–94  (contrasting  the  dense  reviews  provided  by 
medical journals with the engaging advertisements created by pharmaceutical companies that urge 
members of the public to ask their physicians for specific prescriptions). 
322. See supra note 273. 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 282–93.  The government-funded clinical trials on 
tamoxifen for preventing breast cancer might be another example.  See Liz Savage, Researchers 
Wonder Why High-Risk Women Are Not Taking Chemoprevention Drugs, 99 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 913, 913–14 (2007) (discussing, among other factors, lack of promotion as one explanation 
for the relatively low rate of tamoxifen use). 
324. Researchers first discovered that most peptic ulcers could be cured with antibiotics in 
1982, but because those antibiotics were “off-patent,” the researchers found it difficult to find a 
sponsor for testing the treatment in clinical trials.  See Marshall, supra note 106, at 199.  After a few 
years, the researchers were able to run a number of studies and confirm the effectiveness of the 
antibiotic treatment.  Id. at 187–201.  Nonetheless, the pharmaceutical companies holding patents 
on acid-reducing drugs “effectively drowned out much of the [antibiotic-treatment] research by 
funding hundreds of acid reduction trials.”  Id. at 199.  Even after the NIH issued a consensus 
statement  in  1994,  a  decade  later,  stating  that ulcers  should  be  treated  with  a  combination  of 
antibiotics and acid-reducing drugs, NIH Consensus Development Panel, supra note 106, at 67–68, 




325 the failure to promote valuable new drugs can be just as 
bad when it prevents those drugs from being used.
326 
 F o r   t h e s e   r e a s o n s ,   a n d   p e r h a p s   o t h e r s ,   t h e   g o v e r n m e n t   i s   i l l - s u i t e d   t o   t h e  
task of developing and commercializing unpatentable drugs.  This is not to 
say that the government could never play a more direct role in the financing 
of drug development.  It is possible that Congress could implement elaborate 
reforms  to  overcome  the  problems  with  government  funding  identified 
above, such as instituting some sort of payment or reward system to encour-
age private industry to develop drugs that cannot be patented.  If such a 
system were to be created, however, it is unclear why it should be limited to 
only unpatentable drugs, rather than attempting to eliminate the deadweight 
loss caused by drug patents more generally.  These types of policy proposals 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
C.  FDA-Administered Exclusivity Periods 
 I n   t h e   e n d ,   t h e   b e s t   w a y   f o r   C o n g r ess to promote the development of 
unpatentable drugs is through the FDA, by requiring the agency to withhold 
regulatory approval from generics for long enough to replicate the protection 
normally provided by patents.  These FDA-administered exclusivity periods 
could fill the gaps left by the novelty and nonobviousness requirements by 
guaranteeing an adequate period of market exclusivity to any drug that suc-
 
to a lack of awareness of its effectiveness.  See Thomas Breuer et al., How Do Clinicians Practicing 
in  the  U.S.  Manage  Helicobacter  Pylori-Related  Gastrointestinal  Diseases?:  A  Comparison  of 
Primary  Care  and  Specialist  Physicians,  93  AM.  J.  GASTROENTEROLOGY  553,  559–60  (1998) 
(examining  different  causes  of  the  “delayed  adoption”  of  the  new  treatment  by  primary-care 
physicians).  In the practice of medicine, “[p]harmaceutical marketing is the most important source 
of knowledge about new drugs for most physicians,” AVORN, supra note 113, at 292, and up until 
1996, when the manufacturer of Prilosec
® secured FDA approval for the Prilosec
®-plus-antibiotic 
combination as a treatment for ulcers, there was no one to market the NIH-recommended treatment 
to physicians.  See MAE THAMER ET AL., PHYSICIAN PRESCRIBING AMONG PRIVATELY INSURED 
PEPTIC  ULCER  DISEASE  PATIENTS  16–17  (1999),  available  at  http://www.mtppi.org/pdfs/pud_ 
paper.pdf (stating that the lack of marketing for the two-drug treatment limited its availability prior 
to 1996); H. Pylori Treatment Recognized by FDA, 53 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1229, 1229 
(1996) (reporting FDA approval of the two-drug regimen for ulcer treatment).  It was not until the 
late  1990s  that  most  physicians  were  treating  ulcer  patients  in  a  manner  consistent  with  NIH 
recommendations.  See Virender K. Sharma & Colin W. Howden, A National Survey of Primary 
Care Physicians’ Perceptions and Practices Related to Helicobacter Pylori Infection, 4 J. CLINICAL 
GASTROENTEROLOGY 326, 329 (2004); Roger J. Zoorob et al., Practice Patterns for Peptic Ulcer 
Disease: Are Family Physicians Testing for H. Pylori?, 4 HELICOBACTER 243, 246–47 (1999).  It is 
likely that this change is at least partially attributable to the marketing efforts behind Prilosec
®.  H.J. 
O’Connor,  Helicobacter  Pylori  and  Dyspepsia:  Physicians’  Attitudes,  Clinical  Practice,  and 
Prescribing Habits, 16 AILMENT PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 487, 493 (2002). 
325. See  generally J OHN  ABRAMSON,  OVERDO$ED  AMERICA:  THE  BROKEN  PROMISE  OF 
AMERICAN  MEDICINE  (2004)  (detailing  the  deleterious  effects  of  the  commercialization  of  the 
medical profession and the concentration of power in the pharmaceutical industry); ANGELL, supra 
note 180, at 115–72 (arguing that the pharmaceutical industry’s marketing strategies are largely 
deceptive and abusive). 
326. This problem might be most severe when a non-novel or obvious drug developed by the 
government must compete against patented drugs being marketed by pharmaceutical companies. 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  565 
 
 
cessfully completes the FDA’s clinical-trial requirements.  Congress could 
implement this proposal with only modest changes to existing law, because 
the FDA is already required to impose short delays on generic manufacturers.  
Solving the problem of unpatentable drugs simply requires lengthening those 
existing  regulatory  delays.    Moreover,  since  the  FDA’s  regulatory 
requirements are themselves what drive much of the need for protection in 
the pharmaceutical industry, linking the reward of exclusivity to successfully 
completing clinical trials is a sensible approach to promoting innovation. 
  While  pharmaceutical  companies  currently  rely  on  the  market 
exclusivity afforded by patents to recoup their R&D investments, Congress 
could use the FDA to provide roughly the same level of protection.  Generic 
drugs cannot be sold to the public without FDA approval, and Congress can 
build  automatic  delays  into  that  process—lasting  ten  or  more  years—to 
mimic the effects of strong patent protection.
327  A lengthy exclusivity period 
administered by the FDA should provide nearly the same inducement for 
pharmaceutical innovation as do patents and thus solve the problems created 
by the novelty and nonobviousness requirements.
328 
  Fortunately,  the  basic  framework  for  these  FDA-administered 
exclusivity periods is presently in place;
329 Congress just needs to lengthen 
certain  regulatory  delays  that  already  exist  under  current  law.    When 
Congress first authorized abbreviated regulatory review for generic drugs in 
1984,
330 exempting generics from the FDA’s clinical-trial requirements,
331 it 
required the FDA to wait between five and seven-and-one-half years after 
approving most new drugs before allowing generics onto the market.
332  It is 
 
327. Because  these  FDA-administered  periods  of  exclusivity  are  essentially  trade-secrecy 
provisions  protecting  the  clinical-trial  data  submitted  by  pharmaceutical  companies  and  do  not 
guarantee market exclusivity, see infra note 332, they probably would not be subject to any possible 
constitutional limitations on Congress’s patent power. 
328. See Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European Union 
Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 484–85 (2004) (noting that marketing-exclusivity periods can 
encourage the development of unpatentable drugs). 
329. Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 359–61. 
330. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch–Waxman) Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 35 
U.S.C.). 
331. The  FDA will  approve  a  generic  drug without  clinical-trial  evidence  of  its  safety  and 
efficacy if the generic is “bioequivalent” to a drug that the FDA already approved.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A) (2006) (setting out the requirements for an abbreviated application for approval of a 
new  drug  that  is  bioequivalent  to  an  approved  drug);  id.  § 355(j)(8)(B)  (defining  the  term 
“bioequivalent”). 
332. The duration of FDA-enforced exclusivity depends on the drug at issue.  If a new drug 
contains an active ingredient that was previously approved by the FDA, then it receives only three 
years of data exclusivity.  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).  During that three-year period, the FDA will 
not approve generic versions of the drug in its new form, or labeled for its new use, unless the 
generic applicant relies upon its own clinical-trial data in support of the application.  Id.  If a new 
drug  does  not  contain  any  previously  approved  active  ingredients,  then  it  is  known  as  a  new 
molecular entity (NME), and it receives five years of data exclusivity.  Id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).  For 
NMEs, the effective duration of that five-year period varies depending upon whether it is patented.  566  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:503 
 
 
unclear  whether  these  regulatory  delays  were  designed  to  encourage  the 
R&D of unpatentable drugs,
333 or—more likely—simply to coordinate the 
timing of patent challenges by generic drug manufacturers.
334  In either case, 
there is compelling evidence that the current periods of FDA-administered 
exclusivity are inadequate
335 because pharmaceutical companies continue to 
 
When an NME is patented, and the patent holder files an infringement lawsuit against the generic 
competitors trying to enter the market, the FDA will withhold its approval of the generic product for 
seven and one-half years following the NME’s initial approval.  Id.  When the NME is not patented, 
the FDA begins to accept applications for generics as soon as the five-year period expires.  Id.  
Since it takes the FDA an average of sixteen months to approve an application for a generic drug, 
the five years of exclusivity usually turns into six and one-third years of protection.  See STEVEN K. 
GALSON, 2006 CDER UPDATE 11 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/galson/2006 
/StanfordWashResGrpAnnualMtJan182006.pdf (showing an average of sixteen months to approve 
an application for a generic drug).  In each of these cases, generic companies can bypass the FDA-
enforced exclusivity periods by submitting their own clinical-trial data.  The only exception is for 
“orphan” drugs, which receive a different form of protection.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (providing 
protection for drugs for rare diseases or conditions); see also supra note 259. 
333. These  regulatory  delays  may  have  been  designed  to  encourage  the  development  of 
unpatentable drugs.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 29 (1984) (describing the regulatory delays 
in the context of unpatentable drugs).  Yet scholars and policymakers have (until now) been unable 
to identify categories of unpatentable drugs that would justify the delays.  See, e.g., Junod, supra 
note 328, at 484–85 (questioning the assumption that some drugs cannot satisfy the requirements for 
a  patent).    Indeed,  it  was  widely  assumed  that  any  drug  that  fails  to  satisfy  the  patentability 
requirements deserves little or no protection.  E.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
PROPRIETARY  RIGHTS  IN  PHARMACEUTICAL  INNOVATION:  ISSUES  AT  THE  INTERSECTION  OF 
PATENTS AND MARKETING EXCLUSIVITIES 14 (2006), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
RL33288_20060228.pdf. 
334. The existing FDA-administered exclusivity periods may serve primarily the interests of 
generic manufacturers.  The Hatch–Waxman Act rewards the first generic company to successfully 
challenge a drug patent with 180 days of being the only (unauthorized) generic on the market.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  This bounty system creates a race among generic companies to be the 
first to file a patent challenge.  Absent the five-year exclusivity period provided in the Hatch–
Waxman Act, competition among generic companies would force them to file their challenges as 
early as possible.  The successful companies would likely be launching their generic products just a 
few years after the original drug first entered the market.  Even the most successful drugs typically 
do  not  reach  blockbuster  status  until  after  their  fourth  or  fifth  years,  however,  usually  after 
substantial marketing efforts.  See Henry Grabowski et al., Returns on Research and Development 
for  1990s  New  Drug  Introductions,  20  PHARMACOECONOMICS  11,  17–18  (Supp.  3  2002).  
Consequently,  the  market-exclusivity  provisions  in  the  Hatch–Waxman  Act  force  generic 
companies to delay their patent challenges in a way that likely increases their industry’s profits; cf. 
Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their 
Usefulness?:  A  Political,  Legislative  and  Legal  History  of  U.S.  Law  and  Observations  for  the 
Future, 39 IDEA 389, 406 (1999) (explaining that the five-year exclusivity periods in the Hatch–
Waxman Act “did not deprive generic manufacturers of any important economic right since there is 
no real incentive to develop a generic drug until a market has been established”). 
335. See Grabowski, supra note 37, at 21 (“Only drugs with sales revenues in the top decile of 
new  introductions  would  generally  earn  enough  to  recoup  the  mean  R&D  investment  within  7 
years.”).  According to several industry executives interviewed for this Article, the FDA-enforced 
periods of market exclusivity are generally insufficient to justify the expense of developing and 
commercializing a new drug.  See Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Dir. of Intellectual Prop., 
supra note 229 (explaining that the FDA-enforced exclusivity periods alone are rarely sufficient for 
a  pharmaceutical  company  to  move  forward  on  a  drug  project);  Telephone  Interview  with 
Anonymous,  Senior  Intellectual  Prop.  Counsel,  supra  note  231  (stating  that  seven  years  of 
exclusivity is sometimes sufficient, although most often it is not); cf. Telephone Interview with 2009]  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability  567 
 
 
screen drugs with weak patent protection out of their pipelines.
336  If the 
existing market-exclusivity periods were long enough to make unpatentable 
drugs a profitable investment, then private industry should already be devel-
oping them, even if the expected profit is less than what firms would receive 
from patented drugs.
337  Consequently, although it is difficult to calculate the 
precise  optimal  length  of  exclusivity  for  drugs,
338  there  is  a  very  high 
probability that the optimal length is longer than the current five to seven-
and-one-half years.  By lengthening that period to somewhere between ten 
and fourteen years, Congress would at least provide a rough substitute for 
patent protection
339 and thus eliminate the distortions arising from the nov-
elty and nonobviousness requirements.
340 
  Compared to patents, these FDA-administered exclusivity periods would 
be  a  more  sensible  tool  for  promoting  the  development  of  unpatentable 
drugs, because the reward of exclusivity is given in exchange for satisfying 
the FDA’s regulatory requirements, and those requirements are the primary 
reason why exclusivity is necessary.  The FDA requires new drugs to be 
proven safe and effective in clinical trials before they can be marketed, which 
involves tremendous cost and risk.  At the same time, the FDA permits ge-
neric  competitors  to  enter  the  market  without  satisfying  those  regulatory 
requirements, allowing them to free ride upon the pharmaceutical companies’ 
investments in clinical trials.  Whenever the FDA requires that a drug be 
proven  safe  and  effective  in  clinical  trials  before  entering  the  market, 
therefore,  some  guarantee  of  market  exclusivity  is  likely  necessary  to 
encourage its development.
341  Conversely, if a non-novel or obvious drug 
can enter the market without extensive clinical-trial testing, then this lengthy 
award  of  exclusivity  may  be  unnecessary.    FDA-administered  exclusivity 
periods link the promise of market exclusivity with the need for that protec-
tion and are thus a logical approach to promoting investment in clinical trials. 
  Other  adjustments  to  these  FDA-administered  periods  of  market 
exclusivity  might  further  improve  the  incentives  for  pharmaceutical 
innovation.    The  duration  of  exclusivity  awarded  under  a  regulatory 
 
Declan Doogan, supra note 252 (explaining that the seven years of market exclusivity for orphan 
drugs is only occasionally sufficient for firms to develop them). 
336. See supra text accompanying notes 223–52. 
337. See  supra  text  accompanying  notes  255–56.    Under  some  circumstances  firms  might 
discard unpatentable drugs even if the current five to seven-and-one-half years of exclusivity are 
adequate for them to recoup their R&D investment, e.g., if the industry is facing severe, long-term 
resource constraints (perhaps a skilled-labor shortage) that forces firms to invest in only the most 
profitable drugs available.  See supra note 256. 
338. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1813,  1842–44  (1984)  (noting  the  difficulty  in  calibrating  the  optimal  patent  length  for  an 
invention). 
339. See supra note 290. 
340. Generics typically do not enter the market until ten to fourteen years after the initial launch 
of the brand-name drug.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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regime—as opposed to the less flexible patent system—could be tailored in 
accordance with the varying R&D costs and risks of different drugs.  In fact, 
since the exclusivity periods would be awarded in exchange for satisfying the 
FDA’s regulatory requirements, and those regulatory requirements are the 
primary reason why drug development is so costly, the FDA is in a unique 
position to link the duration of market exclusivity to the burden of meeting 
its own requirements.  Longer and more expensive clinical trials likely re-
quire more protection, whereas shorter and cheaper trials could be motivated 
by a briefer period of exclusivity.
342  Additionally, the FDA could discourage 
the  development  of  me-too  drugs  by  withholding  the  market-exclusivity 
rewards—or  even  regulatory  approval—from  new  drugs  until  there  is 
clinical-trial evidence documenting their therapeutic advantages over older 
drugs.
343  It is unclear whether such a policy would benefit the public,
344 but 
it certainly makes more sense to use the FDA for this task than the PTO, 
which has neither the institutional expertise nor the experimental data neces-
sary for making these judgments soundly.
345 
  The only significant problem with the FDA-enforced exclusivity periods 
is that they might permit wasteful development races in clinical research, but 
this problem could be avoided.  If no single firm is given the exclusive rights 
to develop a drug, multiple competing firms could decide to run clinical trials 
on it at the same time in the hopes of being the first to receive FDA approval.  
The FDA could easily prevent such races, however, because firms cannot 
begin testing a drug in clinical trials without the FDA’s approval,
346 so the 
FDA could give its approval to only one firm.
347  So long as the FDA guards 
against these development races, its ability to block entry by generic com-
petitors is the most promising strategy for avoiding the harm now caused by 
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. 
 
342. Interestingly, the patent system currently does the exact opposite.  The twenty-year patent 
term runs from the date when the patent is filed, which occurs during early preclinical research for 
most drugs.  As a result, the longer a drug is in development, the shorter its effective patent life 
becomes, even though the need for protection is likely greater. 
343. See ANGELL, supra note 180, at 240, 240–42 (“Food and Drug Administration regulations 
should require that new drugs be compared not just with placebos but with old drugs for the same 
conditions.” (emphasis omitted)).  But see AVORN, supra note 113, at 365 (“The FDA struggles 
mightily  just  to  answer  the  much  easier  question  of  whether  a  drug  is  probably  better  than 
nothing . . . .  For subtler questions of comparative risk-benefit ratio, . . . the rules of evidence are 
much less well worked out.”); Wertheimer et al., supra note 183, at 78–79 (arguing that having 
multiple drugs within a class is beneficial to the public). 
344. See supra note 192. 
345. See supra text accompanying notes 184–92. 
346. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(a)–(b) (2008). 
347. In the event that the initial firm fails to develop the drug, the FDA could allow another one 
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VI.  Conclusion 
The record of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is one of the 
patent system’s crowning achievements, and it can probably take credit for 
much of the $55.2 billion spent by private industry on pharmaceutical R&D 
in 2006 alone.
348  Nonetheless, there remains considerable room for improve-
ment  in  the  system.    While  many  commentators  extol  the  virtues  of 
pharmaceutical patents in promoting innovation,
349 and other scholars criti-
cize those patents for providing too much protection for drugs,
350 they have 
all overlooked how the patent system often fails to provide any protection to 
valuable medicines.  These unpatentable drugs are generally ignored by pri-
vate industry, and as a result, they rarely reach the public. 
This  stunning  failure  in  innovation  policy  is  caused  by  the  patent 
system’s novelty and nonobviousness requirements, which have been crafted 
under the flawed assumption that patents are only needed to promote the 
creation of inventions, not their development or commercialization.  Under 
current law, once the idea for a drug has been disclosed to the public or be-
comes obvious, that drug is no longer patentable.  Without private industry to 
develop that idea into an FDA-approved drug, however, the public is unlikely 
to ever benefit from its use.  Since pharmaceutical companies rarely invest in 
drugs  without  patent  protection,  the  novelty  and  nonobviousness  require-
ments take on a pernicious role in the industry: Seemingly trivial disclosures 
of drugs often prevent those drugs from later being patented and developed; 
the drugs that appear most likely to be effective in early research are singled 
out as being obvious and are therefore discarded by private industry; and the 
scientific advances that allow researchers to more easily identify promising 
drug  candidates  become  the  basis  for  withholding  patent  protection  from 
those drugs. 
These ill-conceived doctrines have a direct and negative impact on the 
investment decisions made by private industry, causing pharmaceutical com-
panies  to  screen  otherwise  promising  drugs  out  of  development  due  to 
perceived inadequacies in their patent protection.  The public rarely learns of 
these drugs, of course, because they are seldom developed for medical use.  
The detrimental consequences of the novelty and nonobviousness require-
ments  thus  remain  mostly  hidden  from  public  view.    In  light  of  the 
tremendous benefits that pharmaceuticals often provide to society, however, 
 
348. See Press Release, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA), R&D Spending by U.S. 
Biopharmaceutical Companies Reaches a Record $55.2 Billion in 2006 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at 
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349. See supra notes 1–2. 
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there is great cause for concern.  Congress should prevent these harms by 
modifying  FDA  regulations  to  ensure  that  newly  approved  drugs  receive 
adequate protection in the form of automatic regulatory delays imposed upon 
generic competitors. 